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 My guiding question is this: how does what is metaphysically differ from what 
was, will be, or might have been?  The first half of the dissertation concerns ontology: 
are the apparent disputes over the existence of merely past, merely future, and merely 
possible entities genuine and nontrivial disputes?  After demarcating the various positions 
one might take in these disputes, I argue that the disputes are, in fact, genuine.  I then 
offer—in the second half of the dissertation—a limited defense of presentism, the view 
that only present things exist.  In particular, I defend presentism against one of the most 
significant classes of objections to it—the class of objections claiming that it cannot 
account for a variety of past-oriented truths.  In giving this defense, I draw on insights 
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Chapter 1. Temporal and Modal Ontology
1.1 Introduction
There are many things: airplanes, cats, chairs, mountains, etc.  And there were many 
things: dinosaurs, Neanderthals, Julius Caesar, the Library of Alexandria, etc.  And 
(hopefully) there will be many things: lunar bases, flying cars, friendly nanobots, a cure 
for cancer, etc.  Finally, there might have been many things: an eighty-pound cat, a 
winged horse, a chair made of emerald, a city where everyone is trilingual, etc.  
 How do these four categories of things differ among each other?  It should be easy 
to start a list.  Present things—things such as airplanes and chairs—are available to us.  
We can see them and touch them.  But things that merely were or will be—things such as 
the tallest Neanderthal in history or the first human lunar base—are unavailable.1  As 
much as we wish to shake hands with a towering Neanderthal or gaze upon the grandeur 
of a lunar base, these things are beyond our grasp and beyond our sight.  In these 
respects, merely past and future things differ radically from present things.  And insofar 
as the philosophical status of non-present things affects the status of the past and the 
future themselves, then we should allow that the present is different from the past and the 
future.
 Yet this is not to say that the past and future are together of a kind.  Far from it, 
differences between the past and the future are numerous.  Three examples.  First, the 
1
1 I use the locutions ‘things that merely were’, ‘merely past things’, etc. to mean ‘ things that existed but do 
not exist presently’.  And similarly for ‘things that merely will be’, ‘merely future things’, etc. 
past is, by some important measure, closed and irrevocable whereas the future is, by 
some equal measure, open and malleable: We seem able to affect the course of the future 
yet we cannot affect that of the past.2  Second, we can remember what happened in the 
past but not what will happen in the future.  To expand the point somewhat, although we 
can come to remember the past by first observing the present, and although we may 
attempt to predict the future (or certain aspects of it), the future nevertheless seems in 
some fundamental sense beyond our ken.  And third, the past, but not the future, causally 
affects us: Neanderthals, e.g., have causally affected the contents of present-day 
encyclopedias but future human space colonies have not.3,4  
 Non-actual possibilities diverge more radically from the present still.  Though an 
emerald chair is a genuine metaphysical possibility—there genuinely could have been 
one, say, if there had been a sufficiently rapacious king with a love of emerald objects—
we cannot perceive any such chair in the least.  We cannot causally affect such a merely 
possible chair nor can it causally affect us.  Merely possible objects strike us—or they 
should strike us—as somehow more remote than merely past and future ones.  
(‘Remoteness’, of course, here captures a type of conceptual rather than spatiotemporal 
distance.)
2
2 At least the past and the future strike us as being this way.  Specifying, in a rigorous way, precisely what 
“being closed” and “being open” consist in is no small matter.
3 And by this I mean nothing more than: Neanderthals existed and were casually implicated in a chain of 
events that contributed to the contents of encyclopedias.
4 The the first two differences (irrevocability and memory) seem to depend crucially on the third difference
(the forward direction of causation), yet they are not the same differences.
 But, perhaps not surprisingly, some philosophers have denied that there are 
genuine, deep differences between the past, the present, the future, and the merely 
possible.  (Not surprisingly, because philosophers have often made work of denying what 
seems intuitively clear and defending what seems counterintuitive.)  In the philosophy of 
time,  B-theorists claim that there is no objective present and hence no objective, 
metaphysically-significant distinction between the present and the non-present.5  And in 
the philosophy of modality, modal realists claim that there is no objective actual world 
and hence no objective, metaphysically-significant distinction between the actual and the 
non-actual.6  Just what these views amount to will be of key importance to the present 
discussion.
 Since it is helpful for a sustained philosophical discussion to be explicit about its 
guiding question(s)—its “Big Question(s)”, we might say—here is one of mine:
(The Big Metaphysical Question)  How does what is metaphysically differ from 
what was, will be, or might have been?
Many sorts of answers to The Metaphysical Question are possible.  We could say that the 
present is (or perhaps that present objects are) in principle perceivable whereas the mere 
past, mere future, and merely possible are not.  Or we could answer that whereas the past, 
present, and future are united within a single causal order, the merely possible is causally 
removed from this order.  Both count as answers to The Metaphysical Question, for both 
make metaphysical demarcations among the categories.
3
5 Two prominent defenses of B-theory are Mellor (1998) and Sider (2001).
6 The most prominent defense of modal realism is Lewis (1986).
 However, we may narrow our focus.  For one especially striking class of answers 
to The Metaphysical Question is ontological: what is, was, will be, and might have been 
differ chiefly with regard to whether they exist.  This is not a single answer but rather a 
class of answers.  We could hold that while the present exists, the non-present and the 
merely possible do not.  Or we could hold that while the past, present, and future exist, 
the merely possible does not.  Both of these answers fall within the ontological class, for 
they demarcate solely with regard to existence.  Of course, other, stranger answers also 
fall within the ontological class.  For any combination of ontological views about the 
past, present, future, and merely possible counts as a possible answer to The 
Metaphysical Question.  We could—if we wished—proclaim that the future exists but 
that the past, present, and merely possible do not.  Or that the merely possible alone 
exists.  It is hard, of course, to imagine anyone genuinely accepting such bizarre and 
unmotivated views.  But these are indeed views within the space of ontological answers 
to The Metaphysical Question.
 Let us then narrow The Metaphysical Question to its ontological component7:
(The Big Ontological Question)  What are the ontological differences among what 
was, is, will be, or might have been?
4
7 I assume that The Ontological Question is a proper sub-question of The Metaphysical Question in the 
following sense: Any ontological difference among the past, present, future, and merely possible counts as 
an ipso facto metaphysical difference among them.  Thus, for example, to hold that the present exists but 
the non-present does not is to hold that the present metaphysically differs from the non-present in respect of 
existence.  But not every metaphysical difference among these categories counts as an ontological one.  For 
example, to hold that the present is in principle perceivable but the non-present is not perceivable is to hold 
that they differ metaphysically but not, necessarily, that they differ ontologically.     
This dissertation will investigate both Big Questions.  In particular, it will approach these 
questions from three angles.  First, in the present chapter, I ask what sorts of answers to 
The Ontological Question are possible.  That is, the present chapter demarcates the major 
ontological views about time and modality.  In chapter 2, I investigate the status of The 
Ontological Question itself.  Why believe that The Ontological Question has a significant 
answer?  Why believe that we should ask this question in the first place?  In chapters 
three and four, I examine some implications of answering The Ontological Question in a 
certain way.  In particular, I examine some major arguments against treating the present 
as ontologically special, and I connect these arguments to parallel ones against treating 
the actual as ontologically special.  To employ terminology that we will now explore, this 
chapter and chapter two are concerned, broadly speaking, with understanding what, 
exactly, are the views of presentism and actualism and how these views genuinely differ 
from their rivals.  Chapters 3 and 4 offer a limited defense of presentism—the view that 
everything is present— against some major objections.  In giving this defense, I draw on 
insights from the dispute between modal actualists—those who hold that everything is 
actual—and their rivals. 
 Before proceeding, a brief note about some textual conventions that I adopt 
starting now.  I use italics for emphasis, when introducing new technical expressions or 
names of theories (e.g. modal realism), and to denote propositions (e.g. that Caesar 
crossed the Rubicon).  I use bolded expressions to emphasize a tenseless construction—
e.g. ‘exist’ or ‘is’ to indicate that I mean ‘exist tenselessly’ (‘exist simpliciter’) or ‘is 
5
tenselessly’ (‘is simpliciter’) rather than ‘exist presently’ or ‘is presently’—in cases 
where an incorrect reading might undermine, or render confusing, what I say.  I will 
shortly say more—and I will say much more in chapter two—on what I mean by the 
equivalent terms ‘exist tenselessly’ and ‘exist simpliciter’, as their use is crucial to much 
of what I say.  Finally, a comment on the pronouns ‘he’ and ‘she’.  To entirely avoid their 
use is sometimes difficult or cumbersome.  But to exclusively pick one or the other is to 
potentially engender certain biases.  I therefore choose to alternate my use of these 
pronouns—chapters 1 and 3 get ‘she’, chapters 2 and 4 get ‘he’.  I hope the reader finds 
this alternation not distracting.
 Before turning to the main task—demarcating the ontological views—we take a 
brief but important detour into the metaphysics of tense that will, I believe, prove useful.
1.2 Tense: the A-theory and the B-theory
J.M.E. McTaggart (1908) gave philosophers of time an excellent gift: the distinction 
between the A-series and the B-series.  This distinction amounts to a distinction between 
two fundamentally distinct ways of thinking about time.  A B-series is an ordering of 
events in terms of the relations earlier than (or later than) and simultaneous with.  The B-
series consisting of all the births of famous musicians tells us, for instance, that Elvis’s 
birth was earlier than Buckethead’s and that J.S. Bach’s birth was earlier than both.  
Similarly, a B-time—in effect, a date—is a way of locating events on a B-series.  Elvis’s 
and Buckethead’s births, e.g., have B-times of January 8, 1935 and May 13, 1969, 
6
respectively.  (If a B-series contains all events and B-times whatsoever, we’ll call it the 
B-series.)  
 Now take some event on a given B-series—say, the event of your reading this 
sentence—and bestow upon it the property of being present.  The bestowing of this 
property is sufficient to generate an A-series, an ordering of events in terms of their 
pastness, presentness, or futurity.  An A-series of famous musician births would tell us, 
for instance, that Elvis’s birth is past and—assuming that Elvis turns out to have a famous 
musical great-great-granddaughter—that Elvis’s great-great-granddaughter’s birth is 
future.  Analogously, an A-time is a way of locating and comparing events on an A-series.  
Elvis’s and Buckethead’s births have A-times, as of my writing this, of 77 years past and 
43 years past, respectively.  (Here again, if an A-series contains all events and A-times 
whatsoever, we’ll call it the A-series.)  The A-series/B-series distinction is, put 
differently, a distinction between tensed and tenseless notions of time. 
 McTaggart infamously used the A-series/B-series distinction to argue that time is 
unreal.  In broad strokes, his argument went as follows.  Time requires genuine change.  
But genuine change requires the A-series.  That is, genuine change is possible only if 
events pass from being future to being present to being past.  However, the A-series 
cannot exist—events cannot really go from from future to present to past—for the A-
series is inherently contradictory.  Therefore, genuine change cannot exist, and so time is 
unreal.  Why did McTaggart believe the A-series to be inherently contradictory?  For a 
simple reason: Take any event, E.  If the A-series exists, then E is past, present, and 
7
future.  But nothing can be past, present, and future—these properties are contraries.  
Therefore, the A-series cannot exist.8  
 McTaggart’s argument has proven among the more contentious in metaphysics. 
Contemporary philosophers of time, though they take the A/B distinction seriously, do 
not generally take McTaggart’s conclusion very seriously.  Few if any follow him in 
concluding that time is unreal.  But many take McTaggart’s meditations on time seriously  
insofar as they take McTaggart to have shown us how to distinguish two fundamentally 
opposed views of time, the A-theory and the B-theory.  According to the B-theory, time 
just is the B-series, a tenseless series of events, linked by the primitve relations earlier (or 
later) than and simultaneous with.  On this picture, a metaphysically-complete account of 
time needn’t invoke the primitive (unanalyzable) A-properties of being past, being 
present, or being future.  Rather, B-theorists hold that the B-series is alone sufficient to 
explain temporal order and variation and, hence, to explain time.9  
 B-theorists do not, however, reject all tensed talk.  They may admit that tensed 
truths—e.g. that I am now listening to a Glenn Gould album—are inalienable from 
human thought and language while also maintaining that such truths are reducible to B-
theoretically acceptable ones.  In offering his “token reflexive” B-theory Mellor (1998) 
8
8 Broad (1938: 309-317) called McTaggart’s argument “a howler”.  For reconstructions and evaluations of 
the argument, see also McDaniel (2010), Mellor (1998: 70-83), the papers in Oaklander and Smith (1994), 
and Tooley (1997: 325-331).
9 See Mellor (1998: 70-95).  For B-theorists, change simply involves an object’s instantiating different 
properties at different times—e.g. a poker changes from hot to cold just in case it is hot at one time, t0, and 
then cold at a later time, t1.  The B-theorist thus offers an analog to the spatial view of change—e.g. a road 
changes from straight to curved just in case it is straight at one location, l0, and curved at some other 
location, l1.
claims that B-theorists may allow A-truths (tensed truths), however they will maintain 
that such truths are made true entirely by B-facts, facts about which B-relations hold 
among events or times.  On Mellor’s view, my assertion that I am now listening to a 
Glenn Gould album is made true by the B-fact that my assertion is simultaneous with my 
listening to a Glenn Gould album.10  The B-theory offers, at bottom, a tenseless picture of 
reality, one that makes no use of the metaphysically-special properties of pastness, 
presentness, and futurity.
 According to the A-theory, there is more to time than the B-series: A 
metaphysically-complete account of time must invoke, in addition to the B-series, the 
special property of being present.  Moreover, presentness is not in any way reducible to 
tenseless B-theoretic concepts—a complete account of time requires the “special glow” 
that only the privileged, objective present can provide.  On this picture, my assertion that 
I am now listening to a Glenn Gould album is made true by the A-fact that my listening to 
a Glenn Gould album has the property of being present.11  McTaggart’s legacy might then 
be best  summed up not as his having given us an argument that time is unreal but rather 
as his having given us the highly useful A-theory/B-theory distinction plus a controversial 
argument that the B-theory of time prevails over the A-theory.
 The foregoing suggests general formulations of these two theories of time:
9
10 On B-theoretic reductionism about tense, see also Sider (2001: 12-14), the papers in Oaklander and 
Smith (1994), and Tooley (1997).
11 Similarly, the A-theorist accounts for change—e.g. the change in the hotness of a metal poker—by saying 
that whereas the poker was hot, it is now cold.
(A-theory) Some things have the A-property of being present.  This property is 
genuine and irreducible; it cannot be analyzed in terms of merely B-theoretic 
(tenseless) properties or relations, e.g. earlier than, later than, or simultaneous 
with.
(B-theory)  There are no irreducible A-properties of being past, being present, or 
being future.  Rather, truths involving such tensed concepts are to be understood 
entirely in terms of B-theoretic (tenseless) properties or relations, e.g. earlier 
than, later than, and simultaneous with.12
This formulation of the A-theory states that some things have the property of being 
present.  Which things?  Presumably, A-theorists will hold that B-times instantiate A-
properties—e.g. when April 3, 2103 is the present day, this B-time will instantiate the A-
property of being present.  And while I have also characterized the A-theory/B-theory 
distinction in terms of the intuitive idea that events have tensed properties, this distinction 
could equally be characterized in terms of concrete objects—e.g. tables and chairs and 
dinosaurs and flying cars—having tensed properties.  In both cases, it is natural to say 
that an event (e.g. The Tour de France) or an object (e.g. The Eiffel Tower) instantiates 
the property being present just in case it exists at a moment of B-time that also 
instantiates this property.13  But for the purpose of generally defining the A-theory, what 
10
12 But for a somewhat heterodox view on the distinction between tensed and tenseless theories of time, see 
Tooley (1997: 11-42)
13 Caution is needed, for B-times can be characterized as widely or narrowly as we wish.  For instance, the 
21st century is a B-time, and so is 6:13PM on June 3, 2017.  (On characterizing B-times, see Mellor (1998: 
7-18)).  But if The Eiffel Tower is demolished in 2015—say, to make room for a newer, larger tower—then 
it would be true that The Eiffel Tower existed in the present (21st) century but not true that The Eiffel 
Tower will exist on June 3, 2017 at 6:13PM.  And so it would be false to assert, on June 3, 2017, that The 
Eiffel Tower exists presently on the grounds that it existed in the present century.  We should therefore let 
the relevant principle—that an event or an object instantiates the property being present just in case it exists 
at a B-time that also instantiates this property—be interpreted to mean a maximally narrow B-time (a literal 
moment), e.g. June 3, 2017 at precisely 6:13PM.  If so, then The Eiffel Tower does not count as a present 
object on June 3, 2017, for it does not exist at any of the moments during this day.
matters is just that some category of thing (e.g. times, events, objects) be endowed by the 
A-theorist with the glow of genuine presentness.
 Moreover, while the A-theory is naturally described as one where events, in 
addition to having the A-property of being present, also have the A-properties of being 
past or being future, the most general formulation of the theory should leave out the latter 
properties.  The reason is that, as we shall see, presentists, who say that merely past and 
merely future objects and times are nonexistent, are A-theorists.  Since presentism is 
compatible with there existing no things that have the properties of being past or being 
future, the proper definition of the A-theory should avoid including these properties.14  
But this is no problem.  Whether or not a theory includes the property of being present 
should alone be sufficient to demarcate all versions of the A-theory from all versions of 
the B-theory.  Some versions of the A-theory may additionally say that some things have 
the properties of being past or being future.
 We now turn to the key philosophical task of this chapter: formulating the 
ontological views.  I undertake this task with little if any regard for motivating the views 
themselves; reasons for accepting or rejecting any view will be put on hold.
11
14 As will become apparent, presentism is also compatible, it seems, with things having the properties being 
past and being future, so long as the things in question also have the property being present.  The Eiffel 
Tower, e.g., is something that may, even on presentism, have all three properties, for the Eiffel Tower 
existed, exists, and will exist.  But the crucial point here is that presentism is compatible with nothing 
having the properties being past or being future, for presentism is compatible with all the existing (present) 
objects being such that they did not exist a moment ago and will not exist a moment from now.
1.3 Presentism and its Rivals
We begin with the prima facie intuitively-appealing view that there is something special 
about the present.  It is only present things, we might say, that truly exist.  Call this view 
presentism.15  Presentism is sometimes said to offer a “three-dimensional” view of time 
according to which there is no temporal distance between any two things.16  On this view, 
you and I and all the objects in the universe whatsoever exist at one time and one time 
only: the present one.  Neither the long-dead Roman emperors nor the exciting nano-
swarms of the future exist at any temporal distance from us—these things are simply 
nonexistent, unreal, entia non grata.  On the presentist picture, we can therefore think of 
the universe (the world) as a sort of three-dimensional expanse, extended in space but not 
time.17    
 Presentists are not foes of common sense.  Indeed, presentists are fond of 
claiming that their view is the common-sense, default position.18  Consider the 
historically-demonstrable claim that Julius Caesar existed.  Presentists will embrace this 
12
15 For defenses of presentism, see Bigelow (1996), Crisp (2003), Markosian (2004), Merricks (2007), Prior 
(1970), and Zimmerman (2007).
16 See, for example, Crisp (2007: 130-131).
17 For this reason, presentism is sometimes said to endorse a “momentary” view of existence: only the 
present is real, but the present is just a single moment, and so only a single moment is real.  Whether or not 
this is an accurate characterization of presentism depends, I think, on how the presentist should characterize 
the present.  Is the present indeed just a moment, an infinitesimally-thin “slice” of time?  I will not attempt 
to answer this question, for it takes us afield, and I do not think the answer has much bearing on what 
follows.  
18 Bigelow (1996), Markosian (2004), Merricks (2007: 137-142), and Zimmerman (2007) accord 
presentism with the virtue of common-sense and, hence, the endorsement of “the man on the street”.  (Or, 
at the very least, they treat presentism as being the intuitively plausible view.)  Philosophers notoriously 
differ on the general extent to which this endorsement—like that of the shady politician or the corrupt town 
boss—is worth having.
claim.  They maintain, however, that this claim is not equivalent—or reducible—to the 
claim that Caesar is located at some past temporal region (some past time).19  Thus, the 
truth of that Caesar existed is held to be compatible with Caesar’s nonexistence, and the 
truth of past-oriented claims must generally be understood in some other way—i.e. some 
way other than existing, concrete things being located in the past—or else treated as 
primitive.20  To this end, presentists typically help themselves to tense operators—WAS 
and WILL—that allow them to regiment past- and future-tensed claims in ontologically-
noncommittal ways.  For instance, that Caesar existed is to be understood as something 
like the ontologically-noncommittal WAS(that Caesar exists).21  WAS and WILL are to 
be understood as “slice operators” that represent what was true or will be true at some 
past moment of time—e.g. WAS(that dinosaurs exist) says that at some past moment, 
dinosaurs existed.  (I will say more about these operators later, in §1.5.)  Generally 
speaking, presentists wish to uphold the canon of common-sense and historically-
demonstrable truths, the truths accepted by the average citizen and the truths written 
down in the history books.  
13
19 See Merricks (2007: 123).  Note that as a consequence, presentists will deny that the truth of that Caesar 
existed is grounded by a concretely-existing Caesar who is located in the past.  This has led some to 
criticize presentism for failing to provide truthmakers for past-oriented truths.  This so-called “grounding 
objection” to presentism will be explored at length in Chapter 3.
20 See Bigelow (1996), Bourne (2006), Cameron (2011), Crisp (2007), Keller (2004), Kierland and Monton 
(2007), Merricks (2007: 74-80 and 119-125), Sider (2001: 35-42), Szabó (2007), and Tooley (1997: 
234-240).
21 See Sider (2001: 15).
 Contraries of presentism are said to offer a “four-dimensional” alternative view of 
time.22  The two most prominent such views are eternalism, according to which the past 
and the future are just as real as the existing present, and the growing block view, 
according to which the past and present exist but the future does not.23  Eternalists picture 
the world as an eternally-existing, four-dimensional block where all times are equally 
real.  Growing block theorists pictures the world as a four-dimensional block that 
perpetually grows as time passes.  On eternalism, the flying cars of the future are as real 
as the presently-existing cars that drive on roads; on the growing block, the flying cars 
are not now within the whole of being, though the four-dimensional block will eventually  
grow to include them.  On both views, we should think of the universe (the world) as a 
sort of four-dimensional expanse, extended in both space and time.  Both views say that 
some existing things stand at a temporal distance from us—e.g. on both views, a temporal 
distance of over ten-thousand years separates you and the neanderthals that exist in the 
past.  Though now long dead, the neanderthals are no less real than us—they have no less 
claim to existing—merely in virtue of their temporal location in the past.  
14
22 I here use the term “four-dimensional” to identify views—e.g. eternalism or the growing block view—
about temporal ontology.  But “four-dimensionalism” is sometimes also used to name a certain view about 
persistence through time, viz. one whereby objects persist by having instantaneous temporal parts, e.g., 
Sider (2001).  Yet the issue of temporal ontology is potentially connected to that of persistence.  Merricks 
(1999), for example, argues that a three-dimensional view of persistence (i.e. endurantism) entails a three-
dimensional view of temporal ontology (i.e. presentism).  
23 For defenses of eternalism, see Lewis (1986), Mellor (1998), Rea (2003), and Sider (2001).  For defenses 
of the growing block view, see Broad (1923) and Tooley (1997).
 What relation do these three ontological views have to the A-theory/B-theory 
distinction?  First, presentism entails the A-theory, for presentism requires an objective 
present in order to make an objective distinction between the existing present and the 
nonexistent  non-present.  Second, the growing block also entails the A-theory, for it too 
requires an objective present in order to make an objective distinction between the 
existing (past and present) regions of the block and the nonexistent future.  Without a 
metaphysically-significant notion of the present, neither presentism nor the growing 
block view get off the ground.24  Finally, eternalism entails neither the A-theory nor the 
B-theory, for there are both A-theoretic and B-theoretic versions of eternalism.  
Eternalism plus the B-theory is the view that the world is a tenseless, four-dimensional 
block where all times are equally real and there is no metaphysically-special property of 
presentness.  On this view, my assertion, e.g., that it is now raining serves to locate itself 
within a certain rainy region of the four-dimensional block.  Eternalism plus the A-theory, 
on the other hand, is often called the moving spotlight view.  As before, the world is a 
four-dimensional block where all times are equally real, but now, on top of the block 
15
24 What would a B-theoretic version of presentism or the growing block look like?  Consider two 
individuals in two different eras: J.S. Bach, composing with his harpsichord in 1710, and Buckethead, 
composing with his electric guitar in 2012.  Suppose that both individuals, in a strange act of ontological 
inspiration, utter the sentence “only present things exist”.  Does either speak truly?  By the lights of A-
theoretic presentism, Bach speaks truly in 1710 when his utterance is genuinely present, and Buckethead 
speaks truly in 2012 when his utterance is genuinely present.  But according to B-theorists—who favor a 
reduction of the tenses to purely tenseless notions—there is no real fact of the matter about which assertion 
is present.  The B-theorist says that both musicians, in uttering this sentence, thereby assert something to 
the effect that the only existing things are the things simultaneous with this very utterance.  Since these two 
assertions do not overlap, only one of them (at most) can be true.  Which one, if any, is true?  The answer is 
that, by B-theory lights, there is no principled way of assigning truth to one but not the other assertion.  By 
B-theory lights, both Bach and Buckethead say something false about the region of the tenseless, four-
dimension block that they occupy.  This illustrates, I think, that there is no such thing as B-theoretic 
presentism—the two views are incompatible at heart.  Similar reasoning shows that B-theory and the 
growing block view are incompatible.
itself, we add a special glow of presentness (a spotlight) that moves across the block.  On 
this view, my assertion that it is now raining servers to indicate that the spotlight is now 
pointing at a rainy region of the block.  The moving spotlight is notably the only A-
theoretic view where the special fact of presentness is entirely independent of what 
exists.  For example, on the moving spotlight, when the dinosaurs went extinct and some 
new creatures—say, the mammoths—emerged, the dinosaurs did not cease to exist (they 
remained a part of the block universe) nor did the mammoths begin to exist, but, rather, 
the glow of the spotlight simply moved from one existing epoch (the dinosaur epoch) to 
another existing epoch (the mammoth epoch).
 In formulating these ontological views, it is crucial that we use ‘exist’ to mean 
‘exist simpliciter’ (or, equivalently, ‘exist tenselessly’).  The presentist’s distinctive claim 
is not, after all, the trivially true claim that only present things exist presently (i.e. ‘exist’ 
in the present tense sense), nor is it the demonstrably false claim that only present thing 
existed, exist, or will exist (plenty of non-present things—e.g. dinosaurs—existed).  
Rather, the presentist’s distinctive claim is that only present things exist full-stop (exist 
simpliciter), that only present things are within the whole of reality in an unrestricted 
sense.  Or, at any rate, this is our first pass on presentism.  As we will see, the thesis 
requires refinement.  I consider the issue of existence simpliciter in greater detail in the 
next chapter.  For now, it will suffice to say that formulating presentism—and 
formulating the other views of temporal and modal ontology—requires a tenseless, 
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temporally-unrestricted notion of existence; without such a notion, temporal and modal 
ontology can hardly get off the ground.25
 It is a notable feature of these three ontological views that they disagree about the 
claim that what exists changes over time.  For eternalists, that which exists—that which 
is within the range of our most unrestricted quantifier—is eternally fixed: We can at all 
times quantify over all of what did, does, and will exist throughout the history of the four-
dimensional block universe.  For this reason, we can say that eternalism offers a static 
view of ontology.  But for presentists and growing block theorists, that which exists—
that which is within the range of our most unrestricted quantifier—changes over time.  
According to these views, new objects—objects that were once merely future and hence 
nonexistent—are perpetually coming into existence and hence into the range of the 
unrestricted existential quantifier.  We can therefore call presentism and the growing 
block theory dynamic views of ontology.26  Yet all sides of the debate—presentist, 
eternalist, and growing-block theorist alike—agree that dinosaurs existed is true and that 
dinosaurs exist presently is false.  Generalizing, all sides of the ontological debate should 
agree over the truth-values of tensed existence claims—such claims are just empirical, 
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25 See also Crisp (2004), Sider (2001: 15-17), and Sider (2006).  One additional complication: There are 
arguments against the possibility of talking about (quantifying over) absolutely everything.  See, for 
example, Cartwright (1994) and the papers in Rayo and Uzquiano (2006).  Might such arguments 
undermine the intelligibility of existence simpliciter?  Fortunately, as Sider (2006) points out, the 
intelligibility of the dispute between presentism and its rivals needn’t hinge on the possibility of absolutely 
unrestricted quantification (including quantification over all sets).  Rather, the dispute merely hinges on the 
possibility of quantification over certain sorts of temporal objects, namely, merely past and merely future 
ones.
26 The usage of ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ is similar to that of Tooley (1997: 11-16) who uses ‘dynamic’ to pick 
out views whereby “which states of affairs exist depends on what time it is.”  
non-philosophical existence claims and so cannot serve to distinguish static and dynamic 
views.
 The descriptions of presentism and its contraries as being, respectively, three- and 
four-dimensional is helpful, I think, to grasping what sort of ontological picture they 
paint.  So, I hope, is the contrast between static and dynamic ontological views.  Yet 
given that presentism plays a prominent role in chapters to come, it will be helpful to be 
able to rigorously formulate the view.  Here, then, is our first attempt:   
 (Presentism !)  Only present things exist.
I use ‘thing’ in the most inclusive way possible: Concrete objects, e.g. tables and chairs, 
are things and so are abstract objects, e.g. the universal redness and the number two.  And 
so are events, facts, times, locations, or things of any category you care to name; these are 
all things in my usage.  (This is why, on my usage of ‘thing’, it is redundant to claim that 
only present things and the present time exist.  The present time, whatever it is, is a 
present thing.)
 But there is an immediate problem with treating presentism as the view, simply, 
that only present things exist.  Abstract objects—e.g. the number two—are, on a certain 
natural understanding of abstractness, not to be counted as present things.  Yet neither 
should abstract objects be excluded by the ontology of presentism.  Presentism rules out 
the existence of merely past and future things: dinosaurs, lunar bases, and the like.  
Presentists qua presentists should not rule out the existence of abstract objects, for 
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presentists qua presentists should stay neutral about the ontological status of abstract 
numbers, properties, propositions, and the like.  
 In what sense are abstract things not to be counted as present things?  Take the 
number two.  Supposing it exists, is it a present thing?  In a certain trivial sense, yes.  
After all, if the number two exists, then it is trivially true to say, at the present time, that it 
exists.  Yet this is not the relevant sense of ‘present thing’ at issue in the definition of 
presentism.  It is the temporal location (or lack thereof) of the number two, and not the 
temporal location of any question about the number two, that we wish to know in order to 
settle the ontological question.  And I take it for granted that there are platonic views of 
numbers whereby the number two simply has no location, temporal or otherwise.27  By 
the lights of such views, the following claim is a necessary, a priori truth:
 (1) The number two exists, but it does not exist in the present. 
Such a platonic view of numbers is plainly inconsistent with the claim that only present 
things exist.  But, as we’ve seen, it should not be inconsistent with presentism.  What fix 
is needed?  Apparently, the presentist thesis ought to pertain to temporal objects alone.  
Recall that we previously characterized presentism as offering a three-dimensional view 
of reality in the following sense: no two things stand at a temporal distance.  Might this 
idea offer the needed fix?
 (Presentism ") There is no temporal distance between any two things.
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27 The literature on platonism is enormous.  But see, for example, Linnebo (2009) and Maddy (1990).
Since atemporal objects are not temporally related to anything, they are no exception to 
Presentism ".28  Unfortunately, this revision will not suffice.  Consider a bizarre 
ontologist who we will label “The Extreme Gettysburg Ontologist”.  This ontologist 
believes that only one type of thing exists: just those things that existed at the very first 
moment of the Gettysburg Address, during the American Civil War.29  The Gettysburg 
Ontology is consistent with no two things standing at a temporal distance; on this 
ontology, everything exists at a single moment in the nineteenth century.  The Gettysburg 
Ontologist must believe, oddly enough, that nothing exists presently, on pain of 
conceding that some things exist other than those things that existed at the first moment 
of the Gettysburg Address.  The fact that this ontological view is both ludicrous and 
without an iota of motivation is besides the point.  All that matters for our purposes is that 
it is a view occupying a different position in logical space than presentism.  Since such a 
view is indeed inconsistent with presentism properly understood, Presentism " fails as a 
proper formulation.   
 Rather than treating the presentist thesis as one concerned with the temporal 
distance between objects, we should try simply restricting the thesis to one concerning 
temporal objects:
 (Presentism #)  All the temporal things are present things.
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28 I use ‘atemporal things’ as shorthand for ‘things that exist outside of time’.  Similarly for ‘atemporal 
existence’.
29 Presumably, some moment on the afternoon of Thursday, November 19, 1863.  Ignore the complication 
that, if we are to put on our vagueness hats, we should say that the Gettysburg Address had no determinate 
first moment.  To make the needed point here, all that matters is that our fictional ontologist believe solely 
in entities that exist at some single non-present moment.
This is better.  Presentism # excludes past and future things but not, necessarily, 
atemporal things.  Relatedly, we might ask where Presentism # stands with respect to so-
called meinongian ontology, the thesis that, in addition to there being existing objects, 
there are also nonexistent objects.30  First, we might ask whether meinongianism is 
generally compatible with presentism—could there be a coherent meinongian presentist 
who embraces nonexistent objects?  Second, we might ask whether this meinongian 
presentist takes her meinongian, non-existent objects to be temporal objects and, if so, 
whether she takes them to adhere to presentist strictures.  In the echelon of strange 
philosophical views, meinongianism surely holds lofty rank.  And although I find 
meinongianism to be a strange view indeed, and although I will assume its falsity in the 
chapters to follow, I wish to remain as neutral as possible with respect to its truth when 
formulating presentism.  But, fortunately, Presentism # is entirely silent on whether there 
are nonexistent objects tout court and hence on whether meinongianism is minimally 
true.  For Presentism # constrains meinongianism in only a very minimal way.  Since the 
quantifier involved here—“all of the temporal things”—is meant to quantify 
unrestrictedly over temporal things (and thus, given the truth of meinongianism, to 
quantify over any nonexistent temporal things), Presentism # merely commits the 
meinongian to holding that if her nonexistent objects are temporal objects, then they are 
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30 See Marek (2009).  Meinong’s nonexistent objects include such impossible objects as the round square 
and, perhaps, paradoxical objects such as the liar proposition that this proposition is false.
present ones.31  Since it is unclear whether the meinongian’s nonexistent objects are 
meant to exist in time, it is hard to say whether this amounts to a significant constraint.  
 But we are not yet done.  For Presentism # says that all temporal things are 
present things.  But it does not say anything about whether the temporal things always 
were or will be present things.  And this is problematic.  For consider another outlandish 
ontologist, The Flashing Future Ontologist, who believes that the past is nonexistent, the 
present exists, and the future “flashes” in and out of existence according to the following 
scheme: when an odd-numbered year is the present year, the future is as real the existing 
present; when an even-numbered year is present, the future is entirely nonexistent.  Thus, 
according to this ontologist, when 2011 was the present year, Presentism # was false.  But 
now, as I write this in 2012, The Flashing Future Ontologist believes that Presentism # is 
true.32  Is this ontologist a presentist?  If she is, then she is an unfortunately unstable one.  
Better, I think, to say that presentism requires a stable rather than temporary commitment 
to an ontology of present things:  
 (Presentism $)  It is always true that all the temporal things are present things.
This formulation is firmer and better still.  But a question arises: Are presentists entitled 
to use a sentential (or propositional) operator—the ALWAYS operator—via which 
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31 In the quinean tradition of ontological commitment, existence is the same as quantification, and asking 
“what exists?” is the same as asking “what is there?”  In the chapters to follow, I will firmly wear the 
quinean hat (or vest or decorative scarf or whatever quineans wear to signify their allegiance to the quinean 
dictum).  But, of course, meinongians reject the quinean tradition, for they believe that there are some 
nonexistent objects.  So, in considering whether presentism is compatible with there being nonexistent 
objects, it is helpful to temporarily suspend the quinean dictum and allow the conceptual possibility that 
there might be some nonexistent things that we can quantify over.        
32 Assume that this Flashing Future Ontologist is an A-theorist: she believes that there is an objective fact of 
the matter about which time is the present one.
Presentism $ can be understood?  We might observe that, since ALWAYS looks like a 
quantifier over all past, present, and future times, there is reason to be suspicious.  
 I do not think that ‘always’ poses a problem here, however.  We noted that 
presentists already help themselves to ontologically-opaque tense operators—WAS and 
WILL—in order to understand tensed claims in presentist-friendly ways.  Just as WAS 
and WILL are not to be understood as quantifiers over (concrete) past and future times, 
neither are ALWAYS and NEVER to be so understood.33  Fortunately, ALWAYS and 
NEVER can be defined in terms of the tense operators.  ALWAYS(%) is true just in case 
~WAS(~ %) & % & ~WILL(~%).34  Similarly, NEVER(%) is true just in case ~WAS(%) & 
~% & ~WILL(%).  Therefore, if presentists are permitted use of WAS and WILL, they 
should be permitted use of ALWAYS and NEVER as well.  The definability of ALWAYS 
and NEVER in terms of WAS and WILL seems to show that so long as WAS and WILL 
can be understood as something other than quantifiers over non-present times, then so can 
ALWAYS and NEVER.  Of course, this is not to say that WAS and WILL are themselves 
unproblematic for presentists—far from it, there are non-trivial objections to the 
presentist’s use of tense operators, objections that I consider below, in §1.5.
 The temporally-restricted formulations, Presentism # and $, have an interesting 
implication concerning worlds devoid of concreta.  For consider yet another character in 
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33 The operators may, however be understood by ersatz presentists—e.g. Bourne (2006) and Crisp (2007)—
as quantifiers over abstract times.
34 Just as WAS(that there are dinosaurs) does not to ontologically commit to any past time that contains 
dinosaurs, similarly, ALWAYS(that there are electrons) does not commit to past and future times that 
contain electrons.  
our parade of eccentric ontologists, The Extreme Platonic Ontologist.  According to her, 
the only things that exist are abstract, atemporal things; no temporal objects exist 
whatsoever.  This view is compatible with the temporally-restricted formulations, 
Presentism # and $.  If only atemporal things exist, then nothing whatsoever is a temporal 
thing, and Presentism # and $ are trivially satisfied.35   
 It is perhaps tempting to reply that, upon reflection, Extreme Platonism is simply 
a counterexample to the thesis that Presentism $ properly formulates presentism.  The 
presentist worldview is not most naturally understood, the objection might go, as one 
merely where the past and future are nonexistent; it is also one where the present exists.  
It is therefore natural to say that the ontology of our Extreme Platonist is incompatible 
with presentism precisely because Extreme Platonism includes no presently-existing 
things.
 I want to resist this tempting reply.  First, I concede that the choice to require 
presently-existing things on presentism is, at least to some degree, a matter of 
terminological preference.  It is perhaps therefore somewhat a matter of preference 
whether to label Extreme Platonist worlds as presentist worlds.36  Yet I also maintain that 
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35 Does the Extreme Platonic Ontologist believe that time itself is unreal?  Suppose so.  Is Presentism ! 
nonetheless true by her lights, given that it requires a certain claim—viz. that all temporal things are present 
things—to be always true?  Presumably, yes, for if the truth conditions of ‘always’ involve the embedded 
claim being true for all times, then the Extreme Platonic Ontologist believes that, whereas there are no 
times, all claims of the form ALWAYS(") are trivially true.
36 I find it useful to speak of “extreme platonist worlds” or “presentist worlds” or “eternalist worlds”.  To 
the extent that ontology is invariant across worlds, this talk may be misleading, since it seems to imply that 
the existence of the past or future could vary from world to world—e.g. in some worlds the future exists 
and in others it does not.  Nonetheless, I hope that the reader will permit me this useful device.  I intend the 
phrase “a presentist world” to mean simply “a world where the presentist thesis, whatever that is, holds”.  
And mutatis mutandis for “extreme platonist world”, “eternalist world”, etc.  Of course, if it turns out that 
presentism is a necessary truth, then all worlds are presentist worlds.
there is some pressure to allow such worlds on presentism.  This pressure comes from the 
fact that it seems more elegant and ontologically-perspicuous to view presentism not 
merely as a thesis about which concrete things happened to exist (only the present ones) 
but rather as a thesis about what it means to exist.  Presentism # is concordant with this 
pressure insofar as it captures the following idea that presentists should find attractive: to 
exist, in the temporal sense, is just to be a present thing.  And Extreme Platonist worlds, 
regardless of whether they are genuinely possible, are no threat to this attractive idea: 
since Extreme Platonist worlds are devoid of temporal objets, they are no threat to the 
idea that existence, in the temporal sense, is just present existence.  In fact, let us 
explicitly add this idea as a possible formulation:
 (Presentism &)  To exist temporally is to be a present thing.
A key question is whether—or to what extent—Presentism $ and Presentism & say the 
same thing.  I do not think they say quite the same thing.  For a claim that concerns not 
merely what happened to exist but rather what it is to exist seems most naturally 
understood as a strong modal claim.  If I tell you that only present things exist, I have told 
you something that, if true, is only contingently so.  But if I tell you that to exist just is to 
be a present thing, I seem to have said something much stronger, viz. that, necessarily, 
everything is present.  This leads us to a modally strong formulation:
 (Presentism ')  Necessarily, it is always true that all the temporal things are 
    present things.
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We might think that the addition of necessity removes the need for the temporal qualifier, 
‘always’.  After all, if necessarily(!) is true, then how could there ever be a time when ! 
is false?  
 But I take it that whether necessarily(!) entails, by presentist lights, ALWAYS(!) 
depends on the sort of temporal and modal logic that presentists adopt, and, in particular, 
on how presentists choose to represent possible worlds.  Eternalists standardly think of a 
possible world as a four-dimensional “total history item”, one that encompasses an entire 
past, present, and future.37  On the eternalist conception of possible worlds, it is natural to 
infer  ALWAYS(!) from necessarily(!), for the latter represents that ! holds across every 
world and hence—by the four-dimensional conception—across all temporal regions of 
each four-dimensional block.38  But if, as presentism maintains, the whole of temporal 
being includes only present things, and if presentism is a thesis with modal force, then 
presentists may wish to think of a possible world not as a four-dimensional “total history” 
but rather as a momentary slice of that history, one corresponding to the present time.  Of 
course, presentists need not conceptualize possible worlds in this way—but it is one way 
of conceptualizing them.  Now, supposing that we conceptualize worlds in a three- rather 
than four-dimensional way, then necessarily(!) does not entail ALWAYS(!).  For if each 
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37 See, e.g., Lewis (1986).
38 Counterargument: Imagine a theist who believes that god and Earth exist in every possible world and 
that, in every possible world, god will experience a moment of anger whereupon he floods the Earth.  It 
seems natural for our theist to assert that, necessarily, The Flood occurs.  By this, our theist means only 
that, no matter how things turn out, god will unleash The Flood—she does not mean that god is, in every 
possible world, perpetually flooding Earth.  Ergo, necessarily(!) seems not to be a priori equivalent to 
necessarily, ALWAYS(!).  On the other hand, perhaps we can account for the theist by saying that her claim 
is most naturally understood as the claim that necessarily(WAS(!) or ! or WILL(!)).
world, w, is (or represents) a momentary slice of being—viz. the moment that is present 
(relative to w)—then each presentist world is akin to a way that the present might have 
turned out.  On this picture, each true possibility claim tells us something about how the 
present might have turned out, and each true necessity claim tells us something about 
how the present must have turned out.39  And so, on this picture of worlds, if I wish to say 
something about how every possible world is at every possible time, I must temporally 
qualify my necessity claim with ‘always’.
 But there is a downside to this way of depicting possible worlds.  Namely, it 
seems very natural to infer possibly(!) from WAS(!), for it seems very natural infer the 
metaphysical possibility of some state of affairs from the claim that the state in question 
obtained in the  past.  But on the momentary, three-dimensional picture of worlds, this 
inference fails: on this picture, possibly(!) is equivalent to the claim that ! could have 
been presently true and hence does not entail WAS(!).  Ontologically speaking, this 
conception says that we cannot infer what could have been within the whole of reality on 
the basis of what was or will be within the whole of reality.  The logic that underpins 
three-dimensional worlds may be therefore undesirable.  And this may push presentists to 
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39 It would be an excellent exercise in philosophical logic to work out the temporal and modal logic that 
results from the three-dimensional, momentary conception of worlds.  Such an exercise is beyond my scope 
here.  But we might tentatively observe that such a logic could operate with a 2-dimensional system of 
accessibility relations—the first dimension acts as a “temporal” relation that links the various momentary 
worlds that together form a total “world history”; the second dimension acts to link corresponding moments 
across modal space.  By four-dimensional lights, the first relation would appear akin to an ordering of 
moments within a given world.  The second would appear to be a trans-world relation between 
corresponding moments.      
move to a more standard four-dimensional conception of worlds.40  With such a move, 
the presentist permits the inference from necessarily(!) to ALWAYS(!), and we may then 
drop the temporal qualification in our formulation:
 (Presentism ()  Necessarily, all the temporal things are present things.
Have we found a stable resting place?  First, I will remain neutral between Presentism ' 
and (, since I do not want to make any assumption about which conception of possible 
world the presentist should adopt.  And second, although I find it natural and attractive to 
regard presentism as having modal force, I have no particular knock-down argument that 
we ought to treat it that way.  Moreover, since some presentists seem not to especially 
favor the modal reading, and since the issue has, I believe, no particular bearing on what 
follows, I want to remain officially agnostic on whether presentism is a contingent or 
necessary claim.41
 Before concluding, we consider a final problematic case.  Consider an eternalist 
world—i.e. one where the past and future are as real as the existing present—of a special 
sort, a world where the same things exist at every time.  Such a world is ontologically 
constant: no object is ever created or destroyed.  Consider a person in this world, 
MacLeod, who asserts that all the temporal things are present things.  Assume that, in 
MacLeod’s assertion, ‘present things’ picks out all and only the things that exist at the 
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40 Of course, this assumes that the presentist can innocently adopt a four-dimensional view of possible 
worlds for the purpose of employing a modal logic that permits the right inferences.  Yet the presentist 
should maintain that possible world are mere theoretical devices in modal logic—we should not read into 
the logic of worlds the claim that, somehow, reality is really four-dimensionally extended. 
41 See, e.g., Merricks (2007: 120, fn. 1)
time of assertion.42  Has MacLeod asserted truly?  It seems that he has.  After all, the 
present things—the things that exist concurrently with his assertion—are the only things 
that exist throughout the entire history of MacLeod’s world.  His static, eternalist world is 
thus seemingly devoid of non-present things.  And his world therefore seems consistent 
with the formulations of presentism thus far—the formulations all label the MacLeod 
world as one where presentism holds.  But this seems to show that there is something 
wrong with the formulations of presentism thus far, for presentism ought to be 
inconsistent with eternalism.
 But appearances deceive in the MacLeod case.  MacLeod’s world is misleadingly 
described as one where the same things exist at all times.  But remember that, in 
formulating presentism, we use ‘things’ in a maximally-inclusive way; it covers material 
objects as well as events and times.  And although it is entirely plausible that a world 
could exist where no material object is ever created or destroyed—all material objects 
exist in sempiternal perpetuity in such a world—this would not automatically be a world 
where everything full-stop is a present thing.  For not all times in such an eternalist world 
should count as present things.43  Thus, consider a past time, t1 (a time prior to 
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42 Eternalists typically defend such a view of ‘now’ or ‘present’.  See, for example, Mellor (1998: 29-38).
43 Presumably, MacLeod’s eternalist world also contains some non-present events in addition to containing 
non-present times.  However, we might attempt to modify the description of the MacLeod world as being a 
world where, in addition to all material objects existing in sempiternal perpetuity, all events exist in 
sempiternal perpetuity.  In such a world, no event is ever created or or destroyed.  Would such a world—
lacking any creation or destruction of either events or material objects—simply be a world entirely devoid 
of change?  And is such a world genuinely metaphysically possible?  To circumvent these difficult 
questions, I choose to focus on the issue of non-present times in MacLeod’s world, rather than that of non-
present events.  For it should be clear that, whatever the status of non-present events in eternalist worlds, 
these worlds surely contain non-present times. 
MacLeod’s assertion) as well as the present time, t2 (the time concurrent with MacLeod’s 
assertion).  In MacLeod’s world, all the material objects whatsoever are presently-
existing things (they exist at t2), yet t1 itself, as well as a host of other past and future 
times, are entirely non-present things.  Of course, in MacLeod’s eternalist world, the past 
time t1 exists (it exists simpliciter).  But, crucially, it does not exist presently 
(concurrently with MacLeod’s assertion).  This point should not be controversial.  To 
reinforce it, notice that t1 is, relative to MacLeod’s world, a wholly past thing in exactly 
the same sense that, e.g., the year 1863 is a wholly past thing relative to our world.
 A caveat about my response to the MacLeod world: I assume that times are 
genuine things over which we can quantify.  Is this assumption problematic?  Perhaps it is 
generally problematic, for perhaps the best account of times dispenses with (or reduces) 
them, in favor of, e.g., the events and objects that populate the manifold.  Yet I do not 
think this assumption problematic in the context of my response to the MacLeod 
example.  To see why, we introduce some terminology.  Following standard usage, say 
that substantivalism about time is the view according to which times are real things that 
exist over and above the objects and events that exist at them.  And say that relationism 
about time is the view according to which times are nothing over and above the objects 
and events that exist at them.44  If substantivalism is true, then times are real things over 
which we can quantify, and the MacLeod example fails to undermine the formulations of 
presentism thus far.  But if relationism is true, then the MacLeod example also fails to 
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44 This usage is analogous to how “substantivalism” and “relationism” are used to describe theories of 
space or theories of space-time.  See, for instance, Huggett and Hoefer (2009) and Nerlich (2003).
undermine any of the formulations.  Why?  Because the MacLeod world is the sort of 
world that relationists notoriously declare to be impossible.  For the MacLeod world to be 
dialectically effective against the foregoing formulations of presentism, it must be an 
eternalist world where no object or event is ever created or destroyed.  But, on 
relationism, times are individuated solely in terms of the objects and events existing at 
them.  Thus, Benovsky (2010) explains, “a particular instant of time is thus, according to 
relationism, a collection of simultaneous events and things (a simultaneity class of events 
and things), and a time-series is all the collections of simultaneous events in the order in 
which they occur.”  Yet, in the MacLeod world, every time is the same simultaneity class, 
for every time has precisely the same members.  Insofar as classes are individuated by 
their members, it follows that there exists only a single instant of time in the MacLeod 
world, contradicting the original assumption that it is a four-dimensionally extended 
eternalist world.  In short, the relationist is prima facie unable to account for the 
possibility of the MacLeod world.  The upshot is that if substantivalism and relationism 
are logically-exhaustive, then the MacLeod example is no threat to any of the 
formulations of presentism thus far.
 I tentatively conclude that presentism is naturally understood as one of three 
claims: (i) Presentism $, the claim that it is always true that all of the temporal things are 
present things; (ii) Presentism ', the claim that, necessarily, Presentism $ is true; or (iii) 
Presentism (, the claim that, necessarily, all of the temporal things are present things.  
These latter two formulation capture the idea—one that presentists should find 
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perspicuous and attractive—that to exist, in the temporal sense, is just to be a present 
thing.  Finally, I note that from here forward it will often be helpful, for brevity’s sake, to 
treat presentism as the simple-minded claim that only present things exist.  But, 
fortunately, in light of the foregoing, we may at any time fall back on one of the more 
rigorous formulations when appropriate. 
1.4 Actualism and Possibilism
There are many truths about how things might have been.  Your physical characteristics 
or life history might have been different.  You might have been an inch taller than you 
actually are.  You might have been born in Chicago—or if you were born in Chicago, you 
might have been born elsewhere.  You might have never been born at all.  Various 
features of our planet or our universe might have been different.  The Axis might have 
prevailed in World War II, and German (or Japanese or Italian) might have been the 
dominant global language in the 21st century.  There might have been six-legged horses.  
There might have been no black holes.  These are all metaphysically possible ways that 
our world might have turned out, if our world had turned out differently.  Similarly, there 
are many truths about how things must have been.  Triangles must have three sides.  
Seven must be a prime number.  That all bachelors are unmarried must be true.  These 
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are all metaphysically necessary features of our world—our world could not have turned 
out differently in these respects.45  
 One of the great challenges of metaphysics is to provide a theory of modality—
i.e. a theory of necessity and possibility—that accounts for all of the modal truths.  Such 
a theory should tell us what, if anything, explains or underlies the possibility and 
necessity of the many possible and necessary truths.  The pursuit of a metaphysics of 
modality has been greatly influenced by a parallel development in contemporary logic, 
the development of modal logics.  One system in particular—first-order quantified modal 
logic (“QML” for short)—has been especially influential.  QML depicts necessity and 
possibility via a system of possible worlds.  According to QML, the proposition that 
possibly, P is true just in case there is a possible world where that P is true.  That 
necessarily, P is true just in case every possible world is one where that P is true.46  Talk 
of possible worlds—aided, abetted, and made precise by QML—has proven to be of great 
utility in logic, metaphysics, and throughout many areas of philosophy.
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45 We can distinguish between various types of possibility and necessity, e.g. physical, metaphysical, 
logical, conceptual.  For example, it is metaphysically though not physically possible for a mass-bearing 
object to accelerate beyond the speed of light.  (Or, at any rate, this is physically impossible if Einstein’s 
special theory of relativity is to be believed.)  According to Kripke (1980), it is metaphysically necessary 
that water is identical to H20.  Yet it seems conceptually and logically possible that water might have been 
composed of different elements.  It is generally controversial which types of possibilities and necessities are 
genuine possibilities and necessities—i.e. even supposing it is logically possible that water might not have 
been H2O, is this really a genuine possibility?  For present purposes, we needn’t take a stand on which 
types of possibilities and necessities are the genuine ones—all that matters is that there are some genuine 
ones.  Thus, in what follows, I will understand the debate over the foundations of possibility and necessity 
to concern the genuine possibilities and necessities, whichever they turn out to be.
46 Kripke (1963) is a foundational paper.  For a thorough treatment of first-order quantified modal logic, see 
Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998).  On modal logics generally, see Priest (2001).
 Though many adopt possible worlds talk on account of its great philosophical 
utility, the question remains: How seriously are we to take such talk?  Is possible worlds 
talk merely a useful tool not to be taken literally?  Or should we rather take seriously the 
idea that there really are such things as merely possible worlds and at those worlds bona 
fide merely possible objects (e.g. six-legged horses, emerald chairs, fire-breathing 
dragons)?  Some say that we should take this idea seriously.  According to possibilism, 
there are merely possible things that are just as real as actually-existing things.  Lewis 
(1986) defends a famous version of possibilism called modal realism, the view according 
to which there are possible worlds identical in kind to the actual world: each possible 
world is an existing, concrete, spatiotemporally-isolated universe.47  According to modal 
realism, that there might have been a six-legged horse is made true by the existence of a 
six-legged horse at a concrete but spatiotemporally-remote possible world.  That I could 
have been an inch taller is similarly made true by the existence of an inch-taller 
counterpart of me at some non-actual world.48  One of the chief objections to Lewis’s 
possibilism is that it is, quite simply, an incredibly strange view.  It is quite simply 
incredible to think that there are isolated universes where (literal, concrete, existing!) 
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47 See Lewis (1986: 1-5 and 69).  More precisely, according to modal realism, each world, w, is a 
maximally spatiotemporally-unified object: each one of w’s parts bears a spatiotemporal relation to each 
one of its parts, and none of w’s parts bear a spatiotemporal relation to anything not a part of w.
48 According Lewis’s counterpart view, that I could have been ambidextrous is made true by there being an 
ambidextrous person at some possible world who bears the counterpart relation to me.  Crucially, this 
counterpart is not literally—is not identical to—me.  According to the trans-world identity view that Lewis 
rejects, that I could have been ambidextrous is made true by there being some ambidextrous person at some 
possible world who is literally—is identical to—me.  The issue of counterpart theory versus trans-world 
identity, though fundamental to modal metaphysics, is separable from the actualism versus possibilism 
debate per se.  Therefore, I will not presuppose any particular position on counterparts or trans-world 
identity.
donkeys talk and dragons breathe fire.49  Yet Lewis claims that belief in such possible 
worlds allows for a theoretically-powerful account of modality (among other things) and 
that the theoretical benefits of modal realism are worth the costs.50  I treat Lewis’s modal 
realism as the canonical version of possibilism.
 In contrast to possibilism, actualism says that everything is actual.  According to 
actualists, there are neither merely possible worlds nor merely possible objects, for 
nothing exists beyond the actual.  Actualism is often compared to presentism.  And this 
comparison seems a good one, for actualism is just the modal analog of presentism.  Just 
as presentists say that no temporal things exists beyond the present time, actualists say 
that no things exist beyond the actual world.  These views together say that there is 
something ontologically very special about the actual world and the present time that we 
occupy.
 Actualists do not automatically eschew possible worlds talk.  Yet they believe that 
any such talk, if true, is made true by what exists actually.  One version of actualism, 
ersatzism, says that among the actually-existing things are maximal, consistent sets of 
propositions (or sentences) and that these sets—or “world stories”—each describe a 
possible world.51  All of these sets are actual (i.e. all of them exist actually) yet only one 
of them is actualized (i.e. only one of them represents the actual world).  On ersatzism, 
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49 This objection is often known as “the incredulous stare”—see Lewis (1986: 133-135).
50 Allegedly, it allows for a theoretically-powerful account of modality, closeness, content, and properties.  
See Lewis (1986: 5-69) and Divers (2002: 43-58). 
51 Two important actualist views along these lines include Adams (1974) and Plantinga (1974).
that I could have been an inch taller is true just in case this proposition is a member of at 
least one of the sets (i.e. just in case it is true according to at least one of the world 
stories).  Another version of actualism is Armstrong’s (1989) combinatorialism according 
to which possibilities are thought of as mere combinations (rearrangements) of actually-
existing things, viz. universals and particulars.  On combinatorialism, to say that that I 
could have been an inch taller is true is just to say that things could have been (re)
arranged in such a way that I am an inch taller.  
 For our purposes, the metaphysical details of the various actualist theories do not 
matter so much as the ontological bedrock that these views have in common, viz. 
commitment to the idea that nothing exists beyond the actual: 
 (Actualism !)  Only actual things exist.
Should we take this as the proper formulation of actualism?  Unlike the case of 
presentism and its rivals, here no qualification is needed to cover the case of atemporal 
objects.  For according to the actualist, temporal and atemporal things alike—chairs and 
tables and properties and numbers—count as actual so long as they exist.  Thus, objects 
existing outside of time, if there are any, are no counterexamples to Actualism !.  
 Could there ever be a time when Actualism ! is false?  Might Actualism ! be true 
now yet false a year from now?  It is hard to see what motivation there could be for 
believing that Actualism ! changes its truth value over time.  The possibilist believes that 
that there might have been a six-legged horse is true in virtue of some existing but merely 
possible six-legged horse; the actualist believes that this proposition is true—if in virtue 
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of anything—in virtue of what exists actually.  But it is prima facie hard to see why 
exactly someone might think that any merely possible object—e.g. a merely possible six-
legged horse—flashes in and out of existence from time to time.  Call an ontologist who 
believes that merely possible things flash in and out of existence a flashing possibilist.  
(We might think of the flashing possibilist as the modal analog of one of our previous 
eccentric friends, the flashing future ontologist.)  As in the case of formulating 
presentism, we wish to here know not whether flashing possibilism may have genuine 
metaphysical motivation but rather merely whether it is a minimally-coherent position, 
and, if it is, whether it is consistent with actualism properly understood.
 Flashing possibilism is no real threat to our formulation of actualism.  This is 
apparent so long as we fix our conception of merely possible objects via Lewis’s modal 
realism.  Consider a merely-possible six-legged horse, Sixer.  According to Lewis, to be 
Sixer is to exist in a space-time disjoint from our own.  Therefore, to say that Sixer 
flashes in and out of existence can only mean that Sixer exists at some non-adjacent 
times within the space-time that Sixer occupies.52  But this is just to concede that, from 
the perspective of our actual world, Sixer does not exist presently, nor did Sixer exist at 
any of our past times, nor will Sixer exist at any of our future times.  Yet, by modal realist  
lights, Sixer exists.  In short, if Sixer ever exists in any Lewisian world, then actualism is, 
was, and will be false.  If Sixer does not exist, he is never a threat to actualism.  We 
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52 Of course, Sixer has counterparts at other non-actual worlds, but ignore these counterparts.  For the sake 
of this example, pretend that Sixer exists at a single world.  Of course, if Lewis is right that trans-world 
identity fails and that each object is unique to its own world, then we needn’t pretend—Sixer really does 
exist at only a single world.  
revisit the issue of existing in other worlds in chapter two; this issue turns out to be 
fundamental to understanding the notion of existence at play in ontological debates.  But 
for now, it will suffice to say that given a Lewisian conception of mere possibilia, 
flashing possibilism is no threat to the idea that Actualism ! properly formulates 
actualism.
 Should actualists assert something modally stronger than the claim that only 
actual things exist?  Should they assert that, necessarily, only actual things exist?  This 
question is initially somewhat difficult to evaluate, for it is not immediately clear what it 
means to say that actualism is itself a necessary truth.  Here is one thing that it could 
mean.  Consider the set of all things that actually exist, S".  To say that actualism is a 
necessary truth could mean simply that at every possible world the existing things are 
precisely the members of S" (or some subset of S").  Thus, each possible world has a 
domain that is bounded by what is actual, i.e. by the members of S".  On this conception, 
to say that actualism is a necessary truth is to say simply that nothing other than the 
members of S# could have existed.  But actualists surely do not wish to assert that 
actualism is a necessary truth in this sense.  For surely there could have existed things 
other than those things that actually exist.  There surely could have been six-legged 
horses or cities filled with people who speak twelve languages, though none of these 
things actually exist.  Therefore, actualists should not say that their view is a necessary 
truth in this sense.
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 But there is another sense in which we might claim that actualism is a necessary 
truth.  This other sense falls out of the distinction between what Bennett (2005) calls “w-
ism” and “@-ism”:
 w-ism: the thesis of actualism, whatever it is, is true whichever world w is actual.
 @-ism: the thesis of actualism, whatever it is, is true given that this world @ is the actual world.  
 (Bennett 2005: 311).
@-ism is the view that actualism is deeply contingent.  According to @-ists, everything is 
actual, yet if some other world were to be actual, then all bets are off concerning whether 
everything is actual.  W-ism, on the other hand treats actualism as fixedly true.  According 
to w-ists, even if some other world were to be actual, it would remain true that everything 
is actual.  According to Bennett, actualists should ultimately choose w-ism.  But she also 
claims that there are interesting advantages to @-ism, e.g. that @-ists can account for the 
possibility of alien individuals—individuals that do not actually exist but that might have 
existed—not just relative to the actual world, but relative to every world.53  Actualists 
should ultimately choose between @-ism and w-ism.  But for present purposes, we need 
not choose.  For our purpose of evaluating temporal ontology and comparing it to modal 
ontology, it will suffice to treat actualism as Actualism !, the view that only actual things 
exist.  We leave it open whether actualists should represent their view as fixedly or 
contingently true.  
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53 See Bennett (2005: 311-315).
1.5 Objections to Presentism
To lay the groundwork for the upcoming chapters, I want to close this chapter by 
somewhat briefly discussing some common objections to presentism and some of the 
potential replies to these objections.  The goal here is neither to deeply probe nor to 
decisively answer each objection.  Rather, the goal is chiefly expository: by summarizing 
some of the common objections and replies, I hope to illuminate the debate over 
presentism and thus to put the reader in a better position to appreciate the chapters to 
follow.  I also note that—except for the replies that I discuss at length and endorse in 
forthcoming chapters—I do not necessarily endorse the replies given below.
 Although I will be concerned in the coming chapters with the connections 
between presentism and actualism, there are two reasons why I will not also discuss the 
common objections to actualism.  First and foremost, given that I aim to offer a (partial) 
defense of presentism but not a defense of actualism, it makes sense to focus on the anti-
presentist arguments.  And second, one finds in the contemporary metaphysics literature a 
robust battery of arguments against presentism but not a similarly-robust battery against 
actualism.  The reasons for this asymmetry in the literature are complicated—many are 
philosophical and some, perhaps, are merely sociological. At the risk of over-simplifying 
the debates, it must suffice for present purposes to observe that whereas a legion of 
philosophically-diverse arguments have emerged claiming that presentism has 
counterintuitive implications, the recent arguments against actualism have tended to focus 
not on its counterintuitive implications—indeed, I believe that most regard actualism as 
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the intuitively-appealing view of modality—but more narrowly on the charge that 
actualism simply cannot do the theoretical work demanded by modality.54  
 I now turn to the anti-presentist arguments.  I offer these arguments organized into 
related groups.  The final group of objections—objections concerning the metaphysics of 
past-oriented truths—will be briefly summarized here and addressed at greater length in 
chapters three and four.
1.5.1 Objections from Naïve Conceptions of Time
The Objection from Naïve Quantificational Semantics:  It is true that dinosaurs existed.  
So, therefore, that there is something that was a dinosaur is true too—this is a simple 
existential inference.  Put differently, if dinosaurs existed, then a dinosaur is surely within 
the unrestricted domain of quantification.  For what is an unrestricted quantifier if not one 
that ranges over everything, past, present, and future?  On a basic semantic level, it is 
therefore hard to see how presentism has merit.  
Reply:  The existential inference in question is far from innocent.  In general, it is a vexed 
question which sorts of existential inferences are permissible.  Contrast:
(2) Dinosaurs roamed the earth.
(3) A dragon might have existed.
(4) Chelsea believes that Santa Claus is generous.
May we infer from these, respectively, that there is something that roamed the earth, that 
there is something that might have been a dragon, and that there is something that 
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54 See Divers (2002), Fine (2003), Lewis (1986: 136-191), and Sider (2003).
Chelsea believes to be generous?  Perhaps or perhaps not—it depends on how 
ontologically liberal we are.  But there is nothing automatically innocent about such 
inferences.55  Just as those who deny the existence of merely possible objects and 
fictional objects forbid the latter two inferences, presentists forbid the former.  And 
because presentists regiment the claim that Caesar existed as the ontologically-opaque 
claim WAS(that Caesar exists), we are not, by their lights, permitted to “quantify in”, i.e. 
to infer that there exists something that was Caesar.
 Finally, presentists deny that an unrestricted quantifier ranges over non-present, 
temporal things, for presentists deny that there are any non-present, temporal things.  
This is why presentists hold that what is within the unrestricted domain of quantification 
changes over time—Caesar was once within this domain, but no longer; exciting nano-
swarms will (perhaps) one day be within this domain, but not presently.  The dispute 
between presentism and its rivals is precisely a dispute about which things are within the 
unrestricted domain of quantification—it is a debate about what exists.  Consequently, it 
is debatable whether the unrestricted existential quantifier picks out, in addition to what 
exists presently, what did and will exist.  This last point will be revisited at greater length 
in chapter two. 
The Objection from the Analogy between Space and Time:  Time is analogous to space.  
Just as spatial locations and things spatially distant from us are no less real than what is 
here, distant times and things that exist at distant times are no less real than what is now.  
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55 Examples from Szabó (2007).
But presentism breaks this attractive analogy.  For this reason, presentism seems to be an 
objectionable form of ontological solipsism.
Reply:  Time is unlike space in multiple, crucial ways.  Inter alia, time has a direction in a 
way that space does not.  And time flows—or has the appearance of flow—in a way that 
space does not.  And we can freely move through space in a way that we cannot freely 
move through time.  Similarly, presentists say that time is ontologically disanalogous to 
space.   The label ‘solipsism’, used as a pejorative, is inapt.  Just as modal actualists 
should not be pejoratively labeled ‘solipsists’ merely in virtue of believing that 
everything is actual, neither should presentists be pejoratively labeled the same just in 
virtue of believing that everything is present.  Since the analogy between space and time 
is remarkably imperfect to begin with, there is little cost if any to denying that distant 
times are akin to distant spatial locations.
1.5.2 Objections from Cross-time Truths
The Objection from Cross-time Relations:  Presentism offers a three-dimensional, 
“momentary” picture of reality.  But there are many relations that “cut across times” in 
contravention of this picture.  For instance, that Lisa Marie is Elvis’s child is true.  Ergo, 
Lisa Marie stands in the child-of relation to Elvis.  But whereas Lisa Marie is a present 
individual, Elvis is merely past.  Presentists are therefore in no position to hold that Lisa 
Marie really does stand in such a relation, for the other relatum is missing.  And so 
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presentists are in no position to respect the obvious truth of the proposition that Lisa 
Marie is Elvis’s child.56
Reply:  Several subtly-different ways of replying are available, but I believe we can 
cluster the replies into three main camps.  First camp: Deny that the truth of cross-
temporal claims generally requires the existence of genuine cross-temporal relations.  
Presentists in this camp say that although Lisa Marie fails to stand in any relation to her 
non-present father, this does not prevent that Lisa Marie is Elvis’s child from being true.  
What argument might we give?  One possibility is to say that, even on presentism, it is 
surely true that Elvis fathered Lisa Marie.  But that Elvis fathered Lisa Marie—perhaps 
together with the claim that Lisa Marie is still alive—seems to entail that Lisa Marie is 
Elvis’s child.  Thus, we have:
 (5) Lisa Marie is Elvis’s child. 
 (6) Lisa Marie stands in the child-of relation to Elvis.
 (7) Elvis fathered Lisa Marie.
 (8) Lisa Marie is still alive.
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56 On stating and responding to this objection, see Crisp (2005), Davidson (2003), De Clercq (2006), and 
Szabó (2007).
According to this reply, (5) is true—even in the face of (6)’s falsity—so long as there is 
some presentist-friendly claim, such as the conjunction of (7) and (8), that entails (5).57
 Second camp: Concede that because there are no genuine cross-temporal 
relations, therefore many intuitively-true cross-temporal claims—e.g. (5)—are indeed 
literally false.  But presentists could then say that because the cross-temporal claims have 
presentist-friendly paraphrases that are literally true, the original claims are “quasi-true” 
or “close enough to true”.58  In this case, (5), though literally false, is quasi-true in virtue 
of having a true paraphrase, (7).  So long as the intuitively-true claims are at least quasi-
true, folk intuitions about cross-time propositions are well-enough respected.  
 Third camp: Say that a relation can hold even when one (or both) of its relata fail 
to exist—e.g. Lisa Marie bears the child-of relation to her nonexistent father.  If so, then 
there is no obstacle to the truth of the relevant cross-temporal claims.  This camp rejects 
what Bergmann (1999) calls serious presentism, the view that no object instantiates a 
property or stands in a relation at a time when that object does not exist.  Surely, many 
will find this third camp to be strange, for it ventures into meinongian (or perhaps quasi-
meinongian) territory in saying that ordinary relations can somehow link the existent with 
the nonexistent.  
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57 A potential problem: if that Lisa Marie is Elvis’s child is true, then why are we not permitted to 
existentially generalize and infer that someone is such that Lisa Marie is their child?  Presentists who aim 
for literal truth presumably need some way to argue that certain relational-expressions—e.g. ‘child-of’—
introduce an opaque context.  But it is unclear how to argue for this opaque context in a principled, non-ad 
hoc way.  Contrast, for instance, the two cross-temporal claims that Lisa Marie is Elvis’s child and that Lisa 
Marie is shorter than Elvis was.  Since the latter contains a past-tensed construction, the presentist has a 
principled reason to remain ontologically uncommitted; yet in the former case, no such tensed construction 
shows its face. 
58 Sider (1999) offers presentists a strategy along these lines.
The Objection from Causation:  This objection is really just a special case of the 
objection from cross-time relations, but due to the importance of the causal relation, it 
deserves special attention.  Causal relations exist, and they link events.  Moreover, causes 
are earlier than their effects.  But, on presentism, no existing event is earlier than any 
other existing event, for otherwise it would follow that either one or the other event is 
non-present.  So, assuming, quite plausibly, that a causal relation exists only if both relata 
exist, presentism is in trouble.  In short, it is mysterious how presentists can account for 
the existence of causal relations.
Reply:  What we need is a presentist-friendly view of causation.  Reductionist views—i.e 
Humean views whereby there are no irreducible causal relations and casual truths are 
reducible to non-causal truths—are presentist-friendly so long as the truths constituting 
the reduction base are presentist-friendly.  The Humean regularity view of causation 
holds that for an event C to cause an event E is just for E to regularly follow C: whenever 
an event of of the C-variety occurs, an event of E-variety follows.59  Presentists should be 
able to accept a regularity theory, for they can accept that whenever an event of the C-
variety is present, it will be true that an event of the E-variety immediately follows.  A 
popular neo-Humean view is the counterfactual account given by Lewis (2004b, 1973).  
The basic idea behind the counterfactual account is that causal truths are to be understood 
via claims of the form if C hadn’t have happened, then E wouldn’t have happened.  So 
long as presentists can adopt a legitimate account of counterfactuals, there is no reason 
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59 But it is debatable whether Hume himself accepted the Humean regularity theory—see Broackes (1993).
why they cannot endorse a Lewis-style reduction of the causal relation.  If one eschews a 
reductive approach to causation in favor of accepting a non-reductive causal relation, 
there are other presentist-friendly options.  For instance, Bigelow (1996) suggests that the 
causal relation links propositions rather than events.  And Huemer and Kovitz (2003) 
treat causal chains as involving temporally-overlapping events.  In the latter case, the 
casual relation may be understood most fundamentally as linking simultaneous events, 
and the original objection is undercut.
The Objection from Memory:  This objection is, once again, a special case of the 
objection from cross-time relations, but due to the importance of memory it too deserves 
special mention.  It is part of the canon of common sense that we remember all sorts of 
things.  We remember what high school we attended, who played at our first concert, the 
color of our pet goldfish, and so on.  But an intuitive account of memory is that memory 
is just a certain kind of awareness of the past.  In particular, memory is awareness of past 
objects (or events) that arose by one’s having had certain experiences of those objects (or 
events) and hence by being causally connected, in the appropriate way, to the past thing
(s) of which one is aware.  But according to presentism, there are no past things of which 
one can be aware (or to which one can be casually related).
Reply:  Why insist that memory is a bona fide relation, viz. awareness of that which one 
remembers?  There are several ways that we might understand memory.  The objection 
seems to press an analogy between memory and perceptual awareness: remembering, 
goes the objection, requires being aware of existing past things just as perceiving requires 
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being aware of existing present things.  But it isn’t clear that memory is best understood 
in this way.  Or, at the very least, it is far from obvious that memory must be understood 
in this way.  For instance, rather than viewing memory as a special kind of awareness, we 
might view it as a special kind of belief, or, perhaps, as a special kind of collection of 
mental images.  On the belief model, my memories are beliefs about the past that arose in 
a certain way—e.g. I remember the color of my goldfish by having seen my fish and, at 
that time, having formed a corresponding belief about my fish’s color.  But my retention 
of such a belief—and hence, my memory of my goldfish’s color—does not require the 
existence of the past in any obvious way.  Similarly, if memories are special collections of 
mental images, my retention of the relevant collection of images does not require the 
existence of the past things that originally led to the creation of those images.  For the 
objection from memory to have force against presentism, we require an argument that 
memory is most plausibly understood as a species of genuine relation to past things.  
Unless such an argument is forthcoming, presentists should simply avail themselves of an 
alternative account of memory.       
The Objection from Cross-time Counting:  Some truths “cut across times”, not in the 
sense of requiring cross-temporal relations, but rather in counting things across different 
times.  Taking an example from Lewis (2004a), suppose it true that there have been two 
kings named ‘Charles’  but that these kings never overlapped.  The presentist’s usual 
past-tense operator, WAS, is a “slice operator”—it tells us what was the case at some 
single past moment.  WAS(that there are two kings named Charles) is an inadequate 
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translation of the original claim because it falsely says that there was a single past time at 
which there existed two kings named ‘Charles’.  It is therefore unclear how presentists 
can respect—given their theoretical resources—the truth of a myriad of counting claims.
Reply:  There are three general strategies of reply.  First strategy: Claim that presentists 
can effect, in principle at least, brute force translations of all cross-time counting claims 
in terms of the simple (slice) tense operators.  For instance, that there have been two 
kings named ‘Charles’ could be translated as the following nested claim:
 (9)  WAS(there is a king named ‘Charles’, and WAS(there was another king 
        named ‘Charles’)).
But it is unclear whether the brute-force strategy always works so well.  For we should 
also consider, as Lewis observes, cases where there were infinitely many Fs, as well as 
cases where there were some (unspecified number of) Fs.  Both cases seem to require 
infinitary constructions of tense operators, thereby suggesting that brute force translation 
is a tricky matter.  At the very least, there appears to be no good general formula for 
generating presentist-friendly translations from the counting claims—brute force is hard 
work!  
 Second strategy: Claim that presentists can adopt a different sort of ontologically-
opaque operator—a span operator—that functions as making a claim about a span of time 
rather than a single moment.  Consider the span operator HAS: HAS(that there are two 
kings named ‘Charles’) represents what we’re after, viz. that two kings named ‘Charles’ 
existed over some span of time.  Are presentists entitled to such operators?  An eternalist 
can quantify over spans of time to her heart’s content, but the presentist says that there 
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are no such things as spans of time.  So how is it that presentists are allowed to embrace a 
device that captures an idea they reject?  Yet this reaction is perhaps hasty.  Presentists 
also reject the existence of past moments of time, and actualists reject the existence of 
merely possible objects and worlds, yet both are prima facie justified in using 
ontologically non-committing tense and modal operators.  So long as the operators are 
well-understood in the theory, there seems to be nothing prima facie illegitimate about 
adopting them as ontologically-innocent ways of speaking.  As Brogaard (2004: 74) 
explains, “the totality of truths involving span operators should do no more than [give a 
series of snapshots of the world at successive moments of time]”.
 Another objection to span operators is Lewis’s (2004a: 12-13) observation that 
they are unruly beasts: They create ambiguities when pre-fixed to unambiguous claims—
e.g. HAS(that it is raining and sunny out) could indicate either a time when it is both 
raining and sunny or else non-overlapping times when it is first raining and then sunny 
(or vice versa).  And they create truths when pre-fixed to contradictions—e.g. HAS(that it 
is raining and not raining) could be true, though the embedded proposition could not.  
Such operators therefore seem rather unruly for something of which presentists must say 
we have a primitive understanding.  Brogaard replies that their apparent unruliness may 
be unproblematic so long as presentists help themselves to both span and slice operators, 
for even primitive operators can be constrained in various ways.  For instance, the truth 
of HAS(that it is raining and not raining) can be constrained by requiring the falsity of 
WAS(that it is raining and not raining).  In other words, for it to have been raining and 
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not raining over some span, it must also be false that it was both raining and not raining 
at any past moment.  Slice operators can similarly be used to eliminate ambiguities 
introduced by span operators.
 Third and final strategy:  Presentists might adopt proxies for non-present 
individuals.  Those presentists who adopt ersatz (abstract) times—e.g. Crisp (2007) and 
Bourne (2006)—may freely count across their abstract times; or rather, they may freely 
count the number of kings named ‘Charles’ that are represented, by the ersatz times, as 
having existed.  And those presentists who adopt platonic haecceities—individual 
essences that may exist uninstantiated—may freely count the haecceities of kings that 
were named ‘Charles’.60     
The Objection from Persistence:  Things persist through time.  To say that a given rock 
persists from one time to another is to say simply that the same rock exists at different 
times.  And crucially, people persist.  To say that I persist—e.g. that I survived childhood 
to become a grown adult—is to say that I exist at different times, one time at which I am 
a child and another at which I am a grown adult.61  But the most straightforward way of 
understanding persistence—viz. one and the same thing’s existing at different times—is 
closed to presentists.  For presentists believe that there is only one time: the present one.  
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60 Keller (2004) discusses the prospects for proxies.  One potential problem with the haecceities strategy is 
that it only works if precisely the right haecceities are counted and no more.  For example, when counting 
the uninstantiated haecceities of kings that existed and were named ‘Charles’, we must be sure to avoid 
counting the uninstantiated haecceities of any merely possible kings named ‘Charles’ lest we miscount.  I 
discuss this point further in chapter 4. 
61 See Olson (2010).
Since there are no other times for things to occupy, the same thing cannot exist at 
different times, and it is mysterious how things persist.
Reply:  Presentists fully accept that things persist through time, but we must take care in 
stating what it takes to persist.  On presentism, to say that I survived childhood to become 
an adult is to say simply that a person (me) existed in the past as a child and that the very 
same person (me) exists presently as an adult.  But that is fine.  Presentists can say those 
things.  Putting the point explicitly in terms of identity, we can say that I am 
(numerically) identical to a child that existed.  Again, no problem for presentists, for, so 
to speak, the very same present thing (me) “flanks both sides of the identity sign”.  
 Of course, what presentists cannot say here is that I exist in the past as a child and 
that I exist in the present as an adult—only someone who believes in the reality of the 
past can say that.  The crucial point here is that, on presentism, that I existed does not 
entail that I exist in some past temporal region.  But the truth of the former—together 
with my present existence—is sufficient to metaphysically account for my persistence.  
And consequently, my being tenselessly located at various temporal regions is not 
necessary for my persistence.  
 Presentists may also wish to redirect the energy of this criticism toward the 
attacker, for presentism has an advantage when it comes to theories of persistence.  To see 
this, we make the familiar distinction between two types of persistence: endurance and 
perdurance.  A thing endures just in case it persists by being wholly present throughout 
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its career.  A thing perdures just in case it persists by having temporal parts.62  To say, 
e.g., that a wooden stick endures from 1PM to 3PM is to say that the stick is wholly 
present throughout the 1PM to 3PM interval; to say that it perdures from 1PM to 3PM is 
to say that it has temporal parts throughout the 1PM to 3PM interval.  Now we introduce 
a familiar puzzle about change, the so-called problem of temporary intrinsics.  Assume 
that our wooden stick is straight until 2PM—at which time it becomes bent by an angry 
hulk—and stays bent for the rest of its career.  The puzzle: Our wooden stick is 
(tenselessly) both bent and straight, but nothing can be both bent and straight—a 
contradiction!63  Perdurantists have an easy answer: Some temporal parts of the stick are 
straight, others are bent, and that is no more contradiction than a road’s having some bent 
(spatial) parts and some other straight parts.  But endurantists, eschewing temporal parts, 
lack this easy answer.  And now, presentism to the rescue.  There is never, on presentism, 
any single thing that is (tenselessly) both bent and straight: prior to 2PM, no stick is 
(tenselessly) bent, and after 2PM, no stick is (tenselessly) straight.64  Of course, 
presentists and eternalists alike must concede that, as of 2PM, there is a stick that was 
straight and will be bent.  But this is no problem—there is no contradiction in a thing that 
was F and will be not F.   In short, not only can presentists account for the persistence of 
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62 On perdurance vs. endurance, see Haslanger (2003), Hawley (2010), Lewis (1986: 202-205), Mellor 
(1998: 84-96), and Sider (2001: 53-73).
63 See Lewis (1986: 202-205).
64 Charitably assume, of course, that we restrict our quantifiers to a region where the example stick is the 
only stick around.  To make the needed point, we also assume serious presentism, the view that no object 
instantiates a property at a time when it does not exist—see Bergmann (1999).  This assumption should 
give little cause for alarm, however, for non-serious presentism is a strange view; it is a view on which, 
e.g., Caesar, despite his nonexistence, may now possess the property of being a famous Roman.
objects, they have an advantage over other ontological views when it comes to endorsing 
endurantism.  This is noteworthy for those who take endurantism to be the superior 
account of persistence.65
1.5.3 Objections to Presentist Tense Operators
The Objection from Anti-Ontological Cheats:  Eternalists can offer the following style of 
analysis for WAS: WAS(that Caesar exists) is true iff there exists some past time, t, and 
Caesar exists at t.  But such an analysis quantifies over (concrete) merely past things and 
is thereby closed to presentists.  So presentists resort to the idea that the tense operators 
are primitive and hence to the idea that past-tense truths are primitive truths.  But this is 
cheating!  To maintain that some tensed propositions are primitively true (and so lack an 
ontological explanation) is akin to wanting to have your ontological cake and eat it too.66  
In short, the presentist helps herself to past-tense truths, yet she refuses to pay the 
ontological price for these truths.
Reply:  Although one does indeed see presentists accused of being ontological cheaters 
for adopting primitive tense operators, this objection is, I believe, essentially the same as 
the objection from grounding that I address below.
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65 There is a hefty literature on the endurantism-perdurantism debate.  On why one might prefer 
endurantism, see, for starters, Mellor (1998: 85-87), Sider (2001: 209-236), Van Inwagen (1990), and 
Thomson (1983).  In addition, Merricks (1999) argues that, given a proper understanding of the endurance-
perdurance debate, endurantism simply entails presentism. 
66 Sider (2001: 35-36) advances this objection.
The Objection from Metrical Claims:  It is generally controversial whether presentists 
can do justice to all of the true natural language claims.  The objection from cross-time 
counting is one prickly instance of this controversy.  Another is that the presentist’s tense 
operators seem unable to account for metrical claims such as the claim that dinosaurs 
existed 100 million years ago.   After all, WAS(that dinosaurs exist) says merely that 
dinosaurs existed at some past moment—it does not specify which past moment.  Now, 
perhaps presentists will try to help themselves to metrical tense operators, e.g. the 
metrical operator WASn(!) represents that ! was the case n units of time ago.  But it isn’t 
clear that presentists should be permitted these metrical operators, for such operators all 
too suspiciously resemble quantifiers over past times.  If the metrical tense operator isn’t 
simply a (disguised) quantifier over a given unit of past time, then it’s hard to see what it 
is.   
Reply:  If we already agree that the simple past tense operator, WAS, need not be 
interpreted as a quantifier over an unspecified past moment, then it’s not clear why we 
should think that WASn must be interpreted as a quantifier over some specified past 
moment.  Rather than say that WASn quantifies over some specific past moment, 
presentists could say that such metrical tense operators are complex operators 
conceptually built from two primitive notions, viz. one notion of primitive past-truth and 
another of primitive temporal units.  
 Or, perhaps presentists can eschew metrical operators altogether.  For perhaps 
presentists can avail themselves of the fact that, on presentism, various B-times were 
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once present—e.g. the year 2010 is a B-time that was, as of my writing this, present two 
years ago.  Ergo, that dinosaurs existed 100 million years ago may interpreted as roughly 
the claim WAS(that dinosaurs exist & that 100 million BC is present).  For this strategy 
to work, it must be that we are sometimes ignorant of what proposition we express.  For 
example, I might be wandering through the desert, hallucinating and completely 
oblivious to the date.  Suppose that in my crazed, dehydrated state I shout “yesterday, I 
saw a glorious vision of a gila monster!”  Given my shouting this on April 12, I express 
the proposition corresponding to WAS(that I saw a glorious vision of a gila monster & 
that April 11 is present.)  But I know not what proposition I express, for I know not when 
my shouting occurs.  My propositional ignorance is by no means unique to the presentist 
view, and it should be no cause for alarm.  On the orthodox eternalist view, propositions 
do not change truth values: When I shouted, I thereby expressed the eternally true 
proposition that I see (tenselessly) a glorious vision of a gila monster on April 11, a 
proposition of which I am equally ignorant.  
The Objection from Empiricist Scruples:  While most every theory helps itself to certain 
primitives, there are those who have scruples about which types of primitives are allowed. 
Tooley (2003) endorses an empiricist view of analysis whereby every non-logical 
primitive picks out a property or relation that is an object of immediate perceptual 
experience (or of some sort of direct awareness).  Since we lack direct awareness of the 
future, and since our concept of the future is not a logical concept (such as the concept of 
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negation or disjunction), then by Tooley’s criterion our concept of the future is not, contra 
presentism, a primitive one.
Reply:  Presentists must either jettison primitive tense operators or else reject Tooley’s 
empiricist scruples concerning primitive concepts.  Some presentists have done the 
former.  For instance, Bourne (2006) and Crisp (2007) defend ersatz presentism, the view 
that tensed truths are grounded by an ersatz structure (e.g. an ersatz B-series—maximal 
propositions that describe instantaneous past, present, or future states of the world and 
that are linked by a primitive temporal accessibility relation).  Those who follow this line 
can offer an analysis of tense operators in terms of abstract, rather than concrete, times, 
e.g. WILL(that the Sun rises) is true iff there exists some future abstract (ersatz) time, t, 
and t represents that the Sun rises.
1.5.4 Empirical Objections
The Objection from Special Relativity:  All A-theories of time recognize a 
metaphysically-special, objective cleavage between the present and the non-present.  
Presentists in particular rely on the idea of an objectively-privileged present in order to 
distinguish the existing present from the nonexistent past and future.  But modern physics
—in particular, the empirically-successful special theory of relativity (STR)—does not 
recognize any such cleavage and is in fact inconsistent with it.  
 First, STR is at least superficially opposed to presentism insofar as it treats the 
universe as a four-dimensional (eternalist) space-time manifold.  Second and more 
importantly, on STR, the laws of physics are the same in all inertial reference frames, 
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and, as a result, there is no privileged, observer-independent reference frame available for 
identification as the metaphysically special present.  STR is therefore both superficially 
and deeply opposed to presentism.  Indeed, according to STR, the relative time order of 
two spatially far-separated events, E and E), can vary from frame to frame—e.g. 
according to one reference frame, E is present and E) is future, and, according to another 
reference frame, E) is present and E is future.  Given two such reference frames, 
presentists must seemingly choose one of them as being distinguished and claim that 
whereas one of either E or E) is an existing event the other is nonexistent.  But STR offers 
no quarter for such a choice.67
Reply:  A number of responses are available to presentists.  I proceed from least to most 
radical.  First, Monton (2011: 143) observes that metaphysical arguments based on 
empirical physics are often problematic because “our two best theories of physics, 
quantum theory and relativity theory, are incompatible.”  Monton moreover claims that it 
is currently unclear whether the anti-presentist implications of STR are also implications 
of quantum theory—some current interpretations of quantum theory are in fact presentist-
friendly.   Therefore, those who say that modern physics precludes presentism are betting 
that the eventual, unified theory—the one that reconciles relativity and quantum theory—
will have anti-presentist implications similar to those of STR.  But it is unclear whether 
this is a smart bet.  
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67 On describing the conflict between STR and presentism—or between STR and A-theories broadly—see 
Godfrey-Smith (1979), Hinchliff (2000) and (1996), Monton (2011), Putnam (1967), Savitt (2000), Sider 
(2001: 42-52), Stein (1968), Tooley (1997: 337-373), Weingard (1972), and Zimmerman (2011).  On STR 
generally, see any undergraduate modern physics text, e.g. Wolfson and Pasachoff (1999).
 Second, a number of presentists claim that presentism, though incompatible with 
STR on its most straightforward reading, isn’t ultimately incompatible with STR, for 
presentism isn’t ultimately incompatible with the empirical data that support it.68  The 
idea here is, roughly, that although STR precludes our having knowledge of any 
distinguished reference frame, STR does not preclude there being such a reference frame.  
Presentists can therefore distinguish an epistemic reading of STR (STRe: we cannot know 
which reference frame, if any, is privileged) from a metaphysical one (STRm: there is no 
privileged reference frame) and claim that these readings are at least empirically 
indistinguishable.  But if STRe and STRm are empirically indistinguishable, then we can 
have no empirical reason for preferring one over the other and hence no empirical reason
—apart from sheer theoretical simplicity—for ruling out the existence of a privileged 
present.
 If the foregoing is correct, then we can construct a presentist-friendly—and 
generally A-theory friendly—version of STR, STR+ which is the same as STRe but for the 
addition of an undetectable, privileged reference frame.69,70  The claim is then that STR+ 
predicts all of the data that STR predicts just as well; it merely contains a slight addition 
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68 See Crisp (2003), Hinchliff (2000), Markosian (2004), and Zimmerman (2011) for arguments along these 
lines.
69 See, e.g., the discussion of rendering STR compatible with the growing block theory in Tooley (1997: 
337-373).  Tooley’s approach can presumably be imported by presentists.  
70 The addition of an empirically-undetectable reference frame leads to a kind of “conspiracy of silence” 
objection to STR+.  For we might explain the non-detectability of the privileged reference frame in one of 
two ways: (i) The laws of nature have somehow astonishingly allowed there to be a privileged reference 
frame yet “conspired” to make it impossible for us to detect such a frame; (ii) There isn’t really any such 
privileged frame!  Doesn’t the latter—so goes the objection—sound like a better explanation?
in complexity in the form of a privileged present.  Or, perhaps given the slight addition of 
complexity, we should say that STR+ predicts the data that STR predicts nearly as well as 
STR itself—after all, the simpler of two theories is to be preferred, ceteris paribus.  But 
presentists will quickly point out that simplicity considerations do not succeed in ruling 
STR superior to STR+ all things considered.  For presentists have philosophical reasons 
to prefer STR+, and these reasons more than compensate for the slight addition of 
complexity in the theory.71  Of course, we should readily concede that the presentist’s 
bold claim that there is a privileged reference frame—viz. the one that picks out the 
objective present—itself reaches beyond the empirical data that support STR and STR+.  
But no matter.  Unless one accepts logical positivism, one is allowed take a philosophical 
position supported by a priori reasoning rather than a posteriori observation.  
 Third, presentists might opt for a radical response: claiming that the 
straightforward reading of STR is correct and that we should simply accept whatever 
implications thereby follow.  What implications are those?  STR apparently tells us that 
there is no objective, observer-independent present.  And presentism tells us that only 
present things exist.  Taking both on board, we seem to find that there is no objective, 
observer-independent account of what exists—what exists is a radically relative matter.72  
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71 Which reasons?  Well, whichever philosophical reasons we have to prefer presentism to its rivals.  If 
there are no such reasons, then the argument from special relativity begins to look quite a bit more damning 
for presentism.  But, of course, if there are no philosophical reasons to prefer presentism to its rivals, then 
presentism isn’t in very good shape to begin with.
72 It doesn’t quite follow, even given the radical response, that there is no objective account of what exists 
on STR + presentism.  For perhaps, just as a claim with a vague predicate that is true on all precisifications 
is super-true (true simpliciter) on supervaluationism, perhaps an object that exists relative to every frame is 
objectively real on STR + presentism.  On supervaluationism, see Fine (1975).  On radically relative 
existence and presentism, see Fine (2005).
And surely, STR already carries a number of shocking, highly counterintuitive 
implications, e.g. that certain basic physical properties of objects (e.g. length) are 
possessed not absolutely but only relative to a reference frame.  It is merely another step
—and not a massive leap—to reach the view that what exists is itself not an absolute 
matter but rather always relative to a reference frame.  Philosophers have kindly reserved 
the phrase “biting the bullet” for replies such as this third one.
1.5.5 Objections from the Metaphysics of Truth
The Objection from Grounding:  Presentism seems to conflict with certain intuitive 
“grounding principles” according to which true propositions depend for their truth on the 
world.  For example, given presentism, that dinosaurs existed should be true, yet no 
existing dinosaurs are available to ground the truth of this proposition.  Similar 
difficulties arise for other historically-manifest truths, e.g. that Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon, that Newton made breakthroughs in physics, etc.  In offering this objection, the 
grounding objector typically deploys a theoretically-loaded grounding principle involving 
either truthmaker entities or the supervenience of truth on being.  Insofar as one of these 
principles is needed to make sense of the connection between truth and being, and insofar 
as presentism contravenes these principles, we ought to reject presentism.73  
Reply:  The standard reply is that presentism is compatible with the standard grounding 
principles so long as presentists pay the metaphysical price of endorsing certain entities— 
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73 On the grounding objection and replies, see Bigelow (1996), Bourne (2006), Cameron (2011), Crisp 
(2007), Keller (2004), Kierland and Monton (2007), Merricks (2007: 74-80 and 119-125), Sider (2001: 
35-42), and Tooley (1997: 234-240).
tensed facts, ersatz times, or other entities—that serve as truth grounds for past-directed 
claims.  A second, less-traversed reply is that presentists are within their rights to reject 
the standard grounding principles.  I discuss the grounding objection in detail in chapter 
three and defend the latter reply.      
The Objection from Proper Names:  It is an a priori truth that names refer to their 
bearers.  ‘Obama’ refers to Obama, ‘Buckethead’ to Buckethead, ‘Socrates’ to Socrates.  
But, according to presentism, the name of any merely past individual—e.g. ‘Socrates’—
has nothing to serve as referent.   Therefore, presentism seems to conflict with a basic 
truth about names.
Reply:  Some names are empty—they fail to refer to anything.  The French 
Mathematician Jean Joseph Le Verrier once believed there to be an inner planet orbiting  
between Mercury and the Sun.  He named this hypothetical planet ‘Vulcan’.  But Le 
Verrier was mistaken, and there is no such planet—‘Vulcan’ is an empty name.  
Presentists believe that ‘Socrates’ is like ‘Vulcan’ but with one difference: whereas 
‘Vulcan’ never referred, ‘Socrates’ did once but does no longer.  I discuss this objection in 
chapter four.
The Objection from Singular Predication:  Many truths appear to predicate something of 
a past or future object.  For instance, in asserting that Elvis was a musician, I appear to 
predicate something of Elvis himself, viz. having been a musician.  But according to 
presentism, no such merely past individual as Elvis exists.  More generally, presentism 
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carries the implication that, contra appearances, we never predicate things of non-present 
individuals.  This is counter-intuitive.  And more worrisome still, if there are no past 
individuals of whom to predicate, then past-directed singular propositions—e.g. that 
Elvis was a musician—cannot even be true.  This is highly counter-intuitive.
Reply:  Modal actualists face a similar objection concerning merely possible individuals.  
For instance, in asserting that aliens might have built the pyramids (where ‘might’ is 
given a metaphysical reading), I seem to predicate something of some merely possible 
aliens, viz. having built the pyramids.  Actualists may reply that rather than predicating 
some property of some merely possible aliens, I am rather predicating something else—
viz. possibility—of the claim that aliens built the pyramids.  Analogously, presentists 
may reply that rather than predicating some property of a merely past Elvis, I am rather 
predicating something else—viz. having been true—of the claim that Elvis is a musician.  
Consequently, just as the truth of modal possibility claims does not require on ontology 
of mere possibilia, the truth of past-directed singular claims does not require an ontology 
of merely past objects.  I discuss this objection and reply in detail in chapter four.
  
The Objection from Singular Propositions:  Even if presentists can explain away the 
intuition that we predicate things of non-present individuals, it remains a mystery how 
there can be, on presentism, past-directed singular propositions at all.74  The standard 
view of singular propositions is that in asserting, e.g. that Obama is president, I express a 
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74 By past-directed singular propositions I mean simply propositions that singularly concern merely past 
individuals.
proposition that literally has Obama (the concrete man himself) plus the property of being 
president as constituents.  Similarly, in asserting that Elvis was a musician, I express a 
proposition that literally has Elvis as one of its constituents.  But presentism says that no 
such constituent exists, ergo, no such proposition exists.  To summarize, the objection 
from singular predication says that, on presentism, past-directed singularly-predicative 
propositions cannot be true, for there is no one of whom to predicate; the objection from 
singular propositions says that, on presentism, past-directed singular propositions cannot 
even exist in the first place.75
Reply:  Presentists have a number of possible replies.  First, they could deny that 
propositions depend ontologically on their constituents—perhaps a proposition can 
continue to exist even when one of its constituents goes missing.  Second, presentists 
could hold that singular propositions—all of them or some of them—have proxies for 
concrete individuals as constituents rather than the concrete individuals themselves.  So 
long as the the proxies are in no danger of falling out of existence (so long as they are 
ontologically independent of the individuals they represent), the singular propositions are 
safe.  Third and finally, presentists might simply jettison singular propositions—either in 
past-directed cases alone or in toto—and adopt an alternative theoretical machinery for 
truth-bearers and objects of attitudes.  I discuss this objection and these replies at greater 
length in chapter four.
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75 To see that the objections from singular predication and singular propositions are really different 
objections, notice the following: those presentists who reject the ontological dependence of propositions on 
their constituents—i.e. those who reject what Plantinga (1983) calls “existentialism”—can hold, contra the 
latter objection, that the proposition that Socrates was a philosopher exists, but, given the success of the 
former objection, they cannot hold that this proposition is true.  See also Crisp (2005, 2003).
Chapter 2. Ontology and Existence Simpliciter
According to one sort of skeptic about the presentism-eternalism dispute, presentism is 
either trivially true or trivially false, and there is no real dispute.76  Anti-skeptics reply 
that the dispute is over whether merely past and merely future objects exist simpliciter.  
Skeptics balk at existence simpliciter—why take it seriously?  In this chapter, I claim that 
existence simpliciter underlies disputes about three other ontological views: mathematical 
platonism, David Lewis’s modal realism, and a view—related to modal realism—that I 
call isolationism.  I claim that if temporal skeptics renounce existence simpliciter, they 
face a broad ontological skepticism.  Moreover, I claim that the case of isolationism 
offers a positive reason to be nonskeptical about both temporal and modal ontology.
 I proceed as follows:  I begin by outlining the skeptical position.  In §2.2-§2.4, I 
show that, respectively, the disputes over mathematical platonism, modal realism, and 
isolated space-times plausibly depends on existence simpliciter.  In particular, in each of  
these three cases, I show that parallel cases of reasoning by “ontological counting” are 
valid only if such reasoning employs a notion of existence that underpins ontological 
disputes.  In §2.5, I consider the skeptical options for responding to the ontological 
counting arguments, including the option that the skeptic adopt ontological pluralism, the 
view that there are “modes” or “ways” of being.  Finally, in §2.6, I conclude by 
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76 Lombard (2010), Meyer (2005), Savitt (2006), and Stoneham (2009) are recent advocates of the skeptical 
view (or something near it).  Anti-skeptics include Crisp (2004, 2003) and Sider (2006, 2001: 15-17).
considering whether “common sense” or “folk” belief has any bearing on the status of 
ontological disputes. 
2.1 Skepticism
According to presentists, only present things exist.  According to their rivals, eternalists, 
past, present, and future things exist.  Prima facie, this is a good old-fashioned 
ontological dispute.77  But consider a candidate formulation of presentism78:
(1) Presentism: Only present things exist.
The skeptic asks: which sense of the word ‘exist’ is at play in (1)?  If the present tense 
‘exist’—i.e. ‘exist presently’—then (1) is trivially true.  For it is trivially true that only 
present things exist presently.  But if the de-tensed ‘exist’—i.e. ‘existed, exists, or will 
exist’—then (1) is trivially false.  For it is trivially false that only present things did, do, 
or will exist.79  (Dinosaurs, for example, existed but are non-present.)  According to the 
skeptic, presentism is either trivially true or trivially false, and so there is no substantive 
ontological question here.
 But the skeptic is mistaken.  In denying, e.g., that there are dinosaurs, what 
presentists deny—and what eternalists affirm—is that dinosaurs exist simpliciter.  What 
is existence simpliciter?  I take existence simpliciter to be the most inclusive and 
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77 Though I focus on the presentism-eternalism case, points raised here about that dispute apply mutatis 
mutandis to other views on temporal ontology, e.g. the growing block view.
78 For brevity, I stick to a simplified version of the presentist thesis rather than one of the more precise 
formulations discussed in §1.3.  
79 I’m not using ‘trivial’ in a technical way.  I assume that claims that amount to either obvious necessary 
truths or obvious empirical falsehoods count as trivial in the ordinary sense of the word.
fundamental type of existence, the one expressed by the unrestricted existential 
quantifier, !x.80  To speak of existence simpliciter is to abstract away from the temporal 
location of a thing and to abstract away from whether that thing is a temporal object at 
all.  To ask, e.g., whether a dinosaur or the number two exist simpliciter is to ask whether 
any such things are within the whole of being in the most inclusive sense; it is just to ask 
whether there are any such things, full stop.81
 To forestall confusion about the sort of ontological skepticism I am opposing here, 
I note that there is a more general form of ontological skepticism that might be used to 
undercut the presentism-eternalism dispute.  Eli Hirsch—esp. (2009, 2005, and 2002)—
argues that certain physical object disputes in ontology—e.g. the dispute over whether 
there are strange mereological fusions—are merely verbal.  According Hirsch’s brand of 
skepticism, two alleged “opponents” in some ontological arena do not really disagree so 
long as their positions can be inter-translated to mutual satisfaction, i.e. the claims on 
each side of the “dispute” can, in principle, be mapped into claims that the other side 
should accept.  Taking, for example, the case of mereological composition, there is an 
alleged dispute over the following issue:  Given some collection of objects, when does 
composition occur?82  The mereological universalist answers, “always”; the common-
sense mereologist, “sometimes”; the mereological nihilist, “never”.  By Hirsch’s lights, 
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80 I use ‘exists simpliciter’ as synonymous with ‘exists tenselessly’, however I treat ‘exists atemporally’ as 
synonymous with ‘exists outside of time’. 
81 As before, and pace the meinongian, I here treat the questions “what exists?” and “what is there?” as 
equivalent.
82 For an overview, see Korman (2011).
these alleged disputants are not really disagreeing substantively over the nature of reality, 
they are merely each choosing to speak in a different language.  Roughly, each party is 
choosing to adopt a different quantifier when uttering English-languages sentences of the 
form “there are Fs” or “there are not Fs”:  The universalist adopts a maximally-inclusive 
quantifier that counts any arbitrary collection of objects as a separate object within its 
domain—e.g. an object composed of your nose and The Eiffel Tower is in the domain of 
this maximal quantifier, just as your nose and The Eiffel Tower are each individually in 
its domain.  And similarly, the common sense mereologist and the nihilist adopt, 
respectively, a sort of common sense quantifier and a minimalist quantifier.  According to 
Hirschean skepticism, so long as there is a way of treating each of these three 
philosophers as speaking truly in their preferred language (i.e. using their preferred 
quantifier), we need not see these three philosophers as having a genuine ontological 
dispute.  
 Perhaps Hirschean considerations can be extended to show that the presentism-
eternalism dispute is merely verbal too.  For perhaps a Hirschean can propose that when 
an eternalist makes a claim of the form “!xFx” that this is equivalent to when a presentist 
makes a claim of the form “WAS(!xFx) OR !xFx OR WILL(!xFx)”.  Thus, presentists 
and eternalists do not really disagree, since, e.g., when an eternalist claims that a 
dinosaur exists this can be mapped into a claim that the presentist accepts, viz. that there 
existed, exists, of will exist a dinosaur.  
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 The skeptic that I address in this chapter is not precisely a Hirschean skeptic, for 
the skeptic I wish to answer is not someone who ambitiously believes that claims within 
various ontological arenas can be inter-translated to the mutual satisfaction of the various 
parties.  The skeptic I have in mind in this chapter is more straightforward.  He does not 
come armed to the metaontological debate with a conciliatory theory—rather, he comes 
armed with a mere question: why believe in existence simpliciter?  As I hope will become 
apparent, my way of answering this simple skeptic does have some bearing on Hirschean 
skepticism (specifically, it has some bearing on the the prospects for extending it to the 
presentism-eternalism dispute).  Yet, the anti-skeptical arguments that I want to advance 
are not, I think, essentially anti-Hirschean arguments, for they do not seek, at bottom, to 
refute Hirsch’s reconciliation arguments.83
 With that said, we can fix on the skeptic at hand, viz. the skeptic who harbors 
suspicion of existence simpliciter.  His position can perhaps be helpfully illustrated by the 
following speech:    
Skeptic: It seems clear that so-called presentists and eternalists alike agree that dinosaurs existed.  
And it seems equally clear that both parties agree that dinosaurs do not exist presently.  Indeed, it 
seems that both sides of this “dispute” can in principle agree over the truth values of all tensed 
existence claims whatsoever!  So, where is the disagreement?  You say that there is disagreement 
over whether, e.g., a dinosaur exists simpliciter.  But what does it mean to assert that something 
exists simpliciter?  I have little idea, since I have little idea what it means to say that a thing just 
exists in some unqualified, wholly general sense.  Please do not respond by “explaining” existence 
simpliciter as the very notion of existence that underpins the presentism-eternalism dispute—that 
just begs the question against skeptics like me.  So, if you can’t tell me why I should believe in 
existence simpliciter to begin with, then I have no choice but to regard it as unintelligible.
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83 See Sider (2006) for an argument that suggests that Hirschean skepticism cannot be extended to the 
presentism-eternalism case.
In response, I offer three anti-skeptical arguments, in increasing order of strength.84  Each 
argument shows that some other dispute—beyond the presentism-eternalism dispute—
hinges on existence simpliciter.  If these other disputes are nontrivial, then so is the 
presentism-eternalism dispute.
2.2 The Platonist Argument
The first anti-skeptical argument concerns mathematical platonism, the view that 
numbers exist and are mind-independent objects that lack spatiotemporal location.85  
Consider an attractive form of reasoning, The Platonist Argument:
 (P1) The Eiffel Tower exists.
 (P2) The number two exists.
 (P3) The Eiffel Tower is distinct from the number two. 
 " At least two things exist.
Two plausible constraints hold:
 (C1) The Platonist Argument is valid. 
 (C2) Platonists are willing to assert (P2).
The challenge for skeptics is this: give a sense of ‘exists’ that meets both constraints.  
Anti-skeptics have a straightforward answer: ‘exists simpliciter’.  But those who reject 
existence simpliciter are hard-pressed to meet the challenge.
 By (C1), ‘exists’ must have a consistent sense throughout the reasoning.  But 
‘exists’ cannot, consistently with (C2), mean ‘exists presently’.  For something to exist 
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84 I here gauge argumentative strength by the availability and plausibility of skeptical rejoinders.
85 For a few nice starting points in the enormous literature on platonism, see Linnebo (2009), Maddy 
(1990), and Szabó (2003).
presently, it must occupy the present.  The platonist’s numbers, however, are not 
temporally located.  For the same reason, ‘exists’ cannot here mean ‘did, does, or will 
exist’; the platonist’s numbers are never temporally located.  ‘Exists’ is, in The Platonist 
Argument, most plausibly understood as ‘exists simpliciter’.  (Some—call them 
“ontological pluralists”—wish to treat The Platonist Argument as an equivocation 
involving fundamentally distinct senses of ‘exists’.  After laying out all three anti-
skeptical arguments, I consider the pluralist response in §2.5.)
 Two caveats about The Platonist Argument.  First, in debating the skeptic—in 
particular, in holding (C2)—I am not assuming that there are numbers.  Rather, I am 
merely assuming that mathematical platonism is a coherent view in logical space, that the 
proposition that numbers exist outside of time is a view in the running.  Anti-platonists 
too—whether they are nominalists who hold that numbers are in some sense reducible to 
spatiotemporal objects or whether they are nihilists who deny that there are numbers—
should happily assent to (C2), so long as they see platonism as a coherent contender. 
 Second, I acknowledge that not every view of numbers treats them as atemporal 
objects.  The sempiternalist, for instance, holds that while numbers are temporal objects, 
they exist at every time.  I have no quarrel with sempiternalism.  But it will not offer 
comfort to the skeptic.  For sempiternalists as well as mathematical platonists ought to be 
willing to assert (P2) under some interpretation of ‘exists’ that renders The Platonist 
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Argument valid.86  And whereas the skeptic can accommodate sempiternalism by treating 
‘exists’ in The Platonist Argument as tensed, he can make no such accommodation in the 
case of platonism.  So long as platonism is a coherent view, this is a problem for 
skepticism.
 Thus, for The Platonist Argument to have anti-skeptical force, it is crucial that we 
respect the long-standing distinction between eternal entities (i.e. those that exist but lack 
temporal duration) and sempiternal entities (i.e. those that exist and have maximal 
temporal duration).  Thus:
(2) The number two exists but does not exist presently.
While sempiternalists may regard (2) as a priori false on all readings of ‘exists’, 
platonists regard (2) as true on at least one reading, viz. ‘exists simpliciter’.  Skeptics 
could protest that they find it not merely incorrect but rather incoherent that (2) could 
express a truth.  But this, I take it, concedes my point that temporal skeptics adopt a form 
of skepticism about platonist ontology.
 Not so fast, says the skeptic.  The view that ‘exists’ is most plausibly read as 
‘exists simpliciter’ in The Platonist Argument assumes that ‘exists’ cannot plausibly 
instead mean ‘exists presently’.  And this assumes that something exists presently only so 
long as it temporally occupies the present.  Why assume this?  Are there not coherent 
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86 The anti-skeptic can offer a single interpretation of ‘exist’ on which (C1) and (C2) are satisfied for both 
platonism and sempiternalism about numbers, namely, ‘exist simpliciter’.  But, strictly speaking, it isn’t 
necessary that the platonist and sempiternalist interpretations agree, only that they exist.  To meet the 
challenge, it would be sufficient for the skeptic to show that the sempiternalist has an interpretation of 
‘exist’ that meets (C1) and (C2) and that the platonist has some other interpretation of ‘exist’ that meets 
(C1) and (C2).
statements—statements that even the platonist will accept—that say that some abstract 
entity exists presently?  Consider the sentence “the number two exists now.”  Insofar as 
this sentence is read as saying that the number two has a temporal location, platonists will 
not assert it.  But “the number two exists now” need not be read this way.  Instead, it can 
be read as saying that if we ask at the present time whether the number two exists, then 
the answer is that it does.  This shows that ‘exists now’ and ‘exists presently’ are 
ambiguous between two readings, call them the locational and relative readings87:
 (#x)x is locationally present iff x is temporally located at the present time.
(#x)x is relatively present iff that x exists is true at the present time.
Numbers cannot, by the platonist’s lights, be locationally present, since they cannot be 
temporally located.  But this is no obstacle to their being relatively present.  If this is 
right, it shows that there is a reading of the number two exists on which ‘exists’ means 
‘exists presently’ and yet where (C1) and (C2) are satisfied.  If so, the skeptic need not 
countenance existence simpliciter after all.
 But it is an illusion that by distinguishing these two ways of being present, we 
thereby remove the need for existence simpliciter.  To see this, focus on the analysis of 
what it is for a thing to be relatively present.  The analysis tells us that a thing, x, is 
relatively present just in case that x exists is true at the present time.  But that x exists is 
73
87 One way of putting this point is that, on the locational reading, a time is a constituent of the proposition 
expressed, e.g. the number two exists now expresses (we may assume) a proposition that has the present 
time as a constituent.  On the relative reading, a time is rather an operator on a proposition, and the 
proposition need not contain a time as a constituent, e.g. the number two exists now expresses a proposition 
where the present time is an operator on the tenseless proposition that the number two exists.
ambiguous.  What sense of ‘exists’ is at play here?  If the present tense ‘exists’, then we 
are in trouble.  For then our analysis of the relative reading amounts to this:
(#x)x is relatively present iff that x exists presently is true at the present time.
Of course, the expression ‘exists presently’, as it occurs in the analysans, is itself 
ambiguous between the locational and relative readings that we have just attempted to 
distinguish.  ‘Exists presently’ cannot, on pain of circularity, here (in the analysans) mean 
‘is relatively present’.  Nor can ‘exists presently’ mean ‘is locationally present’, for we 
then rule out the possibility that numbers are relatively present, a possibility that 
motivated the distinction in the first place.
If that x exists (in the analysis of the relative reading) does not mean ‘exists 
presently’, what does it mean?  The obvious alternative is that x exists means that x exists 
simpliciter:
(#x)x is relatively present iff that x exists simpliciter is true at the present time.
On this reading, numbers and other abstracta can be relatively present.  Given that the 
number two exists, then that the number two exists simpliciter is true at the present time.  
But this sense of being relatively present does nothing for the skeptic. 
 It therefore seems highly plausible that reasoning such as The Platonist Argument 
requires a generalized notion of existence.  Can skepticism nonetheless be reconciled 
with The Platonist Argument?  Although skeptics are suspicious of existence simpliciter, 
they might admit a generalized type of existence—one that applies to a thing whether it is 
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abstract or concrete—but hold that this generalized existence is to be innocently 
understood as a mere disjunction of skeptically-acceptable types of existence: 
 A thing existsd iff it exists temporally (exists at a time) or it exists atemporally 
 (exists outside of time).
But this disjunctive account is non-skeptical: Eternalists will claim that dinosaurs exist 
temporally; presentists will disagree.  (Presentists will claim that while dinosaurs existed 
temporally, they do no longer.88)  
 If the skeptic is to defend a disjunctive account, we need one where the 
ontological notions employed in the disjuncts do not allow temporal ontology disputes to 
re-emerge, e.g.
(Disjunctive Account) A thing existsd iff it existed, it exists, it will exist, or it 
exists atemporally.
Here, we have a disjunctive analysis of generalized existence in terms of skeptically-
kosher types of existence.  Since, on Disjunctive Account, it trivially follows that 
dinosaurs existd (and that presentism is false when ‘exists’ means ‘existd’), and since 
Disjunctive Account gives a reading of ‘exists’ consistent with (C1) and (C2), skeptics 
have allegedly found their reconciliation.  
 But skeptics have not yet reconciled their skepticism with The Platonist Argument 
for two reasons: (a) we don’t yet have any reason to think that Disjunctive Account is the 
correct account of generalized existence; (b) it is far from clear why Disjunctive Account 
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88 More generally, if skeptics concede the legitimacy of a type existence that is (a) tenseless, and (b) 
applicable to temporal objects, then their cause is lost: eternalists will claim that past things exist in the 
relevant tenseless way, and presentists will disagree and say that past things merely did exist in the relevant 
tenseless way.
is a genuinely skeptical account (i.e. one that trivializes presentism in the way required by 
skepticism).  I consider these points in turn.
 First, note that in arguing for triviality, disjunctive skeptics make certain 
ontological assumptions89:
 (3) There is no existence simpliciter in the sense intended by the ontological
  anti-skeptic.
 (4) There is a generalized notion of existence, and Disjunctive Account gives its 
 analysis. 
(5) The disjuncts do not rely on existence simpliciter.
(5) is crucial: the disjuncts must capture notions of tensed and atemporal existence that 
are either primitive or analyzed so as to avoid existence simpliciter; otherwise, the 
presentism-eternalism dispute re-emerges.  To see how assumption (5) might fail, note 
that one way to analyze tensed existence claims is via what Szabó (2007) calls “the 
standard quantificational semantics of tense”, e.g. 
 ‘a dinosaur existed’ is true iff there exists simpliciter a past time, t, and a 
 dinosaur exists simpliciter at t. 
We might wish to similarly analyze atemporal existence in terms of existence simpliciter, 
negation, and temporal location, e.g.
 ‘the number two exists atemporally’ is true iff the number two exists 
 simpliciter and it is not located at any time.
Since disjunctive skeptics cannot accept these analyses, they should tell us why their way 
of doing things is better—they should defend (4) and (5).  
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89 When I say ‘triviality’, I of course mean ‘trivial falsity or trivial truth’.
 Second, even if disjunctive skeptics can support their ontological assumptions, it 
is unclear how they thereby establish a triviality claim.  For although presentism is false 
when ‘exists’ is read as ‘existd’, it is unclear how skeptics, in arguing for ontologically-
substantive assumptions (4) and (5), have thereby shown that presentism is trivial in any 
interesting sense.  An analogy: There are a variety of philosophical assumptions that, if 
accepted, entail the falsity of presentism, e.g. the two premises of a well-known sort of 
truthmaker argument:
 (P4) Every positive, contingent truth has a truthmaker.
 (P5) If presentism is true, then some positive, contingent truths—e.g. that 
 dinosaurs existed—lack truthmakers.
 " Presentism is false.
Given (P4) and (P5) as assumptions, it follows—it trivially follows!—that presentism is 
false.  But it would be misguided to think that by establishing (P4) and (P5), one has 
established the trivial falsity of presentism.  These are, after all, philosophically-
controversial assumptions, and triviality given some nontrivial metaphysical assumptions  
is not the same as triviality simpliciter.  Analogously, (3)-(5) are controversial 
assumptions about existence.  And analogously, although doing the philosophical work to 
establish (3)-(5) would show that presentism is no longer in the running, it seems 
misguided to conclude that Disjunctive Account thereby establishes the triviality of 
presentism in the sense required by skepticism.
 Suppose, however, that I’m wrong about Disjunctive Account; suppose that it 
really does establish the triviality of presentism.  (Perhaps there is a disanalogy between 
Disjunctive Account and the truthmaker argument.)   In that case, I claim that skeptics 
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face a new threat: an anti-skeptical modal argument.  And whereas disjunctive skeptics 
may preserve the platonism dispute, such skeptics are less fortunate in the modal case.
2.3 The Modal Realist Argument
According to David Lewis’s modal realism, there are possible worlds identical in kind to 
the actual world: each possible world is an existing, concrete, spatiotemporally-isolated 
universe.90  Lewis claims that belief in such possible worlds allows for a theoretically-
powerful account of modality (among other things).91  For our purposes, it doesn’t matter 
whether modal realism is true or whether Lewis is right about its alleged virtues.  What 
matters is that modal realism, like platonism, is at least a coherent view.  Now consider a 
piece of reasoning that we may label The Modal Realist Argument:
(P1) The Eiffel Tower exists.
 (P4) A talking donkey exists.
(P5) The Eiffel Tower is distinct from all talking donkeys.
 " (C) At least two things exist.
Two constraints govern our assessment of The Modal Realist Argument:
 (C3) The Modal Realist Argument is valid. 
 (C4) Modal realists are willing to assert (P4).
The constraints are exceedingly plausible.  The validity of The Modal Realist Argument 
is as obvious as that of The Platonist Argument.  And modal realists are perfectly willing 
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90 See Lewis (1986: 1-5, 69).  More precisely, according to modal realism, each world, w, is a maximally 
spatiotemporally-unified object: each one of w’s parts bears a spatiotemporal relation to each one of its 
parts, and none of w’s parts bear a spatiotemporal relation to anything not a part of w.
91 Allegedly, it allows for a theoretically-powerful account of modality, closeness, content, and properties.  
See Lewis (1986: 5-69) and Divers (2002: 43-58). 
to assert (P4); according to them, some possible worlds contain flesh-and-blood talking 
donkeys.92  Moreover, on modal realism, such donkeys exists in a different universe from 
our own but not in a different sense of ‘exist’.  Thus, Yagisawa:93
Possibilist realism takes non-actual possible objects to be (real, genuine) objects; it takes their 
metaphysical status to be on a par with that of actual objects.  When possibilist realists assert, 
“Non-actual possible objects exist”, their word ‘exist’ has the same linguistic meaning as when 
actualists assert, “Actual objects exist”. Possibilist realists believe that some domains of discourse 
with respect to which ‘exist’ may be understood include more than actual objects, whereas 
actualists deny it. (Yagisawa 2009)
And Lewis:
The other worlds are of a kind with this world of ours… Some things exist here on Earth, other 
things exist extraterrestrially, perhaps some exist no place in particular; but that is no difference in 
manner of existing, merely a difference in location or lack of it between things that exist.  
Likewise some things exist here at out world, others exist at other worlds; again, I take this to be a 
difference between things that exist, not a difference in their existing...  If I am right, other-worldly 
things exist simpliciter... (Lewis 1986: 2-3)
The modal anti-skeptic hastens to add that although modal realism may seem implausible 
or even almost certainly false, it is not trivially false.  
 Yet taking the modal realist’s existence claims at face value spells trouble for the 
temporal skeptic.  The Modal Realist Argument cannot be interpreted as concluding that 
two things—the Eiffel Tower and a talking donkey—exist presently.  The modal realist’s 
talking donkeys are denizens of spatiotemporally-remote worlds; such donkeys do not 
exist presently, since they do not exist at the present time of our world.  For the same 
reason, the modal realist will not claim that talking donkeys did, do, or will exist.  Nor 
will the modal realist claim that such donkeys exist atemporally; they are spatiotemporal 
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92 Modal realists will assert that a talking donkey exists so long as they take themselves to be speaking 
unrestrictedly.  See Lewis (1986: 3).
93 Yagisawa uses ‘possibilist realism’ instead of ‘modal realism’.  In the present context, these are 
interchangeable; Yagisawa (2009) considers Lewis a “proponent of the best-known version of possibilist 
realism”.
beings, just not ones that are spatiotemporally-connected to us.  The modal realist’s claim 
is, as Lewis says, that such other-worldly donkeys exist simpliciter.   
 What moves are open to the skeptic?  The skeptic could question the assumption 
that something exists presently only if it occupies the actual present.  We might propose 
that, in a certain relaxed sense of ‘exists presently’, a talking donkey exists presently so 
long as it occupies the present of some world.  But the problem is that, on Lewis’s modal 
realism—which takes a four-dimensionalist, “block universe” view94—non-actual worlds 
lack an identifiable present.  Thus, consider a talking donkey world, w.  Thanks to the 
temporal isolation of worlds, there is, from our perspective in the actual world, no fact of 
the matter about which of w’s times (within the four-dimensional block) is the present 
one.  If we inhabited w, and we temporally overlapped with talking donkeys, then we 
could truly say that talking donkeys exist presently.  But as non-inhabitants of w, we can 
only catalog its donkeys in terms of which ones are located at w and which tenseless 
temporal regions of w they occupy.
 Of course, given counterpart theory, there is a fact of the matter about which time 
in w (if any) is a counterpart of our present time.95  But this point will not help the skeptic 
for two reasons.  First, if, on modal realism, a merely possible talking donkey exists at a 
time that has an actual world counterpart, it merely follows that it’s possible that a talking 
donkey exists presently (or existed or will exist).  Thus:
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94 See Lewis (1986: 202-205).
95 For example, for Lewis, that Humphrey might have won is true iff there exists, in any world, an 
individual who bears the counterpart relation to Humphrey and who wins.  See Divers (2002: 122-133) and 
Lewis (1986: 192-198) on counterpart theory.
 (P2) A talking donkey exists.
 (P2*) Possibly, a talking donkey exists.
Given modal realism and counterpart theory, (P2*) holds when ‘exists’ is tensed.  But 
(P2)—the premise employed in The Modal Realist Argument—is only assertible by the 
modal realist if ‘exists’ means ‘exists simpliciter’.  Second, surely the modal realist will 
accept the existence of some mere possibile that exists at a time, t, that lacks an actual 
world counterpart—t differs too radically from all actual times to have any of them as 
counterparts.  Therefore, (P2) can be replaced with a statement asserting the existence of 
such a mere possibile, and the counterpart reply becomes unavailable.
 To attempt to reconcile skepticism with The Modal Realist Argument, the skeptic 
might, as in the platonist case, opt for a disjunctive reading of ‘exists’, i.e. a modal analog 
of Disjunctive Account:
(Modal Disjunctive Account) A thing existsd iff it existed, it exists, it will exist, or 
it possibly exists.96
On the modal disjunctive reading of ‘exists’, The Modal Realist Argument is valid, (P2) 
is assertible by the modal realist, and presentism is false.  But notice that on Modal 
Disjunctive Account it comes out true that: 
(6) Talking donkeys, magical wizards, and fire-breathing dragons existd. 
Thus, the disjunctive skeptic yields to The Modal Realist Argument by adopting the 
modal realist’s ontology of implausibilia.  Moreover, insofar the skeptic himself takes the 
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96 One interesting way of understanding the final disjunct is via Yagisawa’s (2008) proposal of modal tense.  
On the modal tense view, ‘exist’ can have either a temporal or a modal tense.  On this approach, the four 
disjuncts achieve a kind of semantic parity.
Modal Disjunctive Account to trivialize the presentism-eternalism debate, analogous 
reasoning should persuade him that it trivializes the actualism-possibilism debate.  For 
consider the modal analog of presentism:
 (7) Actualism: Only actual things exist. 
The modal skeptic asks: Which sense of ‘exist’ is at play?  If the present tense ‘exist’, 
then (7) is trivially true.  But if the disjunctive ‘existsd’, then (7) is trivially false.  
Disjunctive temporal skeptics should find this reasoning hard to resist—by their own 
lights, the actualism-possibilism dispute is as trivial as the presentism-eternalism dispute.
   Of course, I argued in the previous section that such triviality reasoning fails:  The 
Disjunctive Account leads (in the case of platonism) to presentism’s mere falsity, not its 
trivial falsity.  If I’m right, then, by parity of reasoning, Modal Disjunctive Account also 
fails to establish presentism’s triviality.  In particular, the skeptic may argue that Modal 
Disjunctive Account gives a correct analysis of existence.  But since it is unclear why this 
analysis should itself count as trivially correct, it is therefore unclear why the triviality of 
presentism should follow from it.  The upshot is that if Modal Disjunctive Account 
indeed fails to secure triviality, then a successful skeptic—a skeptic who successfully 
establishes the triviality of presentism—cannot rely on Modal Disjunctive Account to 
make sense of The Modal Realist Argument.  But if I’m wrong, and Modal Disjunctive 
Account does establish triviality, then it does so for both presentism and modal realism.  
Either way, temporal skeptics are unable to account for the substantiveness of modal 
realism—temporal ontology skeptics are modal ontology skeptics as well.
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 I now turn to the third and strongest anti-skeptical argument; in the forthcoming 
case, the disjunctive response seems unavailable entirely.
2.4 The Isolationist Argument
Van Inwagen (1986) objects to modal realism on the grounds that even if there exist 
isolated spacetimes, it’s hard to see why they should have modal significance.  For 
example, it’s hard to see why the modal realist’s alleged fact that no million-carat 
diamond is spatiotemporally related to us but some million-carat diamond is 
spatiotemporally isolated from us should count in favor of the proposition that a million-
carat diamond is possible but not actual.  Van Inwagen’s complaint inspires a third anti-
skeptical argument.  Call a view isolationist when it posits the existence of two or more 
mutually-isolated spacetimes—that is, two or more spacetime regions that bear (and 
whose parts bear) no spatiotemporal relations to each other.  Modal realism is a form of 
isolationism, but isolationism per se is a significantly weaker thesis than modal realism.  
It is weaker ontologically, since it claims nothing about the number or variety of isolated 
spacetimes (beyond that there are at least two of them).97  It is also weaker ideologically, 
since it claims nothing about the modal significance of the isolated spacetimes—as far as 
the mere isolationist is concerned, the existence of isolated spacetimes may well be 
irrelevant to the truth of modal claims.98
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97 On Lewis’s modal realism, the spacetimes (worlds) must be plenitudinous and varied enough to support 
the demands of modality, closeness, content, and properties.  See Lewis (1986: 1-69).
98 Thanks to John Divers for suggesting isolationism.
 Consider an isolationist who contends that there are certain objects, d-particles, 
that exist only in spacetimes outside our own.  This isolationist may reason analogously 
to the platonist and modal realist:
 (P1) The Eiffel Tower exists.
 (P2) A d-particle exists.
 (P3) The Eiffel Tower is distinct from all d-particles. 
 " At least two things exist.
But The Isolationist Argument is harder to reconcile with skepticism than The Modal 
Realist Argument, for the skeptic’s conciliatory reply—a disjunctive account of ‘exists’—
is unavailable.  Since isolationism per se has no modal import, no relevant disjunct is 
available to add to the de-tensed ‘existed, exists, or will exist’.99  On mere isolationism, 
d-particles exist simpliciter, but they are neither atemporal things nor mere possibilia.
 One possible reaction to isolationism is that stripping isolated spacetimes of 
modal significance makes their existence unmotivated.  Why believe a thesis so strange 
as isolationism if not to gain some ideological benefits?  But the isolationist case against 
skepticism requires only that isolationism is coherent, not that it is well-motivated.  
Moreover, isolationism may well turn out to be motivated.  For it seems at least 
epistemically possible that isolationism will turn out to play a role in the eventual 
physics.100  After all, it seems to require unreasonable confidence and undue arbitrariness 
to hold that the complete physics, however it turns out, will rule out isolated spacetime 
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99 Skeptics should not, on pain of self-defeat, offer as a fourth disjunct some tenseless temporal notion, e.g. 
‘exists in a spacetime’.  For then temporal ontology disputes reemerge: do merely past and future objects 
exist in this spacetime?  The answer is nontrivial. 
100 Bigelow and Pargetter (1990: 191-192) note that isolationism is permitted on Einstein’s theory of 
general relativity.
regions.  Thus, isolationism confronts skeptics with a dilemma.  On the one horn, they 
deny that there is any substantive question of whether d-particles exist simpliciter, a 
denial that flies in the face of the epistemic possibility that d-particles play a role in the 
eventual physics.  On the other horn, skeptics concede that there is a substantive question 
of whether d-particles exist simpliciter, a concession that flies in the face of the skeptic’s 
denial that there is a substantive question about whether, e.g., merely past dinosaurs exist 
simpliciter.
 I’ve now offered three anti-skeptical arguments.  Where does that leave us?  The 
Platonist and Modal Realist Arguments show that temporal skeptics are committed to a 
kind of mathematical and modal skepticism.  But I haven’t yet argued that mathematical 
and modal skepticism are in themselves bad.  By the lights of The Platonist and Modal 
Realist Arguments, I have at best shown that temporal skepticism is conditionally bad—
to the extent that one takes mathematical and modal ontology seriously, one should take 
temporal ontology seriously as well.  But the isolationist argument goes rhetorically 
further—it borders, I think, on a reductio of skepticism.  Whereas a skeptic about 
mathematical or modal ontology need merely deny the coherence of platonic numbers or 
Lewis’s possible worlds, a skeptic about isolationist ontology will deny that d-particles 
are epistemically possible.  That is, the skeptic takes the following claim to be non-
substantive or incoherent in some sense: It is epistemically possible that d-particles exist 
simpliciter.  Any theory that posits d-particles is, by skeptical lights, ipso facto non-
substantive or incoherent.  And this seems an unacceptable price of skepticism.  For this 
85
reason, The Isolationist Argument seems to me stronger than the previous anti-skeptical 
ones: it gives us at least some reason to see skepticism as intrinsically misguided. 
2.5 Skeptical Options
Can temporal skeptics stick to their guns and remain skeptical?  Here are the skeptical  
options as I see them.
 First option: The temporal skeptic publicly embraces a broader ontological 
skepticism.  In particular, the skeptic concedes that, absent existence simpliciter, we 
cannot make sense of the platonism, modal realism, and isolationism disputes and that 
this explains why we cannot make sense of The Platonist, Modal Realist, and Isolationist 
Arguments.  On this line of thinking, there is no sense of ‘exists’ that simultaneously 
renders The Arguments valid and (P2)—viz. the number two (a talking donkey, a d-
particle) exists—assertible by the platonist (modal realist, isolationist).  As I think the 
isolationist case shows, this is a costly a bullet to bite.
 Second option: The temporal skeptic tries to make sense of The Arguments, as 
much as possible, by defending a disjunctive account of ‘exists’.  But if I’m right about 
the disjunctive accounts, they fail to secure the temporal skeptic’s wanted triviality claim.  
On the other hand, if I’m wrong, and the disjunctive accounts do secure triviality, then 
disjunctive skeptics secure the triviality of the presentism dispute along with securing the 
triviality of the modal realism dispute.  And since the disjunctive account is unavailable 
for isolationism, disjunctive skeptics are also at a loss to explain its substantiveness.
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 Third option:  The skeptic might claim that we needn’t treat The Arguments as 
valid in order to make sense of platonism, modal realism, and isolationism.  True, the 
skeptic could say, there is a sense of ‘exists’—‘exists presently’—on which we can 
coherently assert (P1), the Eiffel Tower exists.  And there is a sense of ‘exists’—‘exists 
atemporally’ or ‘exists in a possible world’ or some other sense—on which we can 
coherently assert (P2), the number two (a talking donkey, a d-particle) exists.  But there is 
no existence simpliciter that underlies these multifarious existences.  Rather, there are 
fundamentally distinct ways of existing, and so The Arguments are, on their faces, 
equivocations.  
 The view that there are fundamentally distinct ways of existing is, I think, radical 
but legitimate.  Call it “ontological pluralism”, after Turner (2010).101  If ontological 
pluralism lies behind temporal skepticism, skeptics should say so.  But skeptical pluralists 
have burdens to discharge: First, they should spell out, in detail, why pluralism leads to 
(or is at least consistent with) temporal skepticism.  They should explain, in other words, 
how adopting fundamentally distinct types of existence implies that there is no 
substantive question, for any of these distinct types of existence, whether past and future 
things exist.  Second, if pluralists claim that their view leads to skepticism about temporal 
ontology but not about other ontological disputes, the burden is on them to show the 
asymmetry.  If they cannot, then pluralistic temporal skeptics, like other temporal 
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101 Pluralism has a long lineage; see McDaniel (2009) and Turner (2010) for historical references.
skeptics, must either embrace a more widespread ontological skepticism or renounce 
skepticism altogether.
2.6 Ontology and Common Sense 
The preceding discussion has, I think, an interesting implication for so-called “common 
sense” or “folk” belief.  So, I want to close by considering the role common sense plays 
in determining the plausibility of modal and temporal ontology views.  
 It is often said—perhaps rightly—that common sense is a virtue in philosophy.  
And this usually means something like: Philosophers should try to see that their views—
and the implications of their views—do not clash with common sense.  If a philosophical 
view does clash with common sense, then we should accept such a view only if there are 
powerful reasons to accept it, reasons that strongly outweigh any reasons against the view 
and that more than make up for the view’s discordance with common sense.  There is of 
course room for variance—within the pro-common sense camp—over just how important 
common sense is in philosophy.  At one end of the spectrum may sit the common sense 
dogmatists who say that one should never adopt a philosophical view that is at odds with 
common sense.102  In the middle, perhaps, are the common sense moderates who say that 
if a view is at odds with common sense, then this a positive reason—though not 
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102 Does the Moorean response to skepticism count as dogmatic in this sense?  Perhaps not, for the 
Moorean claims roughly that the common-sense proposition that I know that I have hands is never less 
plausible on its own than the premises in any epistemic skeptical argument to the contrary.   Therefore, the 
Moorean seems to reject the skeptical implication—viz. that I do not know that I have hands—not simply 
on the grounds that it is anti-common sense, but rather out of a comparative plausibility judgment between 
the negation of that proposition and the premises of a skeptical argument.  On the Moorean line, See 
Huemer (2001: 27-50) and Pryor (2000).
necessarily a decisive one—to reject that view.  And at the far end of the pro-common 
sense spectrum sit the common sense tie-breakers who say that, all else being equal, we 
should pick the philosophical theory least at odds with common sense, yet common sense 
is no more than a tie-breaker.  I do not wish to here choose among these options, nor, in 
fact, do I wish to take any stand on the value of common sense in philosophy.  Rather, I 
merely wish to asses where temporal and modal ontology views stand with respect to 
common sense.  Are such views ever on the side of common sense?  Are they ever 
opposed to it? 
 Before answering, we should ask: what are common sense beliefs?  According to 
Huemer (2001: 18), such beliefs usually have three characteristics:
(i) They are accepted by almost everyone (except some philosophers and some 
madmen), regardless of what culture or time period one belongs to.
(ii) They tend to be taken for granted in ordinary life.
(iii) If a person believes a contrary of one of these propositions, that is a sign of 
insanity.
Common sense propositions therefore include those such as:
 (8) I have hands.
 (9) Birds exist. 
 (10) The Earth existed five minutes ago.
Huemer’s criteria for common sense beliefs strike me as plausible ones.  In particular, I 
will assume that, at a minimum, criterion (i)—being accepted by most people (including 
most non-philosophers)—is a necessary condition for being a common sense belief.
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 The epistemological skeptic is infamous for calling such common sense 
propositions into question.  One kind of skeptic, the external world skeptic, believes that 
we cannot know that we are not brains-in-vats (as opposed to regular human beings that 
walk around and have arms and legs, etc.).  Therefore, by epistemic skeptical lights, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that the apparent, external world objects of perception—
birds, The Earth, our own hands, etc.—are in fact unreal, their appearances to be 
explained by some elaborate hoax.  Crucially, the epistemic skeptic does not assert that 
such common sense propositions are false.  Rather, he says that, given the truth of 
skepticism, we simply do not—and perhaps cannot—know whether they are true.  In 
what sense, then, does skepticism run afoul of common sense?  Answer: Skepticism runs 
afoul of common sense because, e.g., most people surely believe that I know that birds 
exist, yet skepticism entails that this is false.
 Given the above notion of common sense belief, some philosophical views count 
as anti-common sense, e.g.:
(External World Skepticism)  We cannot know anything about the external world.  
Ergo, it is false that I know that birds exist. 
(Compositional Nihilism)  There are no composite objects—there are only 
simples.  Ergo, it is false that tables exist.103
(Moral Nihilism)  Nothing is morally wrong.  Ergo, it is false that murder is 
wrong.104 
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103 See Korman (2011) and Van Inwagen (1990b).
104 See Mackie (1977) and Sinnott-Armstrong (2011).
In some cases, a view that seems at first to be very anti-common sense may turn out to be 
not quite so bad.  For instance, in the case of mereological composition, perhaps the 
nihilist can lessen the sting of his view by explaining that, although there are no tables, 
there are atoms-arranged-table-wise (or quarks-arranged-table-wise, or whatever) and 
this helps to explain why we labor under the delusion that there are tables.  In other 
words, if the anti-common-sense philosopher can offer an error theory about our beliefs, a 
theory that explains why so many of our beliefs turned out to be mistaken, then perhaps 
this lessens the sting of this philosopher’s variance with common sense.  This is all well 
and good, and the right error theory may indeed lessen the sting of a seemingly strange 
view.  What I wish to observe here is merely that, before any such error theory is on the 
table, these views per se—external world skepticism, compositional nihilism, moral 
nihilism—surely count as being at odds with common sense.  And that is all that I wish to 
observe here: some philosophical views are, by themselves, anti-common sense. 
 Now to the key question:  do views about temporal and modal ontology—the 
views that we’ve considered in this chapter—ever count as on the side of (or as opposed 
to) common sense?  My answer: no.  And my reason for this answer is very 
straightforward:  being believed by most people (including most non-philosophers) is a 
necessary condition for being a common sense belief.  But temporal and modal ontology 
beliefs are beliefs about what exists simpliciter.  And most people, being non-
philosophers, have no beliefs about what exists simpliciter.  Therefore, temporal and 
modal ontology beliefs are neither pro- nor anti-common sense.
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 Why do I say that most people lack beliefs about what exists simpliciter?  Again, 
my reason is straightforward:  Existence simpliciter is a philosophical term of art.  
Understanding the distinction between “exists” (present tense existence) and 
“exists” (existence simpliciter) requires understanding a metaphysically-nuanced 
distinction, a distinction between tensed and tenseless modes of the verb “exist”.  And it 
is implausible that most non-philosophers employ this distinction in their ordinary, 
common sense judgments about what exists.  Of course, I fully grant that nearly everyone 
has a wide-range of beliefs about what exists (present-tense).  Most people believe in: 
tables, chairs, birds, mountains, oceans, the planet Earth, their own hands, etc.  And most 
people, I take it, would claim to know that there are such things.  And this is precisely 
why mereological nihilism and external world skepticism are, prima facie, anti-common 
sense views.  But, as we’ve seen, the presentism-eternalism and actualism-possibilism 
disputes do not concern what exists (present-tense).  All sides of these disputes agree that 
dinosaurs existed but do not exist and that fire-breathing dragons do not exist but could 
have.  What these parties disagree about is something that non-philosophers plausibly 
have no opinion about whatsoever: whether such entities exist. 
 I might be accused here of conducting a priori psychology.  How can I be sure 
what the folk believe without asking them?  How can I be sure that most people lack 
beliefs about what exists?  Yet I think that what I say is quite plausible, even without 
polling the folk.  In fact, I think that polling the folk about what exists would be 
ineffective; absent additional explanation—e.g. some kind of philosophy tutorial—most 
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of the folk wouldn’t understand, let alone have an opinion about, what exists.  I do not 
take this to be any more controversial than claiming that the folk are unlikely to have 
opinions about the truth of the following claims:
(11) There are a posteriori, synthetic, necessary truths—e.g. that water is H20.
(12) The Liar proposition—viz. that this proposition is false—lacks a truth 
value.
(13) There are some classes whose members do not form a set—e.g. the class 
of all ordinal numbers.
Understanding these claims—just like understanding the ontologist’s claims that Caesar 
exists or that talking donkeys exist—requires understanding the relevant technical, 
philosophically-nuanced distinctions, viz. synthetic vs. analytic, a priori vs. a posteriori, 
necessary vs. contingent, having a truth value vs. lacking one, class vs set.  Most 
philosophers would concede, I think, that there is little reason to expect that most people 
currently have any beliefs on whether (11)-(13) are true—these claims are just not the 
right sorts of claims to count as being pro- or anti-common sense.  Similarly, the claims 
of temporal and modal ontologists are just not the right sorts of claims to count as being 
in the domain of common sense (or anti-common sense).
 The upshot of all this is that ontologically-conservative views such as presentism 
and actualism have no right to claim the title of “common sense view” (whatever value 
such a title may have).  This is significant, I think, because it contradicts the impulse—or 
even the considered judgment—of some presentists who attempt to claim precisely this 
title, as when Bigelow (1996: 35) says that “[presentism] was believed by everyone, both 
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the philosophers and the folk, until at least the nineteenth century; it is written into the 
grammar of every natural language…”  Or as when when Markosian (2004: 48) says that 
“I endorse Presentism, which, it seems to me is the ‘common sense’ view, i.e. the one that 
the average person on the street would accept.”  And equally, it contradicts the impulse of 
actualists who wish to proudly say that their ontology is more common-sensical than that 
of the possibilist, himself so decadent as to believe in mermaids, dragons, and million-
carat diamonds.  
 Have I committed myself to saying that all modal and temporal ontology views 
are, with respect to intuitive plausibility, equal?  Have I committed to saying that 
eternalism and possibilism are no less initially plausible than presentism and actualism?  
No.  For there is a distinction between common sense and intuitive plausibility.  For 
example, it may be initially intuitively plausible when learning Set Theory 101—before 
one reaches the section on Russell’s Paradox—to think that naive comprehension is true, 
i.e. that any arbitrary collection forms a set.  Yet naive comprehension is doubtfully a part 
of common sense, for it is doubtful that most people have ever considered the issue of 
whether certain objects form a set.  Similarly, it may be intuitively plausible—yet no part 
of common sense—that action at a distance is metaphysically impossible.  Or that no 
wooden chair could have been made of fire.  Or that every event is caused.  Many 
philosophical positions may be, I take it, intuitively plausible or implausible without 
thereby being on one or the other side of common sense.  Those who feel compelled to 
incredulously stare at holders of strange views should not lose heart.  When the modal 
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realist asserts that, in another concrete possible world, existing leprechauns are happily 
hoarding their gold, the actualist should feel free to incredulously stare.  When the 
eternalist asserts that, in the past, existing Roman Gladiators are ferociously fighting to 
the death, presentists should feel free to do the same.  (Or perhaps, given that eternalism 
is much less grandiose than modal realism, presentists should restrain themselves and 
only raise an eyebrow by a couple of centimeters.)  But, if what I have said is right, then 
in neither case should the ontological conservative view his incredulity as an act of 
solidarity with the folk at-large.
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Chapter 3. Presentism and Grounding
One of the most prominent objections to presentism is that it seems to conflict with 
certain intuitive “grounding principles” according to which true propositions depend for 
their truth on the world—e.g. given presentism, that dinosaurs existed should be true, yet 
no existing dinosaurs are available to ground the truth of this proposition.  Some 
presentists claim that presentism is compatible with strong grounding principles so long 
as presentists pay the metaphysical price of endorsing tensed facts or ersatz times.  In this 
chapter, I claim that presentists may reject the strong principles unless we have some 
non-question-begging reason—some reason that does not assume the falsity of 
presentism—why grounding itself requires the strong principles.  In particular, by 
distinguishing how the world is tenselessly (is simpliciter) from how the world is, was, 
and will be, presentists may reject strong grounding principles in favor of weak, 
presentist-friendly analogues.
I proceed as follows: I begin by giving two precisifications of the grounding 
principle: truthmaking and supervenience.  In §3.2, I give the grounding argument against 
presentism.  In §3.3, I argue that we should distinguish between eternalist and presentist 
notions of grounding; once this distinction is in hand, the grounding argument is 
undercut.  In §3.4, I show how the presentist’s notion of grounding leads to presentist-
friendly truthmaking and supervenience principles.  In §3.5, I consider whether the 
grounding argument might be extended to the modal case.  In §3.6, I address some 
potential objections.
96
3.1 Grounding, Truthmaking, and Supervenience
Philosophers disagree a lot about truth.  But many of them agree about at least this much: 
Truth is grounded; true propositions depend for their truth on the world.  As Rodriguez-
Pereyra puts it:
…truth is grounded.  In other words, truth is not primitive.  If a certain proposition is true, then it 
owes its truth to something else: its truth is not a primitive, brute, ultimate fact.  (Rodriguez-
Pereyra 2005: 21) 
On what do propositions depend?  To what do they owe their truth?  A neutral—and as 
yet, unhelpful—answer: the world.  Call this the grounding requirement: 
(Grounding)  Every true proposition depends for its truth on the world.105
To many, Grounding sounds like a truism.  But some think that it should be understood in 
a way that is far from truistic.  In particular, some think that Grounding should be 
precisified to say that every truth has a truthmaker, an entity whose mere existence 
guarantees its truth.106  Call this the truthmaker principle:
(Truthmaker)  Necessarily, for any true proposition P, there exists something T 
such that T’s existence necessitates the truth of P.
As Molnar explains, Truthmaker theory is meant to cash out and give explanatory  
weight to Grounding:
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105 Two caveats.  First, we might exempt necessary truths, as they are true irrespective of the world—see 
Fine (2005) for discussion.  Second, every proposition is, properly speaking, itself a part of the world.  We 
might then modify Grounding to say that, for every contingently true proposition P, P depends for its truth 
on the world (other than the truths themselves).  For simplicity, I mostly ignore these complications, as they 
are largely tangential to the grounding argument.  But see §4 on the first point.
106 What are truthmakers?  States of affairs, tropes, and ordinary particulars are among the options.  For 
present purposes, nothing hangs on this choice.  For differing views on the nature of truthmakers, see 
Armstrong (2004), Beebee and Dodd (2005), Lewis (2003), and Parsons (2005).
Truthmaker theory is a theory of the groundedness of truth values.  Minimally, such a theory 
would enable one to identify whatever it is that explains why the truth-bearers have the truth-
values they have.  (Molnar 2000: 82).
But Truthmaker is saddled with problems.  First, negative existentials.  On Truthmaker, 
some existing thing is such as to necessitate the truth of that there are no unicorns.  But 
which entity is fit to do the job?  No obvious candidate presents itself.  Second, necessary 
truths.  On the natural way of understanding Truthmaker—namely, that T necessitates P 
just in case, necessarily, T exists only if P is true—every existing thing counts as a 
truthmaker for every necessary truth.  But it’s bizarre, for example, to treat my black 
chair as a truthmaker for the necessary truth that all red things are colored.107
In response to such difficulties, Bigelow and Lewis have defended a more modest 
precisification of Grounding, namely, the thesis that truth supervenes on being:
(TSB)  For any proposition P and any worlds W1 and W2, if P is true in W1 but not 
W2, then either something exists in one world but not the other, or else some 
object instantiates a property or a relation in one world but not the other.108
On TSB, no worlds differ among their truths without also differing among their inventory 
of existing things or their instantiation pattern of properties or relations.109  Happily, TSB 
avoids Truthmaker’s problems with necessary truths and negative existentials:  Since no 
worlds differ among necessary truths, no special entity is required to secure their truth.  
Nor does TSB require any special entities to ground negative existential propositions.  It 
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107 Given these problems, can Truthmaker (or something in its vicinity) be salvaged?  For discussion, see 
Armstrong (2004) and (2003), Cameron (2008), Lewis (2003) and (2001), Merricks (2007), Molnar (2000), 
Restall (1996), and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005).
108 My formulation here is similar to Lewis (2001, p. 612).  See also Bigelow (1988, p. 133) and Merricks 
(2007, pp. 68-97).
109 Note that Truthmaker entails TSB but not vice versa.
merely requires that, e.g., that there are no unicorns does not differ among worlds unless 
those worlds differ among what exists at them.  But TSB gives rise to an argument 
against presentism.  I now explore this argument.
3.2 The Grounding Argument Against Presentism 
To start, note that while presentists and eternalists disagree about the ontological status of 
past things, they ought to both agree that there are many truths about the past.  Among 
them:110
 (1) There were dinosaurs.
 (2) The Ottoman Empire once spanned three continents.
 (3) Apollo 11 landed on the Moon in 1969.
But the presentist’s ability to treat (1)-(3) and their ilk as true clashes with TSB.111  For 
consider (1).  On TSB, this truth supervenes on being: That there were dinosaurs could 
not have been false unless there had been some difference in the existing entities or the 
existing instantiation pattern.  And, on presentism, the present entities and the present 
instantiation pattern exhaust the existing entities and the existing instantiation pattern.  
But, presumably, the same things could have presently existed and the same instantiation 
pattern have presently held and yet that there were dinosaurs been false.  (For imagine 
the far-fetched but metaphysically possible “skeptical scenario” where things are 
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110 Since it’s controversial whether there are truths about the future, I’ll focus my examples on the past.
111 My reasoning here is similar to Crisp (2007).  See also Bourne (2006), Cameron (2011), Keller (2004), 
Kierland and Monton (2007), Merricks (2007, pp. 74-80), Sider (2001, pp. 35-42), and Tooley (1997, pp. 
234-240).
presently just as they are presently in the actual world but where the universe sprang into 
existence ten minutes ago.)  It follows that, on presentism, that there were dinosaurs—
and, by analogous reasoning, (2), (3), and other past-tense truths—fails to supervene on 
the existing entities and the existing instantiation pattern.  The presentist is thereby 
thought to be forced into the embarrassing position of either denying a plausible 
principle, TSB, or else renouncing (1)-(3) and their ilk.  
How shall the presentist respond?  Since I assume it better to renounce presentism 
than past-tense truths, there are two options.  The first option is that the presentist deny 
that things could have been just as they are and yet that there were dinosaurs been false.  
One version of this option is tensed-facts presentism, the view that past-tense truths are 
grounded by presently-existing tensed facts (e.g. the fact that the world previously 
contained dinosaurs).112  Another version is ersatz presentism, the view that past-tense 
truths are grounded by an ersatz structure (e.g. an ersatz B-series—maximal propositions 
that describe instantaneous past, present, or future states of the world and that are linked 
by a primitive temporal accessibility relation).  On both views, it’s false that things could 
have been just as they are and yet that there were dinosaurs been false, for on both views 
the truth of that there were dinosaurs can vary only with a corresponding variance in the 
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112 Some subtlety is needed.  Suppose that some facts are concrete.  If so, tensed-facts presentists may 
choose to treat their tensed grounding facts as sui generis entities, lest they potentially commit themselves 
to a presentist-unfriendly ontology of ordinary concrete past and future things.  
existing tensed facts or ersatz structure.  These approaches have been defended by a 
number of presentists, though I do not here explore the views.113
 The second option is that the presentist deny TSB.  To determine whether this is a 
costly option, we should ask why so many treat TSB as unassailable.  One answer is that 
many hold TSB to be minimally required by Grounding.  If truth is grounded in the 
world, the thought goes, then surely at least TSB must be true.  This suggests a master 
grounding argument against presentism:
(P1) Grounding is true.
(P2) If Grounding is true, then TSB is true.
(P3) If TSB is true, then presentism is false.
(C) Presentism is false.
Many presentists respond that if we bolster our metaphysic with tensed properties or an 
ersatz structure, TSB is then compatible with presentism.114  I respond that presentists 
need not quarrel with (P3).  For absent independent motivation to accept TSB, the 
presentist may remain steadfast.  The master grounding argument alleges to bridge the 
gap by giving this independent motivation.  But it does not bridge the gap.  On 
presentism, truth may be grounded and yet TSB may be false.
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113 See Bigelow (1996) for a defense of tensed-facts presentism.  See Bourne (2006) and Crisp (2007) for 
defenses of ersatz presentism.  See Cameron (2011) and Keller (2004) for related TSB-preserving 
approaches.
114 Many, but not all.  See Merricks (2007, pp. 68-97) and Kierland and Monton (2007).
3.3  Grounding: Eternalist and Presentist  
Is TSB a prima facie plausible principle?  Many think so.  But unless the issue of 
temporal ontology is prejudged in favor of eternalism, TSB may, on reflection, lose some 
of its appeal.  (At the risk of being a nag, let us keep in mind that we use the bolded ‘is’ 
and ‘exist’ to mean ‘is tenselessly/simpliciter’ and ‘exist tenselessly/simpliciter’, for this 
usage will be crucial in responding to the grounding argument.)  On eternalism, how the 
world is includes how it was, and it thus seems very likely that that there were dinosaurs 
(and other past-tense truths) should supervene on how the world is.115  But on presentism, 
how the world is presently exhausts how it is, and it therefore seems dubious that that 
there were dinosaurs (and other past-tense truths) should supervene on how the world 
is.116  This suggests that the plausibility of TSB depends on a prior choice of ontology.  If 
we leave open the ontological question of whether presentism or eternalism is correct, 
truths such as that there were dinosaurs stand as potential (but conspicuous) 
counterexamples to TSB.
 But presentists cannot simply jettison TSB without further comment.  For the 
question arises:  If TSB is jettisoned, then in what sense is truth grounded?  If some true 
proposition P fails to supervene on the existing entities plus the existing instantiation 
pattern, is this not just to say that P is ungrounded, that P fails to depend for its truth on 
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115 I use ‘how the world is’ as shorthand for ‘the things that exist and the instantiation pattern of properties 
and relations’ (and mutatis mutandis for ‘how the world was’ and ‘how the world will be’).
116 Tensed-fact and ersatz presentists of course do think that past-, present-, and future-tense truths 
supervene on how the world is.  But these varieties of presentism involve telling a metaphysical story.  My 
point is that before it occurs to her to tell a story, the presentist has no prima facie reason to think that all 
truths supervene on how the world is.
the world?  It depends on what we mean by a proposition’s being grounded and, in turn, 
on what we mean by a true proposition’s depending for its truth on the world.  Recall:
(Grounding)  Every true proposition depends for its truth on the world.
Grounding is ambiguous, for the presentist, between two readings:
(E-Grounding)  Every true proposition depends for its truth on how the world is.
(P-Grounding)  Every true proposition depends for its truth on how the world was, 
is, or will be.
I label these principles ‘E-Grounding’ and ‘P-Grounding’, for eternalist grounding and 
presentist grounding.  (Keep in mind that ‘is’ is tenseless in the former.)  For the 
eternalist—who believes that how the world is includes how it was, is, and will be—these 
principles are equivalent.117  But for the presentist—who believes that how the world is is 
limited to how it is presently—they are distinct.  By presentist lights, P-Grounding may 
be true even if E-Grounding is false.  By eternalist lights, they stand or fall together. 
If every true proposition depends for its truth on how the world is, then we should 
expect, at a minimum, that no worlds differ among their truths without also differing 
among their existing things or their existing instantiation pattern.  If E-Grounding holds 
in other words, then we should expect TSB to hold as well.  But why should the 
presentist assume that every true proposition depends for its truth simply on how the 
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117 Or, more carefully, these principles are equivalent modulo truths about objects that exist outside of time.  
That is, perhaps there are truths about atemporal things, truths that depend on how the world is but not on 
how the world was, is, or will be.  I ignore such truths since they seem to make no difference to the 
grounding argument.
world is, rather than on how it was, is, or will be?118  I propose that she shouldn’t.  By 
trading E-Grounding for P-Grounding, the presentist can say that while that there were 
dinosaurs doesn’t depend for its truth on how the world is, it does depend for its truth on 
how the world was.  The presentist can then hold that while that there were dinosaurs 
lacks a truthmaker, that there are dinosaurs used to have a truthmaker.  On P-Grounding, 
this is sufficient for treating that there were dinosaurs as grounded.  For on P-Grounding, 
if every truth (or its present-tense analog) had, has, or will have a truthmaker, then every 
true proposition depends for its truth on how the world was, is, or will be.119  Similarly 
for supervenience: If every truth supervenes upon what did, does, and will exist plus the 
past, present, and future instantiation pattern, every truth thereby depends on how the 
world was, is, or will be.
Those accustomed to reading Grounding as E-Grounding may object that on P-
Grounding presentism, that there were dinosaurs is simply a free-floating proposition: It 
has no ground at times when there are no dinosaurs.  But real grounding, they will say, 
requires an existing ground at all times, not one that comes and goes.  I respond that this 
is to suppose a certain view of grounding, one that we are not entitled to suppose without 
argument.  The question is whether P-Grounding is, on presentism, a legitimate 
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118 Sanson and Caplan (2010) argue along similar lines.  They restrict their attention to the presentist’s 
ideological challenge of accounting for “the properties and relations that things once instantiated”, whereas 
I am concerned also with the presentist’s ontological challenge of accounting for the things that once 
existed.
119 I assume that the presentist employs tense operators to construct past- and future-tense propositions 
from present-tense (or tenseless) ones.  Thus, that there were dinosaurs is constructed by embedding that 
there are dinosaurs within the past-tense operator, WAS.  Accordingly, WAS(that there are dinosaurs) is 
grounded just in case that there are dinosaurs was grounded.
disambiguation of Grounding, one that respects “real grounding”.  To answer, we should 
ask why anyone believes Grounding to begin with.   Here are two possible answers: (a) 
one has a pre-theoretical intuition that favors Grounding; (b) one engages in some 
philosophical reflection that favors Grounding.
Suppose that support for Grounding comes from some sort of pre-theoretical 
intuition about the nature of truth.  Call such an intuition the grounding intuition.  Does 
the grounding intuition explicitly favor E-Grounding over P-Grounding?  It would be odd 
if it did.  If the intuition were pre-theoretical, it would be surprising if it were 
metaphysically-nuanced enough to discern between characterizing the world as it is 
tenselessly and characterizing the world as it was, is, and will be.  For the distinction 
between tensed and tenseless existence and between tensed and tenseless property 
instantiation is a metaphysically-nuanced distinction, and one should, in general, not 
expect that metaphysically-nuanced distinctions—ones that rely on technical, 
philosophical terminology to make—will be tracked in pre-theoretical belief.  I am not, of 
course, claiming that it is impossible that this distinction be tracked in pre-theoretical 
belief, only that it would be surprising if it were.  In short, any such intuition would seem 
to be prima facie neutral between E-Grounding and P-Grounding.
 On the other hand, suppose that support for Grounding comes not from a pre-
theoretical intuition but rather from philosophical reflection.  If so, the question is what 
philosophical insight might lead us to favor E-Grounding over P-Grounding.  Here is one 
answer: We might reflect on what it means for a truth to be grounded and so come to 
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understand Grounding in a way that favors its being read as E-Grounding.  In particular, 
we might propose one or more reasonable necessary conditions on Grounding then ask 
whether, on presentism, these conditions are equally satisfied by E-Grounding and P-
Grounding.  Which conditions?  I want to consider two candidates.  Suppose that the 
grounding advocate claims that for truth to be grounded, it is necessary that true 
propositions are anchored to the world and that their truth values are explained by the 
world: 
(Anchoring) Every true proposition is anchored to some of the world’s entities or 
some part of the world’s instantiation pattern. 
(Explaining) Every true proposition can have its truth value explained by the 
world.
Does either candidate necessary conditions on Grounding give us a reason, on 
presentism, to favor E-Grounding over P-Grounding?
 First, Anchoring.  This principle involves an existence-entailing dependence 
between truth and world: For a truth to be anchored is for it to stand in a relation to some 
existing portion of the world.  If so, Anchoring does not, on presentism, admit of a 
presentist-friendly disambiguation.  That a truth might be anchored merely in virtue of 
some anchor’s having existed makes little sense; if the anchor falls out of existence, the 
relevant truth(s) become unanchored, full stop.  Ergo, if Anchoring is a plausible 
necessary condition on Grounding, then we have reason to think that Grounding requires 
E-Grounding.  
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 But Anchoring is not a plausible necessary condition on Grounding.  The reason 
for this involves negative existentials.  On Anchoring, that there are no unicorns stands in 
a relation to some existing entity.  The implausibility of this requirement is a familiar 
point against Truthmaker.  But it is equally a point against thinking that Grounding 
requires Anchoring.  For it seems overly strong to hold that Grounding per se requires 
that there are no unicorns to bear a relation to an existing portion of the world.  In 
particular, the advocate of mere TSB (i.e. TSB without Truthmaker) is in no position to 
complain that, on presentism, some truths are unanchored.  On mere TSB, that there are 
no unicorns is also unanchored, but presumably the advocate of mere TSB does not 
believe that negative existentials are thereby counterexamples to Grounding.  In short, it 
is implausible that Anchoring is necessary for Grounding, for it is plausible that some 
truths are grounded yet unanchored.  So Anchoring gives presentists no reason to accept 
E-Grounding. 
 Next, Explaining.  Is Explaining a plausible necessary condition on Grounding?  
Suppose for the sake of argument that it is.  Now observe that Explaining, unlike 
Anchoring, is ambiguous between a presentist-unfriendly and presentist-friendly version:
 (E-Explaining) Every true proposition can have its truth value explained by how 
 the world is.
(P-Explaining) Every true proposition can have its truth value explained by how 
the world was, is, or will be.
Given this ambiguity, the question here is whether the truth of Explaining requires the 
truth of E-Explaining.  If it does, then Explaining—assuming it to be a necessary 
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condition on Grounding—also requires the truth of E-Grounding.  But the truth of 
Explaining does not seem to require the truth of E-Explaining.  For imagine that the 
grounding advocate makes the following demand: “Please explain why that there were 
dinosaurs is a true proposition.  How is its truth value explained by the world?”  Now 
suppose that the presentist responds:  “Well, let me tell you how the world was some 100 
million years ago: Dinosaurs existed.  So that explains the truth of that proposition.”  
Should the grounding advocate be satisfied with this explanation?  I see no reason why 
she should not be satisfied.  True, if the presentist is a tensed-fact or ersatz-presentist, she 
can add a second piece of information: “Let me also tell you how the world is: Dinosaurs 
existed.”  Surely this second piece of information is metaphysically interesting.  Perhaps 
it supplements the first response in some explanatorily-relevant way.  But does this 
second piece of information actually raise the presentist’s explanation from inadequacy to 
adequacy?  It’s hard to see how it does.  The grounding advocate demanded an 
explanation, in terms of the world, for the truth of that there were dinosaurs.  And she got 
one: The world was such that dinosaurs existed.  The grounding advocate could protest 
that when she asked for an explanation, in terms of the world, what she really wanted was 
an explanation in terms of how the world is and not merely one in terms of how the world 
was.  But without some argument for why the former sort of explanation is necessary and 
the latter sort insufficient, this response just looks like question-begging in favor of E-
Explaining.  In short, it is plausible that, on presentism, the truth of Explaining does not 
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require the truth of E-Explaining.  If so, Explaining gives presentists no reason to accept 
E-Grounding.
 Perhaps the E-Grounding advocate objects that there is some other intuitively 
reasonable constraint on Grounding that favors E-Grounding over P-Grounding, one that 
I haven’t considered.  My challenge to those who think so is this: Articulate it.  What 
would be nice to see here—if indeed P-Grounding is inadequate—is some proposed 
necessary condition on Grounding that is both, (a) genuinely prima facie necessary for 
Grounding, and (b) genuinely supportive of E-Grounding over P-Grounding.  I offered 
two candidates: Anchoring and Explaining.  The first fails (a) while the second fails (b).  
 I don’t take any of the preceding considerations to be capable of actually 
persuading the eternalist.120  After all, from the eternalist’s epistemic position, E-
Grounding and P-Grounding entail each other, and it makes little sense to talk about 
considerations that might favor one grounding principle over the other.121  From the 
eternalist’s epistemic position, it therefore seems trivial that Grounding requires E-
Grounding.  But, of course, in giving the grounding argument we are not entitled to 
assume the eternalist’s epistemic position; to do so is just to assume the truth of 
eternalism and so beg the question against the presentist.  The challenge for the proponent 
of the grounding argument is to give some non-question begging reason—some reason 
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120 In this respect, the P-Grounding presentist view is structurally different from the tensed-fact and ersatz 
presentist views.  These latter views, if successful, may convince eternalists that presentists have the 
ontological resources to ground truth.  My goal here is thus a modest one: It is to show how presentists may 
reasonably resist the grounding argument, not to show how presentists may bring eternalists over to their 
side.
121 Again, modulo truths about atemporal entities.
that does not assume the truth of eternalism—why Grounding requires E-Grounding.  If 
the proponent is unable to do so, presentists are justified in resisting the grounding 
argument by rejecting orthodox TSB and Truthmaker and then adopting supervenience or 
truthmaking principles of their own.  I now turn to a discussion of such principles.
3.4 Presentist Truthmaking and Supervenience
P-Grounding suggests presentist versions of Truthmaker and TSB:  
(Note: ‘WAS’ and ‘WILL’ are tense operators: ‘WAS(P)’ is read ‘It was that P’ 
and ‘WILL(P)’ is read ‘It will be that P’.)
(Presentist Truthmaker)  Necessarily, for any true proposition P:
(i) If P is of the form WAS(Q), then WAS(there exists something T such 
that T’s existence necessitates the truth of Q).
(ii) If P is of the form WILL(Q), then WILL(there exists something T such 
that T’s existence necessitates the truth of Q).
(iii) Otherwise, there exists something T such that T’s existence 
necessitates the truth of P.
(Presentist TSB)  For any worlds W1 and W2, let # be the proposition that 
something exists in one world but not the other, or else some object instantiates a 
property or a relation in one world but not the other.  For any proposition P, if P is 
true in W1 but not W2, then # or WAS(#) or WILL(#).122
These principles have a similar prima facie plausibility for the presentist as Truthmaker 
and TSB have for the eternalist; they are each precisifications of P-Grounding, just as 
Truthmaker and TSB are precisifications of E-Grounding.  It is key that, in defending 
either principle, the presentist can hold that the truth of a proposition can depend on how 
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122 Note that WAS(#) is to be read as equivalent to the proposition that something existed in one world but 
not the other or else some object instantiated a property or a relation in one world but not the other.  And 
mutatis mutandis for WILL(#).  In other words, Presentist TSB is to be read as saying that the truths 
supervene on what did, does, and will exist, plus the instantiation pattern that did, does, and will hold.
the world was or will be—and so to things that were or will be—without thereby being 
ontologically committed to merely past or future things.  Presentist Truthmaker and 
Presentist TSB are formulated in presentist-friendly terms precisely to avoid unwanted 
ontological commitments.  On Presentist Truthmaker, that there were dinosaurs depends 
on past dinosaurs in the following sense: That there were dinosaurs is true just in case 
that there are dinosaurs had a truthmaker.  But the presentist’s admission here—that that 
there are dinosaurs had a truthmaker—entails nothing about what exists.  And on 
Presentist TSB, that there were dinosaurs depends on past dinosaurs in the following 
sense: No worlds differ in whether that there were dinosaurs is true without also differing 
in whether dinosaurs existed.  But the presentist’s admission here—that that there were 
dinosaurs supervenes on what existed—entails nothing about what exists.  
Presentist Truthmaker runs into trouble with cross-temporal truths, truths that are 
about more than one time.  Consider:
 (4) That Elvis was taller than Napoleon was.
An eternalist may plausibly claim that (4) is grounded by the cross-temporal state of 
affairs Elvis’s being taller than Napoleon, an entity that has Elvis, Napoleon, and the 
taller than property as constituents.  But on presentism, there was never a time when that 
state of affairs existed, as Elvis and Napoleon never temporally overlapped.  Since, on 
presentism, that Elvis was taller than Napoleon was (or its present-tense analog) never 
had a truthmaker at any single past time, Presentist Truthmaker fails as stated.
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I think that the presentist can modify her truthmaking principle to deal with such 
truths.  She should start from the observation that two truths are already grounded on P-
Grounding, namely:
 (5) That Elvis was 72 inches tall.
 (6) That Napoleon was 67 inches tall.
I think it plausible, within the spirit of P-Grounding, for the presentist to hold that since 
(5) and (6) are grounded, (4) is also grounded since (4) is just a consequence of (5) and 
(6).123,124  The presentist could therefore adopt the principle that being grounded is closed 
under entailment:
(Entailment)  If there are some Q1,…,Qn and a P such that Q1,…,Qn are grounded 
and Q1,…,Qn * P, then P is grounded. 
A bit of caution here.  Are necessary truths grounded?  On the classical picture of 
entailment, every necessary truth is entailed by every truth, and so Entailment plus the 
existence of at least one grounded truth ensures that every necessary truth counts as 
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123 Need we add as a premise that if Elvis was 72 inches tall and Napoleon was 67 inches tall, then Elvis 
was taller than Napoleon was?  Not if we assume a classical picture of entailment on which Q entails P just 
in case ¬◊(Q & ¬P).  On classical entailment, we needn’t list necessary truths as premises.
124 Even supposing that the entailment strategy is plausible, another objection to the presentist’s treatment 
of (4) lurks.  Namely: If that Elvis was taller than Napoleon was is true, then Elvis must have once stood in 
the taller than relation to Napoleon.  So presentists face a dilemma: Either implausibly say that this 
proposition is false or else implausibly say that the existing Elvis once stood in a relation to the non-
existent Napoleon.  Two observations.  First, the dilemma is not obviously a grounding worry, for it never 
calls into question presentists’ ability to give (4) a truthmaker.  Second, the worry seems to confront all 
presentists (including tensed-fact and ersatz presentists), not just those who accept my view of grounding.  
For discussions of how presentists might treat cross-temporal truths, see Crisp (2005), Davidson (2003), 
and De Clercq (2006).
grounded.125  For those who hold that necessary truths are ungrounded (and no worse for 
it), a modification is needed:  
(Entailment*)  If there are some Q1,…,Qn  and a P such that Q1,…,Qn are 
grounded, P is contingent, and Q1,…,Qn * P, then P is grounded.  
The modified entailment principle avoids the untoward result that necessary truths are 
grounded, yet it retains the welcome result that a contingent truth can be grounded in 
virtue of being entailed by some number of grounded truths.  So long as Grounding is 
construed as P-Grounding, Entailment* looks plausible.  For That Elvis was taller than 
Napoleon was is fully dependent upon (and explicable in terms of) the truths that jointly 
entail it, and the truths that jointly entail it are themselves grounded by how the world 
was.  The presentist’s truthmaking principle could then be amended as follows: 
(Presentist Truthmaker)  Necessarily, for any true proposition P, P is grounded 
according to the recursive truthmaker rule, RTR.
(RTR)  For any proposition P:
(i) P is grounded if there exists some T such that T’s existence 
necessitates the truth of P.
(ii) If P is of the form WAS(Q), then P is grounded if WAS(Q is grounded 
according to RTR).
(iii)If P is of the form WILL(Q), then P is grounded if WILL(Q is 
grounded according to RTR).
(iv)P is grounded if there are some Q1,…,Qn such that Q1,…,Qn * P, P is 
contingent, and Q1,…,Qn are grounded according to RTR. 
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125 See Armstrong (2003), Restall (1996), and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) on the relationship between 
entailment and truthmaking.  Armstrong defends, and Rodriguez-Pereyra attacks, the notion that 
truthmaking is closed under entailment: If T is a truthmaker for P and P $ Q, then T is a truthmaker for Q. 
But note that Entailment and Entailment* are distinct from this stronger entailment principle; grounding 
may be closed under entailment even if truthmaking is not. 
RTR tells us whether a proposition is grounded.126  It says, of every proposition P, that P 
has a truthmaker, or that the embedded proposition within P is grounded on RTR, or that 
P follows from some propositions that are grounded on RTR.  If a proposition is 
grounded on RTR, call it truthmaker grounded.  While not every truth has a truthmaker 
on Presentist Truthmaker, every truth is truthmaker grounded.  Whether the presentist 
opts for Presentist Truthmaker or Presentist TSB alone depends (in part) on whether she 
thinks the familiar objections concerning necessary truths and negative existentials can be 
met.  But both options are consistent with Grounding, as both are consistent with P-
Grounding.  
3.5  Grounding and Modal Truths
Before concluding by considering objections, I want to briefly consider whether there is 
an analogous grounding argument in the modal case.  Recall that actualism—the view 
that only actual things exist—is the modal analog of presentism.  In contrast, possibilism
—the view that merely possible things exist—is the modal analog of eternalism.  The 
purpose here is to determine whether Grounding has modal implications, and, in 
particular, whether it has anti-actualist implications.  We might initially suspect that just 
as Grounding generates an anti-presentist argument in the case of past-tense truths, it may 
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126 Note that clause (i) ensures that every necessary truth counts as grounded, for, trivially, anything 
whatsoever necessitates the truth of a necessary truth.  Was Entailment* then all for naught?  No.  This is 
just the necessary truths problem of Truthmaker—viz. anything whatsoever counts as a truthmaker for any 
necessary truth—coming to bite Presentist Truthmaker under a slightly different guise.  I’ll leave it to the 
truthmaker theorist to solve (or explain away) the problems with necessary truths (and negative 
existentials), and I’ll assume that a proposed solution that modifies Truthmaker can be imported to 
Presentist Truthmaker. 
generate a parallel anti-actualist argument in the case of modal truths.  For while the 
possibilist believes in a profusion of merely possible entities that might serve as truth 
grounds for modal claims, the actualist does not.
 Consider the plausible modal truths that water is necessarily H2O and that there 
could have been purple sheep.  What parts of reality fix the truth of these propositions 
and explain, in a metaphysical sense, why they are true?  That is, what grounds their 
truth?  From a certain perspective, it is tempting to answer that nothing whatsoever 
grounds them.  For these propositions are necessary truths; they hold in all possible 
worlds.127  We might therefore think that modal truths simply do not require a truth 
ground; since they are true at every possible world, nothing is needed to make them true. 
 From another perspective, this answer is wanting.  Necessary truths, like all 
truths, describe reality.  But then what parts of reality ensure that they succeed in 
describing rather than misdescribing?  What explains—metaphysically explains—why 
these claims succeed rather than fail?  If the answer is that nothing ensures or explains 
their success, then, from a certain perspective, their truth may begin to look mysterious.
 Rather than attempt to settle the issue of whether modal truths need grounding, it 
will be fruitful to suppose that they do, then see whether anything interesting follows.  In 
particular, it will be fruitful to treat Grounding as maximal—assume that it covers 
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127 This assumes that the modal logic S5 describes genuine metaphysical possibility and necessity.  On S5, 
every world is accessible to every world, and so the same truths are possible and necessary relative to every 
world.  Thus, given that there could have been purple sheep is true, it is true at every possible world.  And 
given that water is necessarily H2O is true, it too is true at every world.
necessary and contingent truths alike—then see wether it can be used to generate an anti-
actualist argument.
 Whether such an argument is forthcoming depends, presumably, on which 
precisifications of Grounding we are prepared to accept.  We distinguished between 
weaker and stronger precisifications, TSB and Truthmaker, respectively.  Recall:  
(TSB)  For any proposition P and any worlds W1 and W2, if P is true in W1 but not 
W2, then either something exists in one world but not the other, or else some 
object instantiates a property or a relation in one world but not the other.
Since TSB is a transworld principle, that water is necessarily H2O and that there could 
have been purple sheep do not stand at odds with it.  For no words whatsoever differ 
among their necessary truths.  Therefore, these modal truths are TSB-kosher regardless of 
what exists.  This suggests that if there is to be a grounding argument against actualism, it 
must be one that employs a stronger principle than TSB.  It also suggests that if the 
strongest true grounding principle is one that genuinely vindicates—i.e. allows an 
explanation of—the grounding of modal truths, then TSB is not the strongest true 
grounding principle.  
 What about Truthmaker?  Recall:
(Truthmaker)  Necessarily, for any true proposition P, there exists something T 
such that T’s existence necessitates the truth of P.
Here too it is initially tempting to think that modal truths are safe from any grounding 
worry.  For consider a natural proposal concerning what it means to say that T 
necessitates the truth of P:
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 (Simple Necessitation)  T necessitates P just in case, necessarily, T exists only if P 
 is true. 
If Simple Necessitation holds, then anything whatsoever counts as a truthmaker for any 
necessary truth: Since P, if necessary, is true in all worlds, then nothing whatsoever exists 
while P is false.  On this conception of necessitation, e.g., my pencil necessitates the truth 
of (is a truthmaker for) the claim that water is necessarily H20.  Those who take 
truthmaker theory seriously may take this to show that the current conception fails: 
whatever truthmaker theorists mean by ‘T necessitates P’, it must be something more 
metaphysically-demanding than Simple Necessitation.  When an entity stands in the 
truthmaking relation to a proposition, that entity must metaphysically ground its truth in 
some genuine, nontrivial sense.  It must be, we might say, in virtue of the truthmaker that 
the given proposition is true: 
 (Virtue Necessitation)  T necessitates P just in case, necessarily, if T exists, then P 
 is true in virtue of T.
This stronger necessitation principle explains why my pencil is not a truthmaker for the 
claim that water is necessarily H20: it is not in virtue of my pencil that Water is 
necessarily H20.  How should we understand the idea of truth in virtue of a truthmaker?  
This is a crucial question for truthmaker theorists.  For present purposes, we should 
assume that truthmaker theorists will have either an answer to offer or a reason why 
taking the notion as primitive is unproblematic.
 Adopting Truthmaker and Virtue Necessitation allows us, it seems, to get an anti-
actualist argument up and running.  For on actualism, what exists is limited to the actual.  
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Yet many truths extend beyond the actual, e.g. the truth that there could have been a 
purple sheep.  Moreover, if every true proposition requires a truthmaker in virtue of 
which that proposition is true, it is far from clear which truthmakers actualists will have 
to offer for modal claims.  The possibilist can happily say that there are an abundance of 
existing, merely possible purple sheep, each of which is a truthmaker for the claim that 
there could have been a purple sheep.  But this avenue is closed to actualists.  The 
grounding argument against actualism might then proceed as follows: 
 (P1) Every true proposition, P, has a truthmaker in virtue of which P is true.
 (P2) That there could have been purple sheep is true.
 (P3) That there could have been purple sheep has a truthmaker in virtue of which 
 it is true.  (From P1, P2.)
 (P4) If actualism is true, then that there could have been purple sheep lacks such a 
 truthmaker.
 (C) Actualism is not true.  (From P3, P4.) 
Actualists, like presentists, are free to claim that Truthmaker or Virtue Necessitation fails 
and hence that the preceding argument is unsound since (P1) is false.  What specific 
grounds might actualists have for denying (P1)?  I propose that actualists are justified in 
rejecting (P1) for reasons analogous to why presentists are justified in rejecting it: It is far 
from clear that we have a non-question-begging reason—a reason that does not assume 
the truth of possibilism—to believe that Grounding itself requires a strong version of 
Truthmaker that extends to modal truths.  Note that Grounding is ambiguous, for the 
actualist, between two readings:
 (M-Grounding) Every true proposition depends for its truth on how reality is.
118
 (A-Grounding)  Every true proposition depends for its truth on how reality is 
 or might be or must be.
Possibilists may endorse M-Grounding without reluctance; by their lights, reality broadly 
speaking includes truthmakers for claims about how things might have or must have 
been.  
 But actualists should be reluctant to endorse M-Grounding.  If what exists is 
limited to the actual, then why think that the whole of being includes truthmakers for 
claims concerning how things might or must have been, claims that obviously extend 
beyond the actual?  Note that on possibilism, M-Grounding entails A-Grounding and vice 
versa; on possibilism, how reality is includes how reality might and must be.  Thus, from 
the possibilist’s epistemic position, there is no question of these principles differing in 
truth value.  But of course, in giving an anti-actualist argument, we are not entitled to 
assume the possibilist’s epistemic position.  If we rather adopt a neutral view of modal 
ontology—if we leave open the question of whether actualism or possibilism is true—
then, e.g., that purple sheep might have existed stands as a potential but conspicuous 
counterexample to M-Grounding.
 To summarize, the prospects for an anti-actualist grounding argument are even 
from the start noticeably weaker than those for an anti-presentist argument.  Since 
standard versions of TSB and Truthmaker do not stand at odds with modal truths, an anti-
actualist argument requires a stronger precisification of Grounding—e.g. one based on 
the principle of Virtue Necessitation.  With a stronger grounding principle, a valid anti-
actualist argument appears on the scene.  Actualists who are confronted with this 
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argument may respond in a way analogous to how presentists may respond to the 
temporal grounding argument, viz. by distinguishing actualist-friendly and actualist-
unfriendly readings of the grounding principle.
 Finally, I close by considering some objections.
3.6 Objections
Objection:  Dependence is a relation.  Therefore, if the presentist holds that a proposition 
depends for its truth on a merely past thing, she posits a mysterious dependence relation 
between an existing proposition and a non-existent past thing.  
Reply:  Dependence need not be construed as a relation, and so the P-Grounding 
presentist need not posit relations between existing things and nonexistent things.  First, 
take Presentist TSB.  That there are no unicorns supervenes (and so depends) on what 
exists, but it doesn’t follow that this proposition stands in a relation to something.  
Similarly, that there were dinosaurs supervenes (and so depends) on what did exist, but it 
doesn’t follow that this proposition stands in a relation to something.  Though 
supervenience is a notion of dependence between truth and world, it is not one that 
requires relations between truth-bearers and entities.  Next, take Presentist Truthmaker.  
While truthmaking, unlike supervenience, involves a special relation between 
truthmakers and truth-bearers, Presentist Truthmaker only requires this relation to hold at 
times when the relata exist.  On Presentist Truthmaker, when the last dinosaur went out of 
existence, the truthmaking relation ceased to hold between it and that was a dinosaur.  
120
But it was then true that this relation had held, and this is sufficient for our treating that 
there was a dinosaur as grounded on Presentist Truthmaker.
Objection:  If the truth of that there were dinosaurs depends on some merely past 
dinosaurs, then we may infer that some merely past dinosaurs are such that the truth of 
that there were dinosaurs depends on them.  But this amounts to quantification over 
merely past entities, a direct contradiction of presentism. 
Reply:  On P-Grounding presentism, truth’s dependence on being involves no more than 
the truth of Presentist TSB or Presentist Truthmaker, both of which are formulated with 
the presentist’s opaque tense operators.  When the presentist claims that the truth of that 
there were dinosaurs depends on some past dinosaurs, we cannot infer that something is 
such that the truth of that there were dinosaurs depends on it.  Call a statement of the 
form A depends on B where it is illegitimate to quantify into the latter position a 
statement of opaque dependence.  The P-Grounding presentist construes the dependence 
of truth on its ground as opaque when it involves a past- or future-tense truth.
Objection:  What exactly is this thing you call “opaque dependence”?  It sounds 
suspicious.  
Reply:  The presentist already helps herself to tense operators—WAS and WILL—that 
are ontologically non-committing.  Why is the claim that dependence is sometimes 
opaque any more suspicious than the claim that truth is sometimes opaque?  The opacity 
of truth’s dependence on the past and future is arguably to be expected given the opacity 
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of past- and future-tense truth.  Indeed, the former issues simply from Presentist TSB and 
Presentist Truthmaker’s formulation using tense operators.  So long as the introduction of 
opacity via tense operators is unobjectionable, the opacity of dependence should be too. 
Objection:  Supervenience itself is a relation—hence, it is usually called “the 
supervenience relation”—between a proposition and a supervenience base.  In the case of 
TSB, supervenience is cast as a relation between a proposition and the world as a whole.  
To hold that that there are no unicorns supervenes on being is to hold that, even in the 
absence of unicorns, this propositions stands in a relation to the world as a whole.  But, 
on the P-Grounding proposal, that dinosaurs existed does not stand in any explanatory or 
metaphysically-meaningful relation to the world as a whole, for, by presentist lights, the 
world as a whole contains no dinosaurs.  
 So, we are left with an unanswered question, or with a question whose answer is 
unclear, viz. what sits at the other end of the presentist’s supervenience relation?  That is, 
what is the supervenience base for that dinosaurs existed?  It seems that there are three 
options:  (i) Past being—i.e. how the world was as a whole; (ii) Some kind of ersatz 
entity; (iii) Nothing at all.  Given presentism’s eschewal of past being—how the world is 
as a whole does not include how it was as a whole—option (i) seems to be, for the 
presentist, a kind of suspicious meinongianism.  Eternalists, by contrast, have no trouble 
saying that some chunk of past being is the supervenience base for that dinosaurs existed. 
But for the presentist to say this amounts to the the claim that supervenience bases can 
include such shadowy non-entities as things that existed but do not exist.  Option (ii) is 
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not pursued, by the current proposal, as a candidate answer to the grounding problem.  
And option (iii) seems to be a concession that presentists have no truth ground to offer for 
past-tense claims, i.e. on this option, many tensed claims simply lack a supervenience 
base altogether.  In short, negative existentials such as that there are no unicorns are not a 
good guide to the grounding problem for presentism, and it is mysterious what the 
supervenience base is for that dinosaurs existed.
Reply:  I earlier claimed that dependence need not be construed as a relation.  But 
supervenience—which is a kind of dependence—need not be construed relationally 
either.  Of course, supervenience can be construed relationally, but the point here is that it 
need not be.  If supervenience is not a relation, what is it?  My answer: It is a kind of 
covariation.  Or more precisely: It is a kind of modal covariation—viz. covariation 
between what is true at a world and the ontology and ideology of that world.128  
Eternalists can say that truth-world supervenience is covariation between, one the one 
hand, what is true, and on the other, what exists and the tenseless instantiation pattern of 
properties and relations.  My proposal is that, analogously, presentists can say that truth-
world supervenience is covariation between, one the one hand, what is true, and on the 
other, what existed, exists, and will exist, plus the past, present, and future instantiation 
patterns.  Both TSB and P-TSB are supervenience principles for a simple reason: they are 
both principles governing how truth covaries with ontology and ideology.  And both 
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128 Of course, I here use “the ontology and ideology of a world” liberally to potentially include the ontology 
and ideology that a world had or will have.
principles agree that the truth of that there were no dinosaurs covaries with the past 
existence of dinosaurs.
 Moreover, it is not at all clear what is gained, in the case of grounding, by 
construing supervenience as a genuine relation between truth and world rather than as  
mere covariation between them.  To motivate my answer to the grounding objection, I 
drew a parallel between the truth-world dependence of that dinosaurs existed and that 
there are no unicorns.  The current objection claims that the negative existentials such as 
the latter are naturally understood as standing in a supervenience relation to the world as 
a whole.  But why?  Presumably, to metaphysically account for the truth of such negative 
existentials.  Yet it is hard to see what advantage a genuine supervenience relation gives 
us here beyond what we already had with a non-relational, mere covariation principle.  
For suppose that the supervenience of that there are no unicorns is to be understood as a 
genuine truth-world relation.   How does the fact that this proposition stands in a relation 
to the world metaphysically account for its truth?  Answer: it doesn’t.  The world, on its 
own, does not metaphysically account for the truth of that there are no unicorns.  For the 
world to account for its truth, we should need to add something else, viz. a fact that states 
that, whatever the world contains, that is all that it contains—i.e. a “that’s all” fact.  
Absent such a “that’s all” fact, the world on its own does not ground, in any meaningful 
sense, that there are no unicorns.  Of course, the problem of providing grounds for 
negative existentials is precisely one of the metaphysical nettles that motivates the retreat 
from Truthmaker to TSB.  But once we drop the need for Truthmaker and precisify 
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Grounding as TSB, the need for any such “that’s all” fact disappears.  Understanding 
TSB as mere covariation, we can show that that there are no unicorns depends on the 
world in the following minimal sense: no worlds differ among their truths without also 
differing among ontology or ideology.  But if so, then where is the need to treat 
supervenience as a genuine relation?  How does a genuine truth-world relation illuminate 
grounding in a way that mere truth-world covariation does not?
 To summarize, recall the original question posed in the objection: What is the 
supervenience base, on P-Grounding, for that dinosaurs existed?  Answer: It depends on 
what you mean by “supervenience base”.  If by “supervenience base” you mean the thing 
that the truth of that dinosaurs existed opaquely depends upon—i.e. the thing this 
proposition covaries with—then the answer is: past being, viz. what existed.  For when it 
comes to a supervenience base that a proposition opaquely depends upon, we need not 
assume that the base exists.  But if by “supervenience base” you mean the existing thing 
to which that dinosaurs existed stands in a genuine relation, then the answer is: there isn’t 
one.
Objection:  On Presentist Truthmaker, that there were dinosaurs need not have a 
truthmaker so long as that there are dinosaurs had a truthmaker.  But what entitles the 
presentist to hold that any proposition had a truthmaker?  Nothing in her ontology 
grounds the claim that there used to be any truthmakers.  
Reply:  True, the adopter of Presentist Truthmaker accepts the following claim:  
 (7) That (that there are dinosaurs) had a truthmaker.
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But the claim that (7) itself requires a truthmaker is ambiguous.  Must the presentist say 
that (7) has a truthmaker?  Or need she merely say that its present-tense analog—
That (that there are dinosaurs) has a truthmaker—had a truthmaker?  While Truthmaker 
requires the former, Presentist Truthmaker merely requires the latter.  The claim that the 
presentist is unentitled to hold that any proposition had a truthmaker rests on wrongly 
holding her to E-Grounding. 
Objection:  The presentist has only shown that the truth of (7) is consistent with 
Presentist Truthmaker.  But consistency is not enough.  The presentist is charged to 
explain how truths about the past are grounded.  She cannot, in meeting the charge, make 
further assertions about how things were in the past, for such assertions also require 
grounding and making them would simply lead to a truthmaker regress.  
Reply:  Any such regress is not unique to Presentist Truthmaker.  Consider:
 (8) That there are aardvarks
All truthmaker theorists—whether they accept Truthmaker, Presentist Truthmaker, or 
some other truthmaker rule—presumably say that (8) has a truthmaker, that that (8) has a 
truthmaker has a truthmaker, and so on.  But this regress poses no threat to the presentist 
that wasn’t already there for the non-presentist.  Since the regress involved in (7) is in 
principle no different from that involved in (8), any claim that the regress involved in (7) 
is vicious should be treated as troublesome for truthmaker theorists broadly and not just 
presentists.  
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Objection:  You’ve chosen a convenient example in discussing Presentist Truthmaker: 
That Elvis was taller than Napoleon was is entailed by other grounded propositions 
because it involves an internal relation, i.e. one fixed by the intrinsic character of the 
relata.  But there are lurking counterexamples to Presentist Truthmaker.  Consider:
 (9) That the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand caused World War I. 
 (10) That the birth of Napoleon preceeded the birth of Elvis.  
These truths are usually taken (by the eternalist, anyway) to involve external, cross-
temporal relations.  For that reason, these truths are problematic for Presentist 
Truthmaker, since it’s not obvious how they are entailed by some propositions, each of 
which is grounded on Presentist Truthmaker.
Reply:  Two observations.  First, it is not merely the external character of these truths that 
is problematic from the perspective of Presentist Truthmaker.  For on Presentist 
Truthmaker, a grounded truth includes one entailed by any set of grounded propositions; 
the contingent propositions in the set needn’t be restricted to ones concerning the intrinsic 
character of the subjects of the cross-temporal proposition.  E.g. In grounding that the 
birth of Napoleon preceeded the birth of Elvis, the entailing propositions needn’t be 
restricted to ones concerning the intrinsic characters of Elvis’s birth and Napoleons’s 
birth.  Put differently, what matters for Presentist Truthmaker is that all truths be fixed by 
some number of past, present, or future instantaneous states of the world.  If a truth fails 
to supervene on the intrinsic character of all the world’s past, present, and future 
instantaneous states, call that truth globally external.  For Presentist Truthmaker to 
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succeed, there cannot be any globally external truths.  But there can still be locally 
external truths, truths not fixed by the intrinsic characters of the subjects of those truths 
but which are fixed by the intrinsic characters of some number of past, present, or future 
instantaneous world states.
 Second, the presentist already faces a separate (non-truthmaker) problem of 
offering a presentist-friendly account of causal and temporal relations.  The question for 
the presentist qua truthmaker theorist is not whether (9) and (10) are consistent with 
Presentist Truthmaker on any old view of causal and temporal relations but rather 
whether they are consistent with it on presentist-friendly views of casual and temporal 
relations.129
I previously addressed, briefly in §1.5, the prospects for presentist-friendly views 
of causation.  Although I do not wish to offer a detailed defense of a presentist view of 
causation, let me now suggest that I find Huemer and Kovitz’s (2003) view whereby 
causal relations hold between simultaneous events to be especially promising for 
presentism.  Huemer and Kovitz claim that a simultaneous view of causation follows 
from two assumptions: (a) the claim that action at a temporal distance is impossible, and 
(b) the claim that time is mathematically continuous.  Since these are plausible 
assumptions, the claim is that a simultaneous view of causation—one where causes are 
simultaneous with their direct effects—is plausible as well.
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129 Perhaps there are no good presentist-friendly accounts of casual and temporal relations.  If so, 
presentism is unattractive, and there is little point in answering the grounding argument.  For discussion of 
presentist-friendly views of causation (and cross-temporal relations broadly), see Crisp (2005), Davidson 
(2003), and De Clercq (2006).
On this sort of view, a truth such as that pushing down on the see-saw caused the 
other end to lift involves the casual relation’s holding between simultaneous pushing and 
lifting events.  On the simultaneous view, many causal truths—truths involving the direct 
effect of some cause130—will turn out to be uni-temporal rather than cross-temporal, and 
the presentist will face no special difficulty in grounding them.  Of course, causal truths 
are not limited to cases of direct effects.  That the assassination of the Archduke caused 
WWI is a truth that relates some cause to one of its temporally non-overlapping indirect 
effects.  Here, the defender of the simultaneous view may hold that cases of indirect 
effects—cases without temporal overlap between cause and effect—are reducible to a 
series of instances of direct causes and effects, cases where causes are simultaneous with 
their effects.  Thus, that the assassination of the Archduke caused WWI is only true if 
there was a series of overlapping causes and effects leading from the assassination to the 
war.  Taking these ideas on board, the presentist can treat each uni-temporal casual truth 
as grounded on Presentist Truthmaker, and she can treat that the assassination of the 
Archduke caused WWI as reducible to (and hence as entailed by) some number of 
grounded uni-temporal causal truths.
Next, temporal relations.  The presentist might offer the following pair of truths:
 (11) That Napoleon was born in 1769 and Elvis was born in 1935.
(12) That if Napoleon was born in 1769 and Elvis was born in 1935, then the 
birth of Napoleon preceded the birth of Elvis.
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130 By “direct effect”, I mean the effect of a cause such that no other effect is intermediate between that 
cause and that effect. 
That the birth of Napoleon preceeded the birth of Elvis follows from the pair if (12) is 
contingent; otherwise, it follows from (11) alone.  Is (12) true contingently or necessarily, 
and if it’s contingent, what grounds it?  The answer depends on our account of times.  
Eternalists might, for example, think of a time as a maximal slice of the world.  
(Intuitively, on eternalism, an instant is just a three-dimensional slice of a four-
dimensional world; the four-dimensional world itself is an arrangement of all its instants.) 
The eternalist can thereby say that (12) is true in virtue of 1769’s standing in the external 
relation of being 166 years prior to 1935.  But it is contingent that 1769 preceded 1935, 
for it is contingent that the world slice that we call ‘1769’ preceded the world slice that 
we call ‘1935’.131
 The presentist cannot believe that concrete world-slices stand in cross-temporal 
relations—doing so would commit her to non-present things—therefore her account of 
times will likely differ from the eternalist’s.132,133  How should the presentist understand 
times?  Here is one option.  Just as ordinary objects instantiate an age property, the 
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131 Thought experiment: Imagine a world whose history is an exact mirror-image of our own, i.e. the 
election of Obama precedes the re-election of George W. Bush by four years, World War I precedes the 
assassination of Franz Ferdinand, and so on.  In such a world do we wish to say, e.g., that 1942 precedes 
1935 by seven years?  Our inclination to say ‘yes’ seems to lend credence to the idea that times are 
maximal world-slices; our inclination to say ‘no’ seems to lend credence to the idea that they are not.
132 This plausibly assumes that the earlier than relation is existence-entailing: Necessarily, if a is earlier 
than b, then a and b both exist.
133 Presentists cannot believe that concrete things stand in cross-temporal relations, but perhaps they can 
believe that abstract things do (or, rather, that abstract things stand in a relation analogous to a temporal 
relation).  Bourne (2006) and Crisp (2007) counsel presentists to treat times as abstract objects (i.e. “ersatz 
times”).
presentist might think of the universe itself as instantiating an age property.134  She might 
treat this property itself—rather than the state of the world as a whole—as a time.  On 
this view, ‘2011’ names a property that the universe now instantiates, a property giving 
the universe’s age.  Say then that when Napoleon was born the universe had the property 
of being m years old, and when Elvis was born the universe had the property of being m + 
166 years old.  These ages are sufficient to ground the truth of (12), for they’re sufficient 
to ground the truth that the universe was 166 years older in 1935 than it was in 1769.  I 
am not sure whether, ultimately, this view of times is plausible.  But it’s an option for the 
presentist, one consistent with Presentist Truthmaker.  If, however, it turns out that either 
of the most plausible presentist-friendly views of causal and temporal relations are 
incompatible with Presentist Truthmaker, the presentist should retreat to Presentist TSB.
131
134 For the universe to instantiate a property, the contents of the universe must (on standard views of 
property instantiation) compose a single object denoted by ‘the universe’.  Do they?  It seems to be a 
feature of ordinary language that we often treat ‘the universe’ as picking out a single, maximal object.  And 
notice that we need not believe in unrestricted mereological composition in order to think that the contents 
of the universe compose a maximal object; rather, we simply need a principled reason to think that they 
compose such an object.  Cameron (2008) makes this latter point.
Chapter 4. Presentism and Singular Truths
That Socrates was a philosopher is true.  But this proposition seems to be true because it 
says something true about Socrates, the man himself—viz. that he was a philosopher.  
Yet, according to presentism, there is no longer any such thing as Socrates.  And so it is  
mysterious how, on presentism, that Socrates was a philosopher could say anything true 
about Socrates.  And it is equally mysterious how, in uttering the sentence “Socrates was 
a philosopher”, I myself am able to say anything true about Socrates.  For how can I say 
something true about a specific individual, when the individual in question does not 
exist? Call this the problem of singularity for presentism.135  The goal of this chapter 
will be, in §4.1, to clearly demarcate three versions of this problem and, next, in §4.2-4.4, 
to explore solutions to each one.
4.1 Three Problems of Singularity 
The problem of singularity can perhaps be most generally expressed as follow:  how is it 
possible, on presentism, that we can refer to, talk about, or think about a single, specific, 
merely past—and hence, nonexistent—individual such as Socrates?  This general 
problem encapsulates, I think, at least three distinct semantic problems for presentism: 
one concerning proper names, one concerning singular predications, and one concerning 
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135 Can we predicate of merely future individuals as well?  E.g. Suppose that I decide to call my merely 
future grand-daughter by the name ‘Caroline’.  Can I truly predicate of her by asserting that Caroline will 
be tall?  Such cases carry less intuitive force, I think, than cases of merely past individuals.  For this reason,  
I choose to focus on cases of merely past individuals throughout.  But this narrower focus is not likely to 
pose much problem, I think, on the plausible assumption that any presentist solution to the problem of 
singularity will be symmetric with the respect to the past and future. 
singular propositions.  To clearly understand the challenges that presentism faces with 
respect to singularity, I lay out each in turn.
  The first worry is this:  It seems to be a kind of trivial, a priori truth that all names 
refer to their bearers.  ‘Obama’ refers to Obama, ‘Buckethead’ to Buckethead, ‘Socrates’ 
to Socrates.  And moreover, it seems to be a kind of trivial, a priori truth about reference 
that in order to refer to some individual—in order to successfully stand in the reference 
relation to an individual—the individual in question must exist.136  Yet, according to 
presentism, the name of any merely past individual—e.g. ‘Socrates’—has nothing to 
serve as referent.   Therefore, presentism seems to run into conflict with a basic truth 
about names.  We shall call this the problem of proper names.     
  The second worry is this: whereas it seems quite intuitive that in uttering 
“Socrates was a philosopher” I thereby predicate something of Socrates—viz. having 
been a philosopher—there is, on presentism, no Socrates of whom to predicate.  Call this 
second worry the problem of singular predication.  But this worry goes even deeper, I 
think, than the mere intuitive cost of denying that there is no Socrates of whom to 
predicate things.  For, even beyond the intuition that we sometimes predicate things of 
past individuals (e.g. Socrates), there should be an even stronger intuition that various 
propositions concerning merely past individuals (e.g. that Socrates was a philosopher) 
are true.  It seems, in other words, even worse to deny that Socrates was a philosopher is 
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136 This assumes the falsity of a meinongian view whereby there are non-existent individuals to which we 
can refer and over which we can can quantify.  Absent such a view, expressions of the form A refers to B 
seem paradigmatically existence-entailing with respect to B.    
true than it does to merely say that we cannot predicate of Socrates.  But there is an 
argument to be made that so long as there is no Socrates of whom to predicate, then there 
can be no singular truths involving him:  
 (P1)  That Socrates was a philosopher can be true only if Socrates exists.
 (P2)  On presentism, Socrates does not exist.
 (C)  On presentism, that Socrates was a philosopher cannot be true. 
(P1) is the controversial premise here.  And (P1) may be supported by the idea that 
singular predication carries ontological commitment to the object of predication.  We 
might express this idea by The Commitment Principle:
 (Commitment)  [#p#x#F (p predicates F of x * [p * !y(y = x)])].137
Commitment seems a plausible principle.  For consider the claim—assume it to be true— 
that Jane is a philosopher.  This claim is predicative of Jane.  But if so, they by affirming  
the antecedent of Commitment, we see that Jane is a philosopher could only be true if 
Jane existed.  And this is quite plausible.  For, could it be true that Jane is a philosopher 
if Jane failed to exist?  It seems dubious that it could.  Given Commitment, whenever a 
sentence or proposition, P, truly predicates a property, F, of some individual, it must be 
that the individual in question exists.  But given Commitment, (P1) looks solid.  For that 
Socrates was a philosopher seems clearly to be a predicative truth.  And which object is 
the target of this predication?  A natural answer: Socrates.  In short, the idea that the truth 
of that Socrates was a philosopher requires the existence of Socrates follows simply from 
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137 From Crisp (2003)
the plausible idea that this truth is predicative of none other than Socrates himself, 
together with Commitment.
There is yet another way of putting the problem of singular predication, one that 
subsumes it under a more general problem for presentists.  We see this by noting that true 
predications seem to commit us to the existence of a relation between a predicator (e.g. 
the proposition that Socrates was a philosopher or the sentence “Socrates was a 
philosopher” or, perhaps, the person who utters this sentence) and an object (e.g. 
Socrates).  Call this The Relation Principle:
(Relation)  [#p#x#F (p predicates F of x * [p * !R(Rpx)])].138
Relation is a plausible principle.  If Jane (or some sentence that Jane utters) predicates F 
of John, it seems trivial that Jane (or perhaps the sentence she uttered or proposition she 
expressed) stands in a relation to John.  And if Relation holds, then the problem of 
predication can be subsumed under the more general problem of cross-time relations: 
there seem to be various relations that hold between present and non-present things—e.g. 
casual relations, the taller than relation, and (in the present case) the predication relation
—yet the existence of these relations carries ontological commitment to the non-present 
relata, a consequence at odds with presentism.
 These three sub-parts of the problem of singular predication can be put together as 
follows:  In the case of singular truths concerning merely past individuals—e.g. that 
Socrates was a philosopher—it seems intuitive that such truths are predicative of the 
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138 Ibid.
individuals they are about, an intuition at odds with presentism’s eschewal of merely past 
individuals.  Moreover—and worse still for presentism—it seems that the very truth of 
such propositions requires both the existence of the individuals they concern as well as a 
genuine predication relation that holds between those individuals and some predicators. 
 Finally, we arrive at the third worry concerning singularity.  One standard and 
initially attractive view in contemporary philosophy of language is that a sentence 
expressing a singular truth expresses a singular proposition, a proposition that literally 
has, as a direct constituent, the individual that it singularly concerns.139  Consider, for 
instance, the sentence “Obama is president”.  According to the standard view I have in 
mind here, this sentence expresses a singular propositions that may be depicted with 
brackets, as follows: <Obama, being president>.  According to this depiction, the singular 
proposition that Obama is president has two constituents: Obama (the literal man 
himself) and the property being president.  And it is just in virtue of having Obama 
himself as a constituent, so the story goes, that this singular proposition is singularly 
about Obama.
 But this picture raises trouble for presentism.  For it is mysterious how there can 
be, on presentism, past-directed singular propositions at all.  In asserting, e.g., that Elvis 
was a musician, I should express a proposition that literally has Elvis as one of its 
constituents.  But presentism says that no such constituent as Elvis exists.  Ergo, no such 
proposition exists.  We may call this worry the problem of singular propositions.  In 
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139 See Fitch and Nelson (2009).
short: how can there be singular propositions concerning merely past individuals when 
these individuals are unavailable to serve as constituents?  
 That these three problems—the problems of proper names, singular predication, 
and singular propositions—are distinct can be easily shown.  First, the problem of proper 
names is distinct from the problem of singular predication.  For the problem of 
predication need not involve proper names at all.  Imagine that, in wishing to predicate 
being a musician of Elvis, I assert that the star of Jailhouse Rock was a musician.  Did I 
succeed in predicating?  Intuitively, it seems that I did, for I seem no less able to 
predicate something of Elvis by using a singular description (e.g. “the star of Jailhouse 
Rock”) than by using his proper name.  And in asserting that the star of Jailhouse Rock 
was a musician I seem able, in principle, to just as much have Elvis himself in mind as 
when asserting that Elvis was a musician.  This shows, I think, that the problem of 
predication is not, fundamentally, a problem about proper names.
 Next, the problem of predication is distinct from the problem of singular 
propositions.  For imagine that I reject the idea that propositions ontologically depend on 
their constituents—i.e. imagine that I claim that a proposition can, at least in principle, 
survive the destruction of one of its concrete constituents.  If so, then I may, in principle, 
believe that the singular proposition that Elvis was a musician can exist even after Elvis 
falls out of existence.  In this case, I can hold, contra the problem of singular 
propositions, that presentism is compatible with the existence of many past-oriented 
singular propositions—yet, given the success of the problem of predication, I cannot hold 
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that presentism is compatible with their truth.  For the mere existence of the singular 
proposition that Elvis was a musician has no power to undermine, on its own, the 
intuitive idea this proposition is predicative of Elvis, and it has no power to undermine, 
on its own, the idea that the truth of this proposition requires the existence of Elvis.  In 
short, the objection from singular predication says that, on presentism, past-directed 
singularly-predicative propositions cannot be true, for there is no one of whom to 
predicate; the objection from singular propositions says that, on presentism, past-directed 
singular propositions cannot even exist in the first place.
 Finally, the problem of proper names is distinct form the problem of singular 
propositions.  And one reason for this is exactly analogous to the reason why the problem 
of singular propositions is distinct from the problem of singular predication, viz. the mere 
existence of the singular proposition that Elvis was a musician has no ability to 
undermine the idea that all names refer to their bearers.  Therefore, even if one could 
show that the singular proposition that Elvis was a musician can outlive the destruction of 
Elvis, this would seemingly do nothing to undermine the idea that ‘Elvis’ should refer to 
Elvis. 
4.2 The Problem of Proper Names
Of our three problems for presentism, this one is, I think, most easily answered.
According to the objection, it is a kind of trivial truth that all names refer to their bearers.  
Yet this cannot be correct, for some names are empty—they fail to refer to anything.  The 
French Mathematician Jean Joseph Le Verrier once believed there to be an inner planet 
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orbiting between Mercury and the Sun.  He named this hypothetical planet ‘Vulcan’.  But 
Le Verrier was mistaken, and there is no such planet—‘Vulcan’ is an empty name.140  
Presentists believe that ‘Socrates’ is an empty name like ‘Vulcan’ but with one difference: 
whereas ‘Vulcan’ has always been empty, ‘Socrates’ did once refer but does no longer.141  
The principle that all names refer to their bearers perhaps has an attractive simplicity yet 
it admits of such counterexamples as hypothetical empty names (e.g. ‘Vulcan’) as well as  
fictional and mythological empty names (e.g. ‘Santa Claus’, ‘Sherlock Holmes’, 
‘Pegasus’).
 But perhaps this response is too fast.  First, it is possible for there to be theories of 
fictional or hypothetical names on which such names are non-empty but where they refer 
to abstract rather than concrete objects.  For example, Van Inwagen (1977) defends a 
view whereby fictional names such as ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refer to abstract objects.  But 
even by the lights of such a view, it is difficult to know what to say about the referent of 
‘Socrates’ given presentism.  For if ‘Socrates’ once referred to Socrates, did it then, on 
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140 Le Verrier proposed Vulcan in order to explain Mercury’s peculiar orbit around the Sun, an orbit that 
was otherwise mysterious given the best space-time theory of the day (newtonian mechanics) plus the 
influences of the known planets.  When Mercury’s peculiar orbit was later explained by Einstein’s theory of 
general of relativity, it was by then clear that there was no such planet Vulcan.  Those well-read on the 
philosophy of names know that poor Le Verrier is often used as an example of someone who created an 
empty name, a name that he sincerely thought to be non-empty.  Yet Le Verrier fans should rejoice at one of 
his great achievements: he was partially responsible for the discovery of Neptune.
141 It’s not quite right that, even by presentist lights, ‘Socrates’ once referred to Socrates,  For in Socrates’s 
day, he was known by his Greek name and not by ‘Socrates’.  It is unclear whether someone who, for some 
reason, uttered the name ‘Socrates’ in ancient Greek times would have referred to anyone at all.  I ignore 
this complication, since, obviously we could substitute ‘Elvis’ or any other English name in the example.
the abstracta theory, begin to refer to an abstract version of Socrates?142  It is unclear 
what the abstracta view should say here.
 Second, and, I think, more pressingly, the objection from proper names can 
simply be recast as an objection concerning non-fictional and non-hypothetical names.  
For surely, the proper names objector might argue, the following principle is a kind of 
trivial truth about names:
 (Names)  Given any non-fictional, non-hypothetical name, N, ‘N’ refers to its 
 bearer.
Since Names is immune to counterexample by fictional or hypothetical names, it 
therefore causes trouble for presentists. 
 I think the presentist has a strong response.  And the response should be a familiar 
one, for it mirrors what I previously said about the grounding objection.  In particular, I 
think the presentist should observe that Names is ambiguous, for him, between two 
readings:
 (E-Names)  Given any non-fictional, non-hypothetical name, N, ‘N’ refers to its 
 existing bearer.
 (P-Names)  Given any non-fictional, non-hypothetical name, N, ‘N’ referred to its 
 bearer, or ‘N’ refers to its bearer, or ‘N’ will refer to its bearer.
Which of these two disambiguated principles—short for Eternalist Names and Presentist 
Names, respectively—one should accept depends on one’s epistemic position.  From the 
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142 If this is a path that the abstracta theorist wishes to go down, it would seem much better for the abstracta 
view to claim that ‘Socrates’ began to refer to an abstract proxy for Socrates rather than to claim that 
‘Socrates’ always refers to Socrates but that, after his death, Socrates becomes an abstract object.  It is so 
very strange to think that a concrete person could turn into an abstract object.
eternalist’s epistemic position, these principles are mutually entailing, for if ‘N’ referred, 
refers, or will refer to something, then surely ‘N’ succeeds in referring to some object 
within the tenseless, four-dimensional block (and vice versa).  But from the presentist’s 
epistemic position, these principles are importantly distinct, for given that the whole of 
temporal reality contains only present things, then it seems all too obvious that some 
names (e.g. ‘Elvis’, ‘Socrates’, etc.) fail to attach to anything in reality as a whole, yet 
they once did, or they will yet. 
 After distinguishing these principles, it becomes clear that for the problem of 
proper names to have force against presentism, there must be some non-question begging 
reason—some reason that does not simply assume the eternalist’s epistemic position—
why E-Names and P-Names are true rather than P-Names alone.  Yet I am not sure what 
such a reason would be.  And unless one is forthcoming, presentists are justified in 
answering the problem of proper names by rejecting E-Names in favor of P-Names.
4.3 The Problem of Singular Predication
One way of putting the problem of singular predication is this: insofar as a range of 
commonplace truths seem to predicate of merely past things, we have a prima facie 
ontological commitment to such things.  Put in this way, the presentist’s task is to show 
how he may discharge this prima facie commitment.
 The presentist has an answer to the problem of predication, one that parallels the 
modal actualist’s answer to (the modal version of) the same problem.  Consider a true 
present-tense analogue of that Socrates was a philosopher, e.g. that Kripke is a 
141
philosopher.  True enough, this truth predicates something of Kripke, namely, being a 
philosopher.  And that Kripke is a philosopher therefore involves ontological 
commitment to Kripke.  But that Socrates was a philosopher is importantly different 
from that Kripke is a philosopher, for the former is past-tense and the latter is present-
tense.  The presentist claims that this difference in tense makes for a difference in 
ontological commitment, for the claim that Socrates was a philosopher is to be 
understood via the ontologically non-committing past-tense operator: WAS(that Socrates 
is a philosopher).  For this reason, the presentist insists that the truth that Socrates was a 
philosopher need not commit us to Socrates.  
 The presentist’s invoked slogan—“No ontological commitment within the scope 
of the tense operator”—may be motivated by analogy to the modal case.  Consider:
 (1) Aliens from Alpha Centauri might have built the pyramids in Egypt.
Modal actualists face an analogous semantic challenge with regard to (1).  (Give (1) a 
metaphysical rather than epistemic reading.)  For (1) appears to predicate of some 
(merely possible) Aliens from Alpha Centauri.  Assuming that such Aliens do not actually  
exist, the actualist owes us an ontologically non-committing account of (1)’s truth.  But 
the actualist has a straightforward answer.  He holds that (1) is understood as employing a 
modal possibility operator and that any claim within the scope of this operator is read as 
non-committing.  Thus, (1), on its true reading, is to be understood as (2).  (◊ is the 
possibility operator—“◊p” is read “it is possible that p”.)
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 (2) ◊(Aliens from Alpha Centauri built the pyramids in Egypt).143
And so, despite appearances, (1) need not commit us to merely possible aliens.144  “No 
ontological commitment within the scope of the possibility operator” is the actualist’s 
slogan here.  Since the possibility operator operates on a proposition or a sentence, (1) 
need not be understood as predicating something of some aliens.  Rather, it can be 
regarded as predicating something of the proposition that Aliens from Alpha Centauri 
built the pyramids (or of the sentence that expresses it), namely, the property of being 
possibly true.
 The presentist answer to the problem of predication concerning non-present 
objects parallels the actualist answer to the problem of predication concerning non-actual 
objects.  That Socrates was a philosopher need not be understood as predicating 
something of a non-present individual.  Instead, it can be understood as predicating 
something of the proposition that Socrates is a philosopher (or of the sentence that 
expresses it)—namely, the property of having been true.  
 The presentist’s response has some attractive features.  First, it is compatible with 
Commitment and Relation.  On Commitment, if a claim, P, predicates F of x, then, 
necessarily, P is true only if x exists.  But on the current proposal, the object of 
predication is a sentence or proposition about Socrates —viz. that Socrates is a 
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143 See Szabó (2007).
144 It might be objected that perhaps (1) is not the best example, since it sounds like a de re reading with 
respect to aliens.  And so (2) looks to be a problematic regimentation of (1).  But the choice of (1) is quite 
intentional, for it mirrors the claim that Socrates was a philosopher insofar as the latter also seems, at first 
blush, to be de re with respect to Socrates.  Part of the challenge for presentism is to, in a sense, explain 
away the urge to treat that Socrates was a philosopher as inherently de re with respect to Socrates.
philosopher, or the sentence that expresses it—that is embedded within a tense operator 
and not Socrates himself.  Therefore, so long as the proposition or sentence embedded 
within the past-tense operator exists, Commitment is not violated.  And on Relation, if a 
claim, P, predicates F of x, then, necessarily, P is true only if there exists a predication 
relation that links P and x.  But, again, so long as that Socrates is a philosopher (or the 
sentence that expresses it) exists, then nothing is to prevent this claim from standing in a 
predication relation to the property having been true. 
 Second, the presentist can readily explain why that Socrates was a philosopher  
appears to be predicative (or, de re) with respect to Socrates—viz. because it is built from 
a present-tense claim that was genuinely predicative of Socrates.  Similarly, the actualist 
can explain why that Aliens might have built the pyramids appears to be predicative (or, 
de re) with respect to Aliens—viz. because it is built from a claim the might have been 
genuinely predicative with respect to some aliens.  In short, we have a claim that was or 
might be true, and this very claim did stand or might have stood in a genuine predication 
relation to Socrates or to some aliens.  In both cases, the appearance of a genuinely 
predicatively clam is to be explained by the fact that a genuinely predicative claim was or 
might have been true.  
Two features of the presentist-actualist analogy deserve additional elaboration.  
First, the analogy isn’t perfect as given.  Whereas that Socrates was a philosopher 
employs a proper name, that Aliens from Alpha Centauri might have built the pyramids 
employs an indefinite description.  This should not much bother the presentist.  The 
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presentist’s and actualist’s ability to explain the truth of a claim absent undesired 
ontological commitments is what matters most here.  Both do so by demonstrating that a 
certain (temporal or modal) operator introduces an opaque context; it shouldn’t much 
matter whether the terms inside the scope of the operator are names or descriptions or 
whether they are singular or general.  That said, we might concoct an example in the 
modal case that more closely parallels that Socrates was a philosopher.  Imagine that a 
childless couple is discussing the alternate life that would’ve occurred had they had 
children.  Suppose that this couple agrees that had they had a boy, they would have 
named him ‘Fred’.  Consider:
 (3) Fred might have grown up to be a musician.
So long as we’re able to fix the referent of ‘Fred’ (to a merely possible individual), (3) is 
an unproblematic truth and is open to the same treatment, on actualism, as the claim that 
Aliens might have built the pyramids and other analogous claims.145
 Second, I’ve intentionally taken care to state the problem of predication as a 
problem of ontological commitment rather than as a problem of quantification.  This is 
because avoiding commitments to non-present or non-actual things may or may not 
involve avoiding quantification over entities, since some presentists and actualists treat 
their (temporal or modal) operators as quantifiers (over ersatz entities rather than ordinary 
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145 On one sort of essentialism of origins thesis, no human individual could have originated from a sperm 
and egg other than the ones from which she actually originated.  If this is right, we may not be able to fix 
the referent of ‘Fred’ without specifying some unique sperm and egg pair in advance.  We might then 
imagine our hypothetical couple specifying that ‘Fred’ is to refer to the person who would have been born 
had such and such sperm and egg been joined.
entities); e.g. some presentists (actualists) will treat their temporal (modal) operators as 
quantifiers over abstract times (abstract worlds).
I now consider two objections to the presentist’s account of singular predication.
4.3.1 The Objection from Logical Form
The first objection comes from Markosian (2004), who has argued that past-tense 
statements involving proper names have the sorts of truth conditions that prevent the 
presentist from treating those statements as literal truths.  Markosian begins by asking a 
question: What are the truth conditions for “Socrates was a philosopher”?  He gives two 
options:
(TCg)  “Socrates was a philosopher” is true iff (∃x)(x is the referent of 
  ‘Socrates’ and WAS(x is a philosopher)).
(TCs)  “Socrates was a philosopher” is true iff WAS(∃x)(x is the referent of 
  ‘Socrates’ and x is a philosopher).
Markosian labels the first truth condition “g” for “grabby”.  The first truth condition is 
grabby since, metaphorically speaking, it tells us to grab the existing object referred to by 
‘Socrates’ and see whether it used to be a philosopher.  And he labels the second truth 
condition “s” for “searchy”.  The second truth-condition is searchy since, metaphorically 
speaking, it tells us to search the past for the philosopher referred to by ‘Socrates’.  
Markosian then argues that “Socrates was a philosopher”, as normally used in English, 
has the (TCg) truth condition.  
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Before we consider whether Markosian’s interpretation of “Socrates was a 
philosopher” is correct, notice that it spells trouble for the presentist’s response to the 
problem of singular predication.  The reason is that if we take the grabby interpretation of 
“Socrates was a philosopher”, we explicitly rule out the possibility of reading it opaquely. 
According to (TCg), there must be an existing referent of ‘Socrates’ in order for “Socrates 
was a philosopher” to be true, and so the mere fact that “Socrates is a philosopher” was 
true cannot alone be sufficient to guarantee the truth of “Socrates was a philosopher”.  
The presentist who holds that “Socrates was a philosopher” is normally literally true must 
therefore rule out the possibility that (TCg) is normally the correct interpretation.
 So what is the argument that, in fact, “Socrates was a philosopher” normally has 
(TCg) as its truth condition?  To make his case, Markosian contrasts “Socrates was a 
philosopher” with the grammatically equivalent sentence:
 (4) Joe Montana was a quarterback.
What are the truth conditions for (4)?  Markosian holds that, as normally used in English, 
(4) has the grabby truth condition:  
(TC4g)  ‘Joe Montana was a quarterback’ is true iff (∃x)(x is the referent of 
  ‘Joe Montana’ and WAS(x is a quarterback)).
Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that Markosian is right here.  Suppose that when 
someone asserts (4) in normal circumstances, they are trying to say—concerning an 
existing person named ‘Joe Montana’—that he used to be a quarterback.  Markosian goes 
on to conclude that, by analogy, we should expect “Socrates was a philosopher” to have a 
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grabby truth condition as well.  Indeed, he goes on to conclude that, normally, all 
grammatically equivalent sentences—ones with a name and a past-tense operator—have 
grabby truth conditions.  But this is a leap.  Why does it follow from the fact that, 
normally, English speakers use (4) in a grabby way that therefore all grammatically 
equivalent sentences are normally grabby as well?  Such an inference assumes that 
grammatical form fixes logical form (and hence truth conditions).  But why make this 
assumption?
Interestingly, Markosian agrees that the typical speaker would not interpret 
“Socrates was a philosopher” as grabby.  He imagines a case where we poll a typical 
English speaker:
…ask her this question: “Do you think this sentence is true because there is a guy called 
‘Socrates’ who was a philosopher, or do you think it is true because there was a guy called 
‘Socrates’ who was a philosopher?”  I’m willing to bet five dollars that, if you can get her to take 
this last question seriously, she will opt for the second alternative (the one that corresponds to 
(TCs)).  And what I think this shows is that, even though the correct truth condition for [“Socrates 
was a philosopher”] is (TCg), the grabby truth condition, the average person on the street is likely 
to think (mistakenly) that the correct truth condition for [“Socrates was a philosopher”] is 
something like (TCs), the searchy truth condition.  (Markosian 2004: 72)
  
Assume that this is in fact how a typical English speaker would respond if polled.  How is 
the typical speaker’s response here evidence that “Socrates was a philosopher” normally 
has the grabby truth condition?  After all, that’s precisely not what she told us.  Why be 
uncharitable to her?  I suspect that Markosian is tacitly adopting a uniformity principle 
whereby all statements of grammatical form “N was a G” (where N is a proper name and 
G is a description) must, in normal circumstances, have the same logical form.  Perhaps 
Markosian then concludes that since “Joe Montana was a quarterback” is clearly grabby,  
“Socrates was a philosopher” must be too.  
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I want to make two points about such a uniformity principle.  First, it is 
suspicious.  Do we have reason to accept it?  Indeed, contrasting sentences such as 
“Socrates was a philosopher” and “Joe Montana was a quarterback” might be taken as 
evidence that such a principle is false, and Markosian’s own imagined case seems to 
support this.  Second, even if we assume the truth of such a uniformity principle, why use 
it to conclude that “Socrates was a philosopher” normally has the grabby truth condition?  
Why not instead use the uniformity principle to conclude that since “Joe Montana was a 
quarterback” is searchy, then “Socrates was a philosopher” must be too?  If we insist on 
uniformity of logical form for grammatically equivalent sentences, then it would make 
sense to use the more transparent sentences as guides to the logical forms of the less 
transparent sentences.  But “Socrates was a philosopher” and “Joe Montana was a 
quarterback” seem equally transparent.  So, it’s unclear, by Markosian’s example, why 
we should conclude that “Joe Montana was a quarterback” reveals the logical form of 
“Socrates was a philosopher” rather than vice versa.  
But rather than accept any such uniformity principle, I suspect that we should 
probably instead conclude that statements of grammatical form “N was a G” do not wear 
their logical forms on their sleeves; the particular logical form of any such statement is 
not fixed by its grammatical form alone.  Of course, if grammatically equivalent past-
tense statements can differ in their logical forms, it would be nice to have some account 
of this difference.  One such account may involve the conversational context, and, in 
particular, the implied mutual knowledge that exists within the conversational context.  
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Among the items of implied mutual knowledge, we may include an implied mutual 
knowledge that a certain individual (e.g. Joe Montana) exists (or is still alive).  It seems 
at least possible that such implied mutual knowledge could affect the underlying logical 
form of a sentence uttered in a conversation.  
4.3.2 The Objection from Speaker Intentions
The second objection to the presentist account of singular predication concerns a 
speaker’s intentions in asserting that Socrates was a philosopher.  According to the 
presentist, we need not understand this claim as predicating something of a past object.  
Rather, we can understand it as predicating something of the proposition that Socrates is 
a philosopher (or of the sentence that expresses it)—viz., the property of having been 
true.
But it might be objected that the presentist is offering us an implausible view of 
what a typical speaker is doing in asserting that Socrates was a philosopher.  According 
to this objection, the typical, non-philosophical speaker, in asserting that Socrates was a 
philosopher, is clearly not intending to predicate something of a sentence or proposition.  
Rather, in so asserting, the typical speaker intends to predicate something of Socrates.  It 
is sheer wishful thinking for the presentist to insist that since, on presentism, WAS(that 
Socrates is a philosopher) is the reading that comes out true, that therefore this is the 
reading that speakers have in mind when asserting that Socrates was a philosopher.
 I am sympathetic toward this worry.  I agree that it is implausible to assume that 
speakers typically take themselves, in asserting that Socrates was a philosopher, to have 
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said something about a sentence or a proposition, rather than a flesh-and-blood person.  
But perhaps, in answering the problem of singular predication, presentists need not 
commit to holding that speakers intend to predicate something of a sentence or 
proposition.  Keep in mind that we have two readings of a given utterance of “Socrates 
was a philosopher”, one de dicto and one de re reading (corresponding to the searchy and 
grabby truth conditions, respectively):
(5) WAS(Socrates is a philosopher).
(6) Socrates is such that WAS(he is a philosopher).
Suppose, as I maintain, that we have no compelling reason to think that speakers, in 
uttering “Socrates was a philosopher”, typically intend to convey (5).  It does not thereby 
follow that we have reason to believe that speakers, in uttering “Socrates was a 
philosopher”, typically do intend to convey (6).  For this latter claim to follow, we would 
have to assume that speakers, when asserting a sentence of ambiguous logical form, 
typically have some particular disambiguation in mind.  Do they?  Why assume that the 
typical, non-philosophical speaker has either (5) or (6) in mind when uttering “Socrates 
was a philosopher”?  Suppose that we poll a non-philosopher about his utterance.  We 
might attempt to push him into a disambiguation by asking him the following:
You just uttered the sentence “Socrates was a philosopher.”  Did you mean to say that it was the 
case that Socrates is a philosopher?  Or did you mean to say that Socrates is such that it was the 
case the he is a philosopher?
I believe that it would be both reasonable and unsurprising for the speaker to answer by 
saying, “I don’t know.  All I meant to say was that Socrates was a philosopher.”  Suppose 
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that our hypothetical speaker says just that.  Can presentists treat her utterance as true?  I 
don’t see why not.  Since our hypothetical speaker said something of ambiguous logical 
form, and since what he said has (on presentism) both a true and a false reading—(5) and 
(6), respectively—then, ceteris paribus, it seems charitable to interpret her as having said 
something true.  Since it is reasonable for presentists (and non-presentists) to be 
charitable to speakers, it is reasonable for presentists to treat typical utterances of 
“Socrates was a philosopher” as true.146  
Still, there may be a lingering sense that the presentist account is implausible in 
treating ordinary utterers of “Socrates was a philosopher” as in fact serving to make a 
genuine predication—even an unintentional one—of a sentence or a proposition rather 
than of a flesh-and-blood person.  If so, then there may be a retreat position for 
presentists.  They might choose to entirely abandon the claim that, in uttering “Socrates 
was a philosopher”, speakers are doing anything genuinely predicative at all.  Rather, 
presentists could say that, in ordinary utterances of “Socrates was a philosopher”, it is 
justifiably charitable to treat them as true by regarding them as having the de dicto truth 
condition: WAS(Socrates is a philosopher).  But in claiming that certain utterances may 
be assigned a charitable truth condition, perhaps presentists need not also commit to the 
claim that such utterances are predicative acts.  This line of response therefore abandons 
the metalinguistic strategy of treating apparent predications as predications of linguistic 
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146 Even if such charity were unjustified, it is not clear how bad this would be for the presentist.  The 
presentist would be forced to say that utterance of “Socrates was a philosopher” are ambiguous between a 
true and a false reading and that there is nothing in normal usage to govern which reading is produced by 
typical speakers.  This might be unpalatable to the presentist (who would rather treat normal assertions of 
such sentences as unambiguously true), but it might not be awful. 
items rather than predications of merely past individuals.  And this line therefore has a 
certain cost: it acknowledges that to the extent that utterances of “Socrates was a 
philosopher” intuitively seem predicative, presentists do not account for this intuition.  
But this response still accomplishes, I think, what any presentist account must: it treats 
utterances of “Socrates was a philosopher” as true. 
4.4 The Problem of Singular Propositions
One more singularity problem remains: How can there be past-oriented singular 
propositions—e.g. the proposition that Socrates was a philosopher—in the absence of the 
merely past individuals they concern?  We consider three possible lines of reply.  
Although, as we will see, the lines of reply that I offer are insufficient to fully and 
decisively answer the problem, the final line of reply may at least point us in a hopeful 
direction.
 First, we consider an answer to the problem that involves retaining singular 
propositions even when their constituents fall out of existence.  We may begin with a 
view that Plantinga (1983) discusses and calls “existentialism”, a metaphysical package 
whereby: (i) every haecceity (i.e. essence or “thisnesses”) of an object ontologically 
depends upon that object—i.e. no haecceity exists uninstantiated; (ii) every singular 
proposition ontologically depends upon the individual it concerns—i.e. no singular 
proposition exists in absence of the concrete individual it is about.  Plantinga himself 
rejects both theses of the existentialist package.  The possibility of rejecting the second 
view in the package—call it SP Dependence—may give the presentist what he needs:
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 (SP Dependence)  A singular proposition is is ontologically  dependent upon the 
 individual it is directly about—e.g. that Obama is president is directly dependent 
 upon Obama himself, and this proposition can only exist if Obama does.  
By rejecting this form of ontological dependence, one can hold that the singular 
proposition that Obama is president can exist even if Obama does not.  And similarly, by 
rejecting SP Dependence, the presentist can hold that the singular proposition that 
Socrates was a philosopher can exist even if Socrates does not—the proposition, so to 
speak, can “outlive” the man it is about.
 The problem with rejecting SP Dependence is that it carries some unfortunate 
consequences.  Consider the singular proposition that Hume was a philosopher.  
According to presentism, both this proposition as well as the proposition that Socrates 
was a philosopher have lost their respective concrete constituents.  By rejecting SP 
Dependence, presentists can say that this loss is no bar to their (these propositions) 
continued existence.  After Socrates and Hume fall out of existence, the propositions that 
Socrates was a philosopher and that Hume was a philosopher can be depicted, in bracket 
form, as the propositions S and H, respectively:  
 (S)  <_____ , having been a philosopher>
 (H)  <_____, having been a philosopher>
The bracket depiction reveals the inner structure of each proposition.  In each case, the 
first blank position (“_____”) serves to indicate that the relevant constituent—Socrates or 
Hume, respectively—is gone and hence that there is a “gap” in the singular proposition 
where there used to be a concrete person.
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 The problem is this: S and H are supposed to be two numerically distinct 
propositions.  After all, that Socrates was a philosopher is not and cannot be the same 
proposition as the proposition that Hume was a philosopher—these propositions say 
different things, and they are about different people, after all.  But given that S and H now 
have, on presentism, an identical inner structure—a gap, plus the property having been a 
philosopher—it is hard to see how S and H could be distinct: they are are exact intrinsic 
duplicates.  Of course, when Socrates was still alive, he was a constituent of S; when 
Hume was alive, he was a constituent of H.  Therefore, at either such time, S was 
distinguishable from H.  But now that both men are, by presentism, no more, it is hard to 
see what distinguishes these propositions.
 We might respond that although S and H are intrinsic duplicates, they are not 
duplicates full stop, for they can be distinguished extrinsically—S but not H might be 
believed by someone who had heard of Socrates but not Hume.  But this response is very 
unsatisfying.  To say that proposition P could be believed even if proposition Q is not 
believed is a hallmark of individuation for propositions.  Therefore, this response just 
takes for granted precisely what is so mysterious here—viz. that S is distinct from H and 
hence that someone could believe one but not the other.  And this is mysterious precisely 
because S and H look intrinsically the same.  And so one wishes to know: How could 
someone believe one but not the other given that they appear to be the same?  How could 
these propositions represent different states of affairs while being intrinsically the same?
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 Another anti-SP Dependence response is that S and H can be distinct propositions 
despite their being intrinsic duplicates.  After all, to charge that S and H cannot be distinct 
on the grounds of their same inner structure looks suspiciously like an appeal 
to the implausible half of Leibniz’s Law, the idea that if x and y share all properties in 
common, then x is numerically one and the same as y:
 (BL) [#x#y#F (Fx + Fy) * (x = y)] 
But we know that BL—aka “Bad Leibniz”, aka the principle of “The Identity of 
Indiscernibles”—is implausible: surely it is conceptually and metaphysically possible for 
there to be a “Max Black” world consisting entirely of two qualitatively identical iron 
spheres floating in space.147  And if there can be distinct, qualitatively identical objects, 
then why not S and H?
 The problem with this response is that while it is plausible that BL fails in the case 
of physical objects, BL looks highly plausible in the case of propositions as well as 
abstract objects generally.  S and H are no iron spheres floating in physical space—they 
are abstract propositions.  And it is just difficult to understand (let alone believe) the idea 
that there could be two abstract objects—in this case, propositions—that are intrinsic 
duplicates.  Holding that some abstract objects are intrinsically the same yet numerically 
different would open the door, for example, to saying that there are two numbers, n and 
m, that are intrinsically the same yet n , m.  It would also seem to open the door to saying 
that there are two uninstantiated color properties, c and d, that are intrinsically the same, 
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147 See Black (1952).
yet c , d.  This strikes me as quite strange.148  In short, rejecting SP Dependence and 
holding that singular propositions can outlive their constituents is not a great option, and I 
think that presentists should be wary of it.  
 A second option for presentists is to reject the first component of existentialism—
the component we may call HC Dependence—and allow that, when it comes to past-
oriented propositions, haecceities go proxy for concrete individuals:
 (HC Dependence)  A haecceity is is ontologically dependent upon the 
 individual that it is a haecceity of—e.g. Obama’s haecceity is directly dependent 
 upon Obama himself, and this haecceity can only exist if Obama does.  
By rejecting HC Dependence, the presentist may hold that Socrates’s haecceity—a 
property that is his essence—can exist uninstantiated and so can outlive the man himself.  
We know that a haecceity is an individual essence, but what does that mean?  The basic 
idea is this: let a haecceity for any object, O, be any property that O has essentially and 
that all other objects essentially lack—thus, O’s haecceity is instantiated in every possible 
world (and at every possible time) where O exists and never instantiated otherwise.149  By  
rejecting the dependence of a haecceity on its bearer, the presentist could say that past-
oriented propositions are built from haecceities rather than concrete individuals:
 (S*)  <Socrateity, having been a philosopher> 
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numbers or color properties that are such.  But the point is that, in rejecting SP Dependence, one leaves 
little room for a principled objection to such views.
149 We technically leave it open whether an object can have more than one haecceity. On haecceities, see, 
e.g., Plantinga (1974: 70-77).
Thus, S* is a proposition that represents that Socrates was a philosopher, and it 
singularly concerns Socrates not in virtue of having the man himself as a constituent, but 
rather by having his essence—Socrateity—as a constituent.150 
 The problem with the haecceity proxy strategy is that it commits us to a vast 
multitude of uninstantiated essences, properties that platonically float free of the things 
that instantiate them.  This multitude may be vast indeed.  It may include, I think, not just 
the haecceities of all things that did, do, and will exist, but also all of the haecceities of 
anything that might have existed.  Why so?  Consider the proposition that Socrates does 
not exist.  It seems natural to say that, given the falsity of HC Dependence and the 
supremacy of the haecceity view, this proposition would exist and be true were Socrates 
never to have had existed.  And, moreover, this proposition would have Socrates’s  
uninstantiated haecceity as a constituent, just as that Socrates was a philosopher does on 
presentism.  But if so, then by parity of reasoning, there should exist, at the actual world, 
a multitude of uninstantiated haecceities for merely possible objects.  Opinions may differ 
on the undesirability of uninstantiated haecceities.  And while I offer no particular 
argument against the haecceity proxy strategy, I do not endorse it or pursue it further.
 A third option for presentists is to jettison the idea that there are past-oriented 
singular propositions.  On this view, it is true that Socrates was a philosopher in some 
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virtue of having that individual as direct constituent, then S* is no singular proposition.  Someone who 
adopts the haecceity proxy strategy therefore might say one of two things.  First, they might say that S*, 
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their own idiosyncratic definition of singular propositions, one whereby a singular proposition is about an 
individual in virtue of having that individual’s haecceity as direct constituent.  On this strategy, all singular 
propositions have haecceities—rather than concrete individuals—as constituents.
significant sense—e.g. “Socrates was a philosopher” is a true sentence—yet this is no 
thanks to any singular proposition involving Socrates, for there is none.  I find this view 
attractive, but some may find it strange at first glance.  I will elaborate the view and 
explain what motivates it, though fully defending this view is a significant task and, 
ultimately, one that will need to be left for another time.  In the end, we will be left with a 
promising direction for presentists to explore when it comes to answering the problem of 
singular propositions, though not, admittedly, any decisive answer to the problem.
 First, eschewing past-oriented singular propositions while maintaining that it is 
true, even on presentism, that Socrates was a philosopher seems strange on a certain 
orthodox picture of propositions.  According to the orthodox picture, propositions are 
abstract, structured, intrinsically-representational entities that serve as the fundamental 
bearers of truth, objects of attitudes, and meanings of sentences.151  (Singular 
propositions, are but one kind of structured proposition on this conception.)  By this 
conception, the sentence “Kripke is a philosopher” manages to be true because it 
expresses a true structured proposition whose structure may be represented as follows: 
<Kripke, being a philosopher>.  Crucially, the proposition that Kripke is a philosopher is, 
on the orthodox conception, an intrinsically-representational thing—it inherently 
represents the world as being a certain way just in virtue of being the proposition that it 
is, and not in virtue of anything else.  We may ask what other vehicles of truth there are 
besides propositions, and, even on the orthodox conception, there may be some—e.g. 
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sentence types, sentence tokens, utterances, etc.  But these other truth-bearers are all 
derivative truth-bearers—they achieve their representational capacities and hence their 
truth values in virtue of being related to (in virtue of expressing) intrinsically-
representational propositions.  Since it is, fundamentally, abstract propositions that 
bestow representational power, it is counterintuitive to think that there could be truths 
absent true propositions.
 But the orthodox conception of structured propositions is plagued by a 
conundrum, one that may be weighty enough to overturn the whole enterprise.  Following 
others, we may label this conundrum the problem of the unity of the proposition.  The 
problem is this: how is it that any structured proposition is a representational unity 
constituted by its various parts?  The structured proposition that Obama is president has 
two constituents, viz. Obama and the property being president.  But how is it that these 
two constituents are held together such that this proposition is a single entity that 
represents its being the case that Obama is president?  What sort of “metaphysical glue” 
could possibly bind these disparate constituents and turn them into an intrinsically-
representational entity?  Since there is, in reality, no such “metaphysical glue”, the idea 
that Obama and the property being president somehow combine to form a 
representational unity is mysterious, as though their unity occurs by magic.152
 The unity problem is perhaps even more pronounced in following kind of case.  
Consider the true proposition that the Taipei 101 is taller than The Eiffel Tower—this 
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152 The unity problem is discussed at least as far back as Frege (1892) and Russell (1903).  The problem has 
seen revived interest—for recent discussion, see Jubien (2001), King (2007), and Soames (2010).
proposition is importantly distinct from the false proposition that the Eiffel Tower is taller 
than the Taipei 101.  But why are these propositions—each the simple conglomerations 
of the same three entities on the structured conception—distinct?  Of course, we can 
depict them as distinct if we declare that the given order within the brackets matters, e.g.  
<Taipei 101, taller than, Eiffel Tower > vs.  <Eiffel Tower, taller than, Taipei 101>.  But 
this imposition of order is a purely human construct—it is something imposed top-down 
via depictive interpretation.  When it comes to the structured propositions themselves, 
they are each constituted by the very same three things and nothing more: the Eiffel 
Tower, the Taipei 101, and the taller than relation.  So how is that these constituents are, 
in each case, “glued together in the right order” such that one proposition is true and the 
other false?  Again: mystery.
 This problem has led some—including, for example, Jubien (2001), King (2007) 
and Soames (2010)—to abandon the orthodox view of structured propositions and to 
offer alternative accounts of how it is that our beliefs and our utterances can represent and 
be true or false.  The views of Jubien, King, and Soames differ in various crucial respects, 
yet all depart from the idea that there are intrinsically-representational structured unities 
and that these very unities are the founts of meaning.  All of this may be, in a sense, good 
news for presentists.  For unless there is a good solution to the problem of unity, then it is 
a mystery how the singular proposition that Socrates was a philosopher could exist (let 
alone be true) irrespective of whether one is a presentist or not.  And so presentists may 
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have independent motivation to eschew singular propositions (let alone past-oriented 
ones).
 Of course, the insolubility of the unity problem does not by itself preclude there 
from being propositions.  Perhaps propositions are, contra the structured view,  
intrinsically-representational abstract simples (they lack parts).  Or perhaps propositions 
are conglomerations of disparate entities, yet they are not unified by anything intrinsic to 
the propositions themselves but rather by the interpretations we place upon them.  This 
latter path—treating propositions as extrinsically-representational entities that depend for 
their representational capacities on human cognitive acts153—is quite promising for 
presentists.  For if cognitive acts—and not inherently-representational abstract objects—
are the founts of meaning, then there is seemingly no ontological hurdle to prevent 
“Socrates was a philosopher” from being a true sentence or to prevent my utterance of 
this sentence from being a true utterance; representation would originate in cognitive 
acts, not in propositions.  True enough, even if representational capacities are extrinsic to 
propositions, it is still an open question whether the proposition that Socrates is a 
philosopher exists and whether this proposition is a structured entity.  But, in this case, 
the nonexistence of Socrates would pose less (if any) threat to presentism, for there could 
still be plenty of non-propositional truth-bearers—e.g. sentence types, sentence tokens, 
utterances—that truly represent that Socrates was a philosopher.
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153 A view along these lines is defended by Soames (2010).
 To summarize, I have argued that the problem of propositional unity threatens to 
undermine the problem of singular propositions.  So long as friends of singular 
propositions have no good story to tell about the unity of the proposition, foes of 
presentism are in no position to blame presentists for not having the ontological resources 
to support singular propositions—by the lights of the unity problem, neither do the foes.  
This may give presentists temporary reprieve, though, ultimately they must offer a theory 
of truth that can deliver all of the goods, including (but not limited to) truths about such 
merely past individuals as Socrates.
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